دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 Impact of Mantaqa Al-Faraq Theory on General Issues of Contract Law, with a Special Approach to Administrative Contracts تأثیر نظریه منطقة الفراغ بر کلیات حقوق قراردادها با نگاهی خاص به قراردادهای اداری 1 18 87436 10.48308/jlr.2020.184575.1518 FA سیدمصطفی محقق داماد استاد، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران مهدی نیازآبادی استادیار، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شاهد، تهران، ایران (نویسنده مسئول) m_niazabadi@sbu.ac.ir بهاره عرب دانشجوی دکتری، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2019 12 31 One of the issues that has been specifically raised in the modern Usua Al Fiqh and has also been discussed sporadically in its traditional version but has not been the subject of an independent chapter, is the consideration of fixed and variable elements in the inference of rulings (Ahkam) and the method of Ijtihad. If we want to be satisfied with stability in the matter of Ijtihad, the appearances and rulings of Sharia will be isolated from the onslaught of the daily needs of society, and the issues and matters related to the religious in Islamic societies will be left without a solution or answer. Theory of “Mantaqa Al-Faraq” (changeable area) would be considered as one of the parameters of religion flexibility that was introduced by Mohammad Baqir Sadr, under this title, for the first time, regarding the possibility of freedom of government [legislative] intervention in Islamic economy. Mantaqa Al-Faraq is an area that its subjects due to variable and changeable nature, have variable and changeable sutra and rules, so that, God [as the Islamic legislature] refusing to set and codify fixed sutra and rules, delegated the setting and codification the relevant detailed rules, accordance to the benefit and requirements of each period, to the Islamic regnant or governor of that period. So, this area is standing on the opposite side of “fixed area” that its subjects have fixed and unchangeable sutra and rules at any period. The main goal of this article is to examine the criteria of “Mantaqa Al-Faraq” theory and its secondary goals, to reconcile these criteria with the general principles of contract law and a specific type of contract, called administrative contracts. In this article, relying on the descriptive-analytical method and the study of library resources, attempted to first, identify the theory of “Mantaqa Al-Faraq” and its criteria, and secondly, by returning to the sources of contract law and administrative law, while examining the challenging issues in these two areas, by applying the criteria of the “Mantaqa Al-Faraq” theory, to analyze whether these two areas of law are subject to the aforementioned theory and its effects or no? By studying the opinions of Mohammad Baqir Sadr in “Eghtesadona”, three criteria for the area of Mantaqa Al-Faraq can be deduced: First, the area of Mantaqa Al-Faraq governs the relationship between huamn and nature; this type of relationship is changeable and not fixed, due to existence of nature. Second, there are no fixed detailed rules in Sharia law for the area of Mantaqa Al-Faraq. All the subjects and issues are free and not governed by any islamic rule (Hokm). Third, the general rule for the area of Mantaqa Al-Faraq is “permissible” and “Jawaz.” Therefore, the Islamic ruler can prohibit or order any activity or action that is not indicated by a legislative text as obligatory or forbidden. Combining the last three components leads to the clarification and scrutiny of the boundaries of the area of Mantaqa Al-Faraq. Therefore, it can be concluded that firstly, the theory of the Mantaqa Al-Faraq is related to the stage of legislation (caninzation) and not implementation, and secondly, due to the lack of a primary ruling by the legislator in this area, the ruling issued by the ruler is considered the primary ruling, and any issue that meets these three criteria in the present time is interpreted under the scope of Mantaqa Al-Faraq and can be determined by the Islamic ruler according to the requirements of the time and the interests of the day, and is not subject to any immutable principle. Among the issues that can be discussed in terms of inclusion or non-inclusion under this theory is the issue of contract law and a specific type of them under the title of administrative contracts. Among the introduced subjects and issues of Contract Law, some have detailed history of Islamic jurisprudence and the other, because of progress and advancement of science and technology and emerge of human needs, are regarded as new and modern issues and don’t have really detailed history of Islamic jurisprudence. The former one, on the terms of different interpretations, would be included in the fixed area or Mantaqa Al-Faraq and the latter one (like invalidity of unfair terms in contracts, right of withdrawal in distance contracts for consumers and etc), due to the aggregation of Mantaqa Al-Faraq components, would be included in this area. Administrative Contracts as an important and special type of contracts, due to lack of detailed history of Islamic jurisprudence and encompassing all Mantaqa Al-Faraq components, would be included in this area and the authority of setting the rules governing them is delegated to the Islamic regnant or governor. By examining the concept and nature of this type of contract, we find that not only does their essence and essence, but also their causes (the formation of the state in the modern sense and the theories related to it, etc.) have not been examined in Sharia books due to their emergence in recent historical times and it is obvious that there are no express rules to govern them. نظریه «منطقه‌الفراغ» را می‌توان از جمله معیارهای انعطاف‌پذیری شریعت دانست که نخستین بار ذیل همین عنوان توسط شهید محمدباقر صدر درخصوص امکان آزادی مداخله دولت در اقتصاد اسلامی مطرح شد. منطقه‌الفراغ، حوزه‌ای است که موضوعات مشمول آن به‌سبب ماهیت متطور و متغیر خود، متعلق احکام ناثابت قرار می‌گیرد و لذا شارع با خودداری از وضع احکام ثابت در این حوزه، وضع قواعد مربوطه تفصیلی متناسب با مصالح و مقتضیات هر دوره را برعهده حاکم و ولی‌امر اسلامی آن دوره نهاده است. لذا این حوزه در «مقابل منطقه ثابتی» قرار می‌گیرد که موضوعاتِ مشمول آن متعلق احکام ثابت و لایتغیر در تمام ادوار است. ازجمله مسائلی که می‌تواند از حیث شمول یا عدم شمول، ذیل این نظریه مورد بحث قرار گیرد، مبحث حقوق قراردادها و نوع خاصی از آنها تحت عنوان قراردادهای اداری است؛ از مباحثی که ذیل کلیات حقوق قراردادها مطرح شده، دسته‌ای دارای پیشینه مفصل فقهی است و دسته‌ای معلول پیشرفت علوم و فناوری و ایجاد نیازهای بشری، نوین و مستحدثه تلقی شده و دارای پیشینه تفصیلی فقهی نیست. دسته نخست حسب تفاسیر متفاوت می‌تواند ذیل منطقه ثابت یا منطقه‌الفراغ جای گیرد و دسته دوم به جهت تجمیع مؤلفه‌های منطقه‌الفراغ ذیل این حوزه قرار می‌گیرد. قراردادهای اداری نیز به‌عنوان قسم خاص و واجد اهمیتی از قراردادها، به جهت فقدان پیشینه تفصیلی فقهی و واجدیت جمیع مؤلفه‌های منطقه‌الفراغ ذیل این حوزه جای گرفته و لذا اختیار وضع قواعد حاکم بر آنها بر عهده حاکم و ولی امر در حکومت اسلامی است

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_87436_e2e25021d4ac3eaae3768b72ae5f0fe9.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 Jury Institution in Iran with a Look at the Legal Systems of England and France نهاد هیئت منصفه در ایران با نگاهی به نظام حقوقی انگلستان و فرانسه 21 38 105675 10.48308/jlr.2025.233714.2619 FA بابک حبیبی دانشجوی دکتری، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی: واحد تهران مرکزی، تهران، ایران (نویسنده مسئول) habibibabak100@gmail.com 0009-0002-8174-4302 محمد آشوری استاد، دانشکده حقوق، الهیات و علوم‌ سیاسی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی: واحد علوم و تحقیقات، تهران، ایران باقر شاملو دانشیار، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2023 11 06 The role of people and the necessity of their participation within the framework of the judicial system is considered as one of the central and controversial issues in modern criminal law, which can be examined from various legal, social, and political dimensions. Simultaneously by formation of modern criminal law and the development of fair trial theories, the issue of direct or indirect participation of citizens in the judicial process has gained increasing importance. In this regard, the jury institution, as one of the prominent manifestations of popular participation in criminal justice, has always attracted the attention of scholars and legislators and has a history beyond the formation of modern judicial institutions. The presence of a jury in the judicial process, especially in common law legal systems (such as England) and some mixed legal systems (such as France), is considered to be a crystallization of public opinion and a kind of popular guarantee of justice in the trial process. The fundamental basis for the formation of this institution is to create public trust in criminal justice and to confront monopoly and discretionary decision-making in criminal proceedings. By deciding whether the accused is guilty or not, the jury is in fact considered to represent the general conscience of society in a fair trial. A comparative study shows that two general patterns can be distinguished regarding the scope and role of the jury: a minimal pattern that focuses public participation on specific and limited areas, and a maximal pattern that pursues a more active and effective presence of the public in the criminal trial process. In England, as one of the main origins of this institution, the jury has traditionally played a prominent role, especially in major criminal cases. Although in recent decades, changes in law and practice have reduced its scope, and some observers believe that the country is gradually moving towards limiting or even practically eliminating this institution. However, in English legal culture, the jury remains a symbol of popular justice and fair trial. In France, although the institution of the jury was introduced into the country's legal system following England, it gradually adapted to its own legal structure. In the French mixed system, the jury participates alongside the judge in making decisions on specific criminal cases, especially serious crimes. The simultaneous presence of the judge and members of the public in the judging process has been interpreted as a combination of legal rationality and public conscience, which attempts to reduce judicial error on the one hand and strengthen the public's sense of trust in the justice system on the other. In contrast, the Iranian legal system, by adopting a minimal approach, has limited the institution of the jury to press and political crimes only. This, despite the legal capacities in Articles 168 and 175 of the Constitution, has caused the jury to distance itself from its effective role in the country's criminal justice system. On the other hand, the implementation of this institution has also been accompanied by challenges such as the selection of members, insufficient training, lack of transparency in the decision-making mechanism, and public ignorance. Despite the vast potential for enhancing public participation in the judicial process, especially in cases where public trust in the judiciary needs to be restored, the jury institution in Iran remains a formal and ineffective structure. Other problems in the Iranian system include the lack of sufficient cultural support for accepting the role of the public in judging, the lack of basic legal training for jury members, the lack of transparency in the decisions issued, and even the resistance of the traditional body of the judiciary to citizen interference. These challenges, along with the limited scope of jurisdiction of the jury, have prevented this institution from fulfilling its intended role in achieving fair and participatory proceedings. In this article, with a descriptive-analytical approach and using comparative studies, an attempt has been made to examine the historical, cultural, and legal contexts of the formation of the jury in Iran, as well as to identify its strengths and weaknesses. Also, looking at the experiences of England and France, solutions are presented to revive and strengthen this institution as a manifestation of participatory criminal policy. Among these solutions, expanding the jurisdiction of the jury to some important public crimes, increasing general and specialized training for members, reforming executive procedures, strengthening the transparency of the trial process, and promoting a culture of public participation in justice can be mentioned. Finally, the real revival of the jury institution in Iran requires political will, a review of existing laws, and more importantly, an effort to institutionalize the culture of citizen participation in the realization of justice. Only then can this institution be used as a tool to strengthen the legitimacy and efficiency of the judicial system نقش مردم و ضرورت مشارکت آنها در چارچوب نظام دادرسی یکی از موضوعات مهمی است که همزمان با شکل‌گیری حقوق کیفری مدرن از ابعاد نوینی برخوردار شده‌ است. در این راستا، تحولات مربوط به حضور هیئت‌منصفه در فرایند دادرسی، که پیشینه‌ای فراتر از زمان شکل‌گیری حقوق کیفری مدرن دارد، از مصادیق قابل توجه رویکرد مبتنی‌‌بر مشارکت شهروندان در امر دادرسی است. مبنای شکل‌گیری این نهاد، نمایندگی افکار عمومی توسط اعضای آن است که در تلاش است تا هدف استقرار دادرسی منصفانه را درخصوص بزهکاران فراهم آورد. نگاه به الگوهای موجود از این نهاد ما را به دو الگوی کلی، الگوی حداقلی و الگوی حداکثری، رهنمون می‌کند. در این میان، برخی کشورها مانند انگلستان، که از آن به‌عنوان خاستگاه هیئت‌منصفه یاد می‌شود، رویکردی حداکثری را از ابتدای ایجاد این نهاد مدنظر قرار داشته‌اند؛ اگرچه به‌تدریج در این کشور نیز محدودیت‌هایی پیرامون این نهاد در فرایند دادرسی کیفری شکل گرفت؛ به‌نحوی‌که عده‌ای معتقدند که این کشور در مسیر حذف کامل هیئت‌منصفه گام برمی‌دارد. در فرانسه نیز، که این نهاد با الگوبرداری از انگلستان ایجاد شد، هیئت‌منصفه از جایگاه ویژه‌ای در فرایند دادرسی کیفری برخوردار شده‌ است. این درحالی است که نظام حقوقی ایران با پذیرش رویکرد حداقلی، هیئت‌منصفه را صرفاً در جرائم سیاسی و مطبوعاتی و با شرایطی محدود مورد پذیرش قرار داده است. در نوشتار حاضر، با رویکردی توصیفی و تحلیلی، ضمن بررسی ابعاد تاریخی شکل‌گیری نهاد هیئت‌منصفه در ایران، به ارزیابی و در نهایت ارائه راهکارهایی برای تقویت آن به‌عنوان جلوه‌ای از سیاست جنایی مشارکتی با نگاهی به نظام‌های حقوقی کشورهای انگلستان و فرانسه پرداخته می‌شود.

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105675_cca8a1663aacabe3ad05789e07f6651e.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 Analysis of the Legal and Economic Aspects of Money تحلیل ابعادِ حقوقی و اقتصادی پول 39 56 105676 10.48308/jlr.2025.226321.2133 FA عباس کریمی استاد، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران (نویسنده مسئول) abkarimi@ut.ac.ir طاها عرب اسدی دانشجوی دکتری، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران امیر غفاری دانشجوی دکتری، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2022 04 16 There is an inherent connection between money and various dimensions of human social life. This is a connection that is inextricably bound up with various fields of study. In light of this multiple and multidimensional nature of money, a deeper understanding of its nature requires knowledge gained from scientists of various sciences. There are two fields of study that are closely related to money, as it is a fluid and current phenomenon in human social life. The impact of money on the economic life of individuals, on the one hand, and its connection with a large portion of their legal obligations, on the other, make it unquestionable that one must study both of these sciences in order to attain a comprehensive understanding of money. The nature of money is thus analyzed both from a jurist's perspective and from an economist's perspective. This paper examines first the legal status of money and its role in the economy, then its economic functions, and finally its legal characteristics. Considering that economists, with a functional perspective, are only interested in identifying the uses for this medium of exchange, this article reviews three well-known economic functions of money from a new and critical perspective. This paper also provides an explanation and a better identification of the legal characteristics of money, which have been neglected by jurists despite having a significant impact on better understanding the concept of money. This is contrary to the fact that the examination of the specific legal characteristics of negotiable documents, which are less important and less applicable than money, is a well-known and common topic in commercial law. In order to meet the goals of the present paper, the present work has been divided into three main sections. First, a thorough examination of money is provided in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon. In the second section, we will examine the economic functions of money, and in the third and final section, we will discuss its legal characteristics. Analytical-descriptive methodology and library resources are used to write this paper in a comparative manner. Accordingly, while economic sources have been used to analyse and identify the economic functions of money, recourse has also been had to the common law system, particularly the common law of England, for the formulation of its legal attributes. The most significant finding of this article is the emphasis on the multifaceted nature of money and the need to have a broad perspective on it. For the legal characteristics of money to be identified, its economic functions must be identified, and in order to achieve the economic functions of money, the legal concept of money must be thoroughly examined. Thus, since the most important function of customary law is to organize existing customary and practical practices to understand these characteristics, one must gain a general understanding of the economic functions of money as its practical reality, so that the legal characteristics of money can be revised to serve such functions. In contrast, recognizing the nature and legal status of money is also essential to understand the practical functions of money. A key finding of the present study is the importance of understanding this hierarchy, which can lay the groundwork for future legal research on money. Another significant point is that this study undertakes, for the first time, the identification of the legal attributes of money in its absolute sense, independently of its incorporation into any debt or obligation. In other words, the authors have sought to examine these attributes as the inherent legal characteristics of money itself, whereas previous scholarship had addressed only certain aspects; such as whether money is fungible (mithlī) or non-fungible (qīmī), and even then, only with the aim of determining whether a debtor, in discharging their obligation, must deliver the same money (numerical value) or its equivalent purchasing power. Apart from the fact that jurists have invented concepts such as mithlī or qīmī for another purpose (compensation for damages) and cannot be used with the same meaning regarding money; also, apart from the fact that money itself is a price, it cannot have a price. Fundamentally, the answer to such questions must be sought within the framework of the rules governing the monetary obligations, not in the sphere of the legal attributes of money qua money. Conflating these two separate matters not only fails to advance the depth of legal understanding in this field, but also leads to further complexity of legal discourse concerning money. The authors of this paper aim to provide an answer to the following question: What is the nature of money? As part of their analyses of this multifaceted institution, researchers have attempted to reinstate the concept of debt as well as analyze the other elements comprising this institution, including the debtor's Zemma (a fictional repository for monetary obligations), the role of custom, and finally the element of non-collectibility, as a basis and substructure for subsequent discussions describing its economic functions and legal characteristics. In addition to providing a legal basis for its theory by considering money as a credit, this view, regarding the economic power of the debtor of this establishment, and respecting public acceptance as a factor that gives objectivity to this abstract concept, has not neglected the role and position of other sciences, including economics, in the analysis of this complex human phenomenon. Another conclusion reached in this article is that the legal attributes of money must be examined in an abstract sense, separate from the fact that it may be the subject of any debt or obligation. Conversely, such attributes cannot be discerned without a priori understanding of the economic functions of money. In other words, the function of modern law is to identify existing customary practices, to amend them where necessary, and thereafter to refine them into legal rules. In the case of money, its economic functions are precisely its customary functions. Accordingly, once the economic functions of money have been identified, its legal attributes will be understood in a manner consistent therewith. For instance, the attribute of abstraction in money wholly serves its economic function as a medium of exchange. Since money, as an instrument of exchange, is in constant circulation, the law recognises this function through the attribute referred to as its abstract nature. Consequently, whenever a person, acting in good faith and within the framework of an economic exchange, acquires money in pursuit of this function, the law will afford them protection; even against a prior owner from whom the money had been stolen. امروزه، پول تشکیل‌دهنده موضوع بسیاری از تعهدات حقوقی است. همین امر، ضرورتِ بررسی ماهیت آن، برای فهم بهتر این بخش از تعهدات را بیش‌ازپیش نمایان می‌کند. به همین دلیل، این مقاله در کنار داشتن نگاهی نوین به کارکردهای اقتصادی پول از یک سو، و پیرایش و سامان‌ دادن به اوصاف حقوقی این ابزار پرکاربرد اجتماعی برای نخستین ‌بار ازسویی دیگر، به‌دنبال یافتن پاسخ این پرسش اصلی است که ماهیت پول چیست؟ در تحلیل ماهیت این نهاد چندوجهی، پژوهندگان تلاش کرده‌اند تا با بازگرداندن مفهوم طلب به این نهاد و واکاوی دیگر عناصر سازنده آن، از جمله ذمة قدرتمند بدهکار، جعل عرف و نهایتاً عنصر عدم قابلیت وصول، شالوده و زیربنایی برای مباحث بعدی در تبیین کارکردهای اقتصادی و اوصاف حقوقی آن، به‌دست آورند. این دیدگاه علاوه‌بر آنکه به‌سبب اعتباری‌ دانستن پول، بنیادی حقوقی برای نظریه خود ارائه می‌دهد، با نظر به توان اقتصادی بدهکار این تأسیس و احترام به پذیرش عمومی به‌عنوان عامل عینیت‌بخش به این مفهوم مجرد، از نقش و جایگاه دیگر علوم از جمله اقتصاد نیز در تحلیل این پدیده پیچیده بشری غافل نمانده ‌است. درنتیجه، در این مقاله، پس از بررسی ماهیت پول، کارکردهای اقتصادی و سپس اوصاف حقوقی آن مورد ارزیابی قرار گرفته‌اند.

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105676_6d3aa3fab26f6c012db147056796520c.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 The Balance of "Benefit and Harm" As a Basis for Individual Autonomy Violations During Health Crises موازنه ی"نفع و ضرر" مبنای نقض استقلال فردی در زمان بحران های بهداشتی 57 72 105743 10.48308/jlr.2025.234378.2653 FA حسن محسنی دانشگاه تهران - دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی - گروه حقوق خصوصی ندا همکانمراد کارشناس ارشد، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2024 01 17 A correct understanding of the necessity and principles of enacting any law is a prerequisite for correct legislation. Elucidating and clarifying the principles and philosophy of enacting regulations, not only delineates their legal validity and substantive richness but also fosters broader public acceptance of those regulations. Therefore, the study and investigation of the theoretical and intellectual foundations from which legal doctrine and regulations have gained their validity can be one of the main areas of research. The principle of full protection of individual autonomy is sometimes violated due to expediency, including in situations where health crises occur and public health is threatened. The main subject of this research is on what legal reasoning, based on what criteria, and to what extent, legal logic tolerates and can consider it permissible to violate the individual autonomy. In conducting this research, library and online sources beside analysis of collected data were used. While accepting full support for individual autonomy as a fundamental principle, several philosophical theories, while addressing the prioritization of human individuality preservation, have recognized the occurrence of harm to others as a factor in prescribing the violation of this principle. Most of the theories presented in this study believe that although there is always a degree of benefit and harm in every social action and reaction, in general, the benefit of individuals is marginalized where it involves harm to others, and legal mechanisms allow to limit their independence in order to ensure the collective benefit. In times of health crises, governments are forced to take measures such as compulsory vaccination, quarantine, and travel restrictions in order to control and improve the health of society, which conflict with the individual autonomy and the freedom to choose whether to accept or reject these measures. The main focus of this research is on why and how these restrictions are imposed from a legal perspective, and on what basis and justification governments and legislative authorities are able to violate the most fundamental human right, namely their independence. Concentrating on the balance of "Benefit and Harm" as a turning point and a basis for the possibility of imposing restrictions on individual freedom, this article proposes and examines theories that are capable of providing a logical response to such conflicts and will be used in a legal context in order to provide a scale for accepting the possibility of violating individuals autonomy and government intervention in their autonomy in the context of the spread of widespread diseases. Accordingly, this important question has been answered: whether the concept of benefit and harm and establishing a balance between these two can be an acceptable basis for imposing and applying restrictions on individual autonomy? The principles that have been examined in this study to accept the possibility of imposing restrictions on individual autonomy during health crises include: first, harm prevention has been explained in the form of three theories: the Harm Principle (John Stuart Mill), Negative Liberty (Isaiah Berlin), and the "La Zarar" rule (jurisprudential rule). Despite the different perspectives of each of these theories, the need to avoid harm to individuals is a major obstacle to individual freedom. This view is also supported by even the most ardent defenders of individual freedom. Incidentally, preventing harm to others is essential to ensure the freedom of all. Second: the theory of Patriarchy; According to this theory, the government, as a representative of society, has the authority to make decisions on behalf of the individuals in society, taking into account their interests and aiming harm prevention, and effectively replacing their freedom and will. Third, the right to health is a multi-layered concept consisting of different levels, which can balance its various functions and effects. The fourth theory of public interest includes the theory of Social Dilemma (Robin Dawes), which, using this psychological model, can be used to introduce a basis for preferring collective interest over individual personal interest, meaning that securing collective interest is equal to securing the interest of all individuals, and also the General Will (Jean-Jacques Rousseau), in which everyone, by obeying the law that expresses the general will, follows his own reason and his true will, and following his own reason and will means being free, which ultimately leads the authors to believe that the only factor which can limit the independence and freedom of individuals and their interests is preventing harm to others or attracting a general benefit. Thus, the balance between benefit and harm, that is, sacrificing the individual interest in exchange for preventing harm or attracting a collective benefit, is the same balance point that governments must adhere to balance the conflict between the rights of individuals and have permission to violate the independence of individuals. Therefore, it can be concluded that any factor that prevents the establishment of a balance between the benefit of exercising individual autonomy and the harm resulting from restricting it, and in return, the harm resulting from exercising individual autonomy for society and the benefit resulting from imposing restrictions for society, in fact means that the violation of individual autonomy and independence lacks legal justification, and this thin line must be carefully drawn to achieve a point of equilibrium and balance between benefit and harm in a legal context قواعد و اصول حقوقی ضرورتاً مبتنی‌بر یک نظام فکری و فلسفی، صرف‌نظر از خصوصیت‌های نظام‌های حقوقی و قانونی شکل می‌گیرند و منطق حقوقی و همچنین عقل متعارف مبتنی‌بر همان زمینه‌های فکری و فلسفی آنها را می‌پذیرد. بنابراین مطالعه و بررسی مبانی و زمینه‌های پدیده‌های حقوقی می‌تواند یکی از مهم‌ترین حوزه‌های پژوهش‌های حقوقی را به خود اختصاص دهد. اگر بپذیریم که نظام‌های حقوقی باید وضع محدودیت بر استقلال فردی را در زمان بحران‌های بهداشتی در جهت حفظ سلامت و نظم عمومی قانونی‌سازی کنند، لازم است مبانی نظری و فلسفی پذیرش این ضرورت مورد مطالعه و تبیین قرار گیرد. بنابراین در مقاله حاضر به محوریت موازنه‌ «نفع و ضرر» به‌عنوان یکی از اصلی‌ترین مبانی پذیرش وضع محدودیت بر استقلال فردی در شرایط مورد مطالعه پرداخته خواهد شد که اثبات می‌کند مبنای نقض استقلال افراد در مواجهه با بحران‌ها جلب نفع عمومی و دفع ضرر جمعی است؛ به این معنا که آنچه نظام‌های حقوقی را مجبور به پذیرش تحدید استقلال فردی می‌کند، همواره دفع ضرر یا جلب منفعتی بزرگ‌تر از رعایت استقلال فردی براساس منطق حقوقی است؛ ضمن آنکه هر نفعی همواره با میزانی از ضرر همراه است و نقطه تعادل میان این دو همان جایی است که ورود به استقلال افراد را موجه می‌کند.

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105743_9e09a1f0fe53c6d811157bcca12b0957.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 Legal Analysis of Joint Work in the Software Industry with a Comparative View تحلیل حقوقی اثر مشترک در صنعت نرم‌افزار با نگاه تطبیقی 73 90 106063 10.48308/jlr.2025.237289.2793 FA پرویز ساورایی دانشیار، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران p-savrai@sbu.ac.ir 0009-0001-4267-7621 Journal Article 2024 10 19 Computer programs are often written by a team of software programmers, the classic example being program code written by two or more programmers, each of whom incorporates ideas, expressions, text and editorial changes into the source code or binary code. In such a situation, the rights arising from the jointly produced program will generally belong to the authors. The conditions and consequences of ownership and especially the instances of a joint work, in the case of software, are not very clear and may differ from country to country. Understanding the criteria and requirements of a joint work is very important both for authors and for those who wish to explore the complexities and legal ambiguities surrounding it. In this article, the conditions of the joint work in software and the key requirements for its realization, including the common intention of the parties, inseparability and significant contribution in the creative expression of the joint work in the software industry and its examples and the cases that are not considered joint works in the legal sense, have been discussed. This article, highlights the importance of coding in the realization of a joint work in a computer program and clarifies that activities such as participating in training, editing, research assistance, expressing ideas, suggestions, recommendations, interviews, cooperation in software testing and contribution to the main content of the software, are generally not considered as contribution in software creation. Some of the questions that arise in connection with these complexities and ambiguities include: What are the key conditions and requirements for realizing a joint work? Are these requirements the same in all legal systems? What I have tried to answer in this article is the important question of how are examples of collaboration in the software industry realized? This question raises two other questions: Has the alleged co-author made a creative contribution that represents his or her own originality? What should the nature of this contribution be? Although we are faced with legal gaps and weak legal literature in the Iranian legal system, we can answer the aforementioned questions by interpreting existing legal rules and principles and using accepted standards and experiences of other countries, especially their case law. In answering the above questions, the author has tried to use the comparative method and compare the regulations of the legal systems and case law of countries. From the above comparative discussions, I have found out that in order to enjoy the protection provisions of copyright in a joint work, the contributions of the creators must go beyond the mere expression of ideas. The contribution must be such that the main ideas, algorithms and instructions are embodied in the form of computer codes. The work is considered a joint work, when it generally meets these key requirements: 1- The creation of a joint work must be based on objective and legal facts, implying the mutual intentions of the parties. 2- The contributions of the creators must be intertwined and inseparable, otherwise, the joint work will generally not be achieved (with the exception of France). 3- Although the contributions do not have to be the same in terms of "quantity and quality", in order to fulfill the criterion of originality, the contribution of each creator must be significant and creative. Considering the importance of coding in software collaboration, the following actions will not lead to the realization of a joint work: First, mere training, guidance, negotiation, and interviewing are not sufficient to achieve a joint work. Secondly, in cases where the contribution is merely in the form of expressing ideas or suggestions and the author is free to accept or reject them, this does not grant the contributor, the right to be considered as a co-creator. Without assistance in structuring the computer program, ideas, suggestions, and recommendations, no matter how useful they are, do not lead to the realization of a joint work. If the activity of only one contributor leads to the production of a creative work, the role of another may be reduced to the level of an editor or scribe. Thirdly, actions such as technical, advisory, organizational or financial assistance, supervision and facilitation of official registration of the program, due to the lack of creative contribution, are not considered contribution in the creation of a software work. To achieve the objectives of this article, the issues in question have been discussed in two sections with a comparative perspective. The first section is dedicated to explaining the concept of a joint work and the importance of its general elements, including common intention, inseparability, and significant contribution in the creative expression of the work. In the second section, the fundamental role and importance of coding in the creation of a joint work, the complexities of identifying creators and cases where participation is not considered legal are discussed. اثر مشترک شکلی از همکاری است که در آن دو یا چند نفر در ایجاد اثر واحد مشارکت داشته باشند و مشارکت آنها درهم تنیده، غیرقابل‌تفکیک، اصیل و قابل‌توجه باشد؛ مانند نگارش کتاب یا مقاله تحقیقاتی، نگارش نت‌های موسیقی یا کدهای نرم‌افزاری. پدیدآورندگان مشترک در مالکیت اثر و حقوق مرتبط با آن، مانند حق تکثیر، توزیع، اجرا، یا اقتباس اثر، مشترک‌اند. بااین‌حال، اثر مشترک همچنین مسئولیت‌ها و تعهدات خاصی مانند وظیفه حسابرسی، وظیفه وفاداری و وظیفه مراقبت را برای مؤلفین مشترک به همراه دارد. در این مقاله به شرایط اثر مشترک در نرم‌افزار و الزامات کلیدی تحقق آن ازجمله قصد مشترک طرفین، تفکیک‌ناپذیری و مشارکت قابل‌توجه در بیان خلاقانه اثر و مصادیق آن در صنعت نرم‌افزار و مواردی را، که به معنای حقوقی، مشارکت محسوب نمی‌شوند، پرداخته شده است. در نهایت، این مقاله اهمیت کدنویسی در تحقق اثر مشترک در برنامه رایانه‌ای را مطرح و روشن می‌کند که فعالیت‌هایی ازجمله مشارکت در امر آموزش، ویراستاری، دستیاری در امر پژوهشی، ابراز ایده‌ها، پیشنهادها، توصیه‌ها، مصاحبه‌ها، مشارکت در تست نرم‌افزار و کمک به محتوای اصلی نرم‌افزار عموماً به خودی‌خود و به معنای مشارکت در خلق نرم‌افزار تلقی نمی‌شوند.

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_106063_ce21dfd61c40646c42be7a24a4e2fe19.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 The Legal Impact of Revolutions on the Modern Concept of Law: A Legal Study of the Philosophy and History of the Revolution Focusing on French, British and American Revolutions( تاثیر حقوقی انقلاب بر مفهوم قانون(مطالعه‌ی حقوقی فلسفه و تاریخ انقلاب با تمرکز بر انقلاب‌های فرانسه، انگلستان، آمریکا) 91 108 104108 10.48308/jlr.2023.227757.2240 FA امین صدیقی نیشابور دانشجوی دکتری، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران (نویسنده مسئول) amin3dighi@gmail.com محمد جلالی استادیار، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران اسدالله یاوری دانشیار، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2022 06 26 The main issue in this article is to examine the historical and philosophical impact of revolution on the modern concept of law. To historically examine this topic, the characteristics of revolutions in England, France, and the United States have been considered and philosophically, the ideas of thinkers from both the natural law and legal positivism approaches in this field have been studied. However, due to the historical nature of the subject, differences in the revolutionary structure are observed, according to the characteristics of each period and country. As a result, the outcomes of each revolution have also been different. However, at the same time, they have led to structures, institutions, and a system of universal reactions, and have influenced each other. The debate over revolution remains intense today, and revolutionary approaches worldside are undergoing transformation, reconstruction, and sometimes repetition. One of the recent revolutionary centers has been the Middle East, which has led to many discussions. These revolutions necessitate a re-examination of the classical approach to revolution in leading revolutionary countries like England, France, and the United States, which created new concepts in constitutional law and achieved relative stability. The English, French, and American revolutions were not only effective in these three countries; they have generally cast a shadow over revolutionary procedures and the entire world, and the impact of each of them was not limited to the geographical territory of that country and the time of its occurrence. The issue of legalism and anti-legalism at the heart of revolutions became one of the main issues for societies undergoing the modernization process. The desecration of the law, due to its fundamental change in nature caused by the revolutionary situation, led to serious discussions about the nature of law. In this regard, the connection between history, philosophy of law, legal thinkers, and legal activists in society is important. From Hobbes to Kant and Hegel, and from Cromwell to Robespierre and the American founding fathers, and many people who were killed in this path and those who resisted on the opposing front, all of them are part of the identity of the revolution in the face of the law, in the creation of law, and in the preservation of law. The interaction of idealism and reality, as well as dynamism and stability during a revolution, place revolutionary leaders on a difficult path. They must either insist on the mistakes of the past and make an effective change to build a proportional and exemplary system, or, on the contrary, expand the scope of instability. The system of classical revolutions in England, France, and the United States has many lessons within it, which led to the birth and development of the concept of constitutional law. This is a structure of thought that made the transition from command to law possible and broke the idolization of the law and the absolute obedience of its adherents. In fact, although revolution has an anti-law appearance, it becomes one of the main causes for the creation of the modern concept of law. This is because human society is in need of change at certain historical junctures, and what change can be more expressive and foundational than a revolution? Revolution creates hope and fear in different periods without a definite outcome being clear. This hope and fear are not only for the holders of power and thought but also belong to all the people of that land. The unintended consequences of revolution have both dark and bright sides, and it cannot be definitily condemned or praised. As in the system of the English and French revolutions, the sinusoidal relationship between legal, political, and social variables saw substantial fluctuations and went through many turbulences to reach the recent concept of social order, rights, and law. In both countries, the system of government alternated between republic and monarchy, but in the end, it created historical points of convergence for themselves and for other countries in the world. While, the American Revolution did not experience these fluctuations due to its unique conditions and brilliant leadership. It is noteworthy that from a philosophical perspective, issues such as the choice of voluntarism or order-based structuralism are among the key issues for understanding the two philosophical approaches of legal positivism and natural law. Also, the objectivist perception of legal positivism regarding law is one of the issues discussed in the present article. The research method of this study can be considered analytical, descriptive, and, in general, the approach of the article can be considered macro-perspective. The achievement of this research, on the one hand, is the identification of revolution as a key concept in constitutional law. On the other hand, it is the overcoming of the rigidity governing the interpretation and understanding of the law, with the help of a philosophical and historical reexamination and analysis of revolution, as one of the most intricate and central historical disputes reflected in the philosophy of law. The research conclusion clarifies that, in revolution, natural law has achieved a practical and theoretical superiority over legal positivism. Although it might be more accurate to say that legal positivism and the theory of natural law have moved side by side, and it is difficult to imagine that only one of these two theories would take absolute control over law. Today, the evolution of many legal concepts, including the law, is the result of a struggle that thinkers and progressives have been waging for many years in the trenches of natural law and legal positivism by being in the heart of historical objectivity مسئله اصلی در این مقاله، بررسی تأثیر تاریخی و فلسفی انقلاب بر مفهوم نوین قانون است. برای بررسی تاریخی این موضوع به ویژگی‌هایِ انقلاب در کشورهای انگلستان، فرانسه و امریکا توجه شده و از نظر فلسفی، آرای اندیشمندانِ دو رویکردِ حقوق طبیعی و اثبات‌گرایی حقوقی در این زمینه بررسی شده ‌است. دراین‌باره، مسائلی از جمله انتخاب اراده‌گرایی یا ساختارگراییِ مبتنی‌بر نظم، جزوِ مسائلِ کلیدیِ فهمِ این دو رویکردِ فلسفیِ حقوق است. همچنین تلقی عینیت‌گرایانه اثبات‌گرایی حقوقی نسبت به قانون، از مسائل مورد بحث در مقاله حاضر است. روشِ پژوهشِ حاضر را می‌توان تحلیلی، توصیفی و در مجموع، رویکرد مقاله را کلان‌نگر دانست. دستاورد این پژوهش، از طرفی، شناسایی انقلاب به‌عنوان مفهومی کلیدی در حقوق اساسی بود و از طرف دیگر، عبور از جماد حاکم بر تفسیر و شناخت قانون، به مدد بازخوانی و تحلیل فلسفی و تاریخی انقلاب، به‌عنوان یکی از بغرنج‌ترین و درعین‌حال، محوری‌ترین منازعه‌های تاریخی که در فلسفه حقوق منعکس شده ‌است. آنچه در نتیجه‌گیری این پژوهش آمده است، روشن می‌کند که در موضوع انقلاب، حقوق طبیعی به تفوقِ عملی و نظری نسبت به اثبات گرایی حقوقی دست یافته‌ است.

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_104108_a94d46d23f2edd3929ef0bac0fec7e2f.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 The Legal jurisprudence of the buyer s right Adverse transaction in purchasing contracts which are contingent upon possession Right condition وضعیت فقهی حقوقی معاملات معارض حق مشتری در بیع متضمن شرط حفظ مالکیت 109 124 104753 10.48308/jlr.2024.234018.2640 FA جواد نیک نژاد دانشیار، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی: واحد تهران غرب، تهران، ایران (نویسنده مسئول) j.niknejad@yahoo.com علی اکبر نادری سمیرمی کارشناس ارشد، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی: واحد قائم‌شهر، قائم‌شهر، ایران Journal Article 2023 12 18 The contract of sale is among the most frequently used agreements in society. In Irsn's legal system and under Imamiyyah jurisprudence, lack of legal parity exists between the rights of the seller and those of the buyer. Due to the proprietary nature of sale, ownership of the subject matter transfers to the buyer immediately upon formation of the contract, enabling the buyer to exercise both legal and material powers of disposition, including subsequent sale to a third party, even if not a portion of the price has been paid. The seller’s recourse to remedies such as the right of retention or the option for rescission due to late payment is limited to cases where the sale is unconditional and no specific deadline for payment has been stipulated. However, in most real-world transactions, payment is not immediate or in cash, which may result in the seller being deprived of his entitlement or facing significant difficulty in its recovery. The seller may be compelled to initiate legal action against the buyer, which—even if resulting in a favorable judgment—may be rendered ineffective due to the buyer’s insolvency or bankruptcy. To address this legal imbalance, parties often incorporate contractual clauses aimed at safeguarding the seller’s position. One such provision is the retention of title clause, under which the seller stipulates that ownership shall not pass to the buyer until the full purchase price is paid. The key legal question arises as to the validity of any conflicting transaction entered into by the seller with regard to the subject matter prior to satisfaction of the condition. A definitive answer to this question requires a clear analysis of the legal nature of the retention of title clause. Three prevailing views exist among jurists: one considers such a clause to render the sale contract suspended, whereby ownership remains with the seller until the condition is fulfilled. Another treats it as a resolutory condition, where title passes upon formation of the contract but the failure to pay terminates the agreement forcibly. Some scholars regard a sale with a reservation of title (retained ownership) as a type of sale in which the subject matter is pledged by the seller. Obviously, in the latter two scenarios, since upon the conclusion of the sale the buyer becomes the owner of the goods, the sale of the aforementioned goods by the seller to a third party after the sale constitutes a case of unauthorized transaction. However, if the sale with a conditional validity—keeping ownership reserved—is accepted, some jurists argue that such sale lacks effect by the seller. The finding of this research is that the sale including the condition of retention of ownership is of a suspended nature, therefore, by the conclusion of this sale, the sold item remains in the seller's ownership, but due to the customer's right to the transaction, the sold item is not unconditional, consequently, a transaction concluded by the seller faces an obstacle due to the fact that the sold item is not unconditional, the said obstacle is the customer's objective right to the sold item, the legal status of a transaction that faces an obstacle is controversial in Iranian law and Imami jurisprudence, most jurists and lawyers do not distinguish between unathourized transaction and contract under duress which are unenforced and transactions that face the obstacle of a third party's right; Some Imami jurists and lawyers have distinguished between unenforced transactions and transactions that face an obstacle. In suspended transactions, such as unathourized transaction and contract under duress, the contract is voidable due to the lack of a part of the necessary requirements, but in transactions facing an obstacle, the contract is not problematic in terms of necessary requirements, rather the necessary tequirement of the contract exists, but the obstacle also exists. Transactions that face obstacles are in the status of a morae’i (considerate contract) from the perspective of this group of jurists and lawyers. A morae’i transaction (considerate contract) is a valid transaction whose survival is at risk of being annulled, so on the contrary, contract has legal effects during the so-called waiting period for the removal of the obstacle (before determining the obligation of the third party’s right), but if the right is exercised by a third party, it is annulled from the same date. On the other hand, another difference between a suspended and a considerate contract (mora’ei transaction) is that a suspended transaction is invalidated if rejected, but a considerate contract (mora’ei transaction) is not invalidated if the transaction is rejected by a third party (the owner of the right), but rather, the problem of the aforementioned contract is completely resolved due to the disappearance of the obstacle. The result of this research is that transactions contradicting the customer’s right in a sale that include a condition for maintaining ownership are in the status of a mora’ei, this sale is properly formed and has legal effects, if the price is settled by the customer, the said sale is annulled from the same date, but if the customer does not settle the price due to the disappearance of the obstacle, the mora’ei contract continues to be valid without any problems. بیع یکی از کاربردی‌ترین عقود در جامعه است. به‌علت عدم تعادل کفه ترازوی حمایت قانونی میان حقوق بایع و مشتری، طرفین در عقد بیع شروطی را جهت جبران این عدم تعادل پیش‌بینی می‌کنند. یکی از این شروط شرط حفظ مالکیت است که درصدد حمایت از حقوق بایع است، سؤالی که دراین‌خصوص پاسخ به آن از اهمیت بسیاری برخوردار است این است که قبل از تحقق شرط (پرداخت ثمن) چنانچه معامله‌ای معارض با شرط مذکور ازسوی بایع نسبت به مبیع صورت گیرد، وضعیت حقوقی معامله مذکور چیست؟ عده‌ای از حقوق‌دانان قائل به عدم نفوذ معامله مذکورند. فرضیه ما این است که در فرض مذکور معامله معارض در وضعیت مراعی قرار دارد؛ زیرا با درج شرط مذکور و ازآنجایی‌که ماهیت حقوقی شرط مذکور نوعی تعلیق انتقال مالکیت مبیع است، حقی که برای مشتری ایجاد می‌شود حق عینی است و انجام معامله معارض توسط بایع قبل از تحقق معلق‌علیه باعث این می‌شود که معامله معارض به‌علت وجود مانع (تعلق حق عینی برای مشتری نسبت به مبیع) در وضعیت مراعی باشد. در وضعیت مراعی تعیین وضعیت حقوقی دقیق معامله مجهول است تا اینکه تحقق یا عدم تحقق معلق‌علیه مشخص شود. درصورت پرداخت ثمن توسط مشتری معامله معارض از همان تاریخ منفسخ می‌شود و درصورت عدم پرداخت ثمن توسط مشتری کشف می‌شود معامله معارض صحیح بوده است.

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_104753_0f346b1c6370b8a8ba801d14117c520a.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 Economic Critique of Penalty Clauses and the Necessity of Reforming Article 230 of the Iranian Civil Code نقد اقتصادی شرط کیفری و لزوم تجدیدنظر در ماده 230 ق.م 125 142 104635 10.48308/jlr.2024.230749.2457 FA وحید فقیهی محمدی دانشجوی دکتری، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران (نویسنده مسئول) vfmlawyer@gmail.com غلامعلی سیفی زیناب استادیار، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران علیرضا عالی پناه استادیار، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2024 01 26 In contractual agreements, parties commonly include a liquidated damages clause, under which a predetermined amount is to be paid in the event of a breach. Liquidated damages represents the parties’ mutual agreement to ensure the performance of obligations. One of its advantages is that in order to claim damages, there is no need to prove actual harm or establish causality between the wrongful act and the resulting damage. Such features encourage the parties to include this clause and make it a popular tool in contracts, especially in cases where there is a possibility of breach of obligation or the impossibility of proving actual damages in practice. However, it is necessary to question whether the absolute and unconditional enforcement of this clause is always logical, fair and economical. Article 230 of the Civil Code states: “If it is stipulated in a contract that in case of breach the breaching party shall pay a certain sum as compensation, the judge may not award more or less than that amount.” In other words, the amount agreed upon between the parties (liquidated damages) is recognized as the final and enforceable damages and the court cannot adjust or change it. According to the aforementioned article, the arbitrator or judge is obliged to use the same amount as the criterion and refrain from violating the provisions of the contractual clause. However, in some cases, the absolute implementation of this rule in practice may lead to unfair and unjust results, especially when the economic, social, or even personal circumstances of one of the parties have changed after the conclusion of the contract. In contrast, in common law systems such as England, an excessive penalty clause is not enforceable. English courts do not automatically accept the parties’ agreement; if the stipulated amount significantly exceeds the estimated actual loss, the clause is considered a penalty clause and declared unenforceable. In English law, the principle is that of actual and reasonable compensation for damages, not punishment for the breaching party. Therefore, judges distinguish between a “reasonable lump sum” and a “penalty clause” and consider a penal clause to be valid only if it is justified in economic and equitable terms. In other words, penalty clauses are not enforceable in English law unless they are reasonably related to anticipated loss, rather than merely designed to punish or intimidate the breaching party. In law and economics literature, the classical view is that the penalty clause hinders the efficiency of the market and contracts. Classical economists believe that after the conclusion of the contract, conditions may arise in which the performance of the obligation is more costly for the obligor than its benefit. In such scenarios, breaching the contract while paying fair compensation - known as efficient breach- can yield better results for all parties and society. However, excessive penalty clauses distort this mechanism by reducing the incentive to pursue economically beneficial breaches. They also hinder optimal resource reallocation and may force performance in situations where breach would be more efficient outcome for the society. However, recent analyses in economic law indicate that a penalty clause is not necessarily always detrimental to efficiency and may even be beneficial in some cases. From this perspective, a clear fixed amount for breach can operate as a pre-arranged option that enhances transparency and predictability in contractual relationships. In this case, the parties know from the outset what amount they will receive in the event of a breach and can better adjust their economic decisions. Some studies show that a penalty clause can also facilitate efficient breach; on the one hand, the need to file a lawsuit in court to determine the amount of damage is reduced from this perspective and, on the other hand, as a deterrent, it forces the obligor to pursue long-term interests and perform obligations on time. Such a clause can also be considered an alternative to an insurance contract. Despite the aforementioned benefits, an exorbitant penalty clause should not be enforced unconditionally. The contemporary approach of legal scholars is that a penalty clause must have a “reasonable economic role” in the contract. If the opposite is proven (i.e. if it is found that the parties imposed the onerous condition solely as a punishment or unfair pressure), its implementation is unacceptable. It is also necessary to distinguish between the terms of supplementary contracts and contracts concluded through fair negotiation. In summary, it can be acknowledged that although the obligation is a useful tool for ensuring the performance of contractual obligations, the absolute implementation of an excessive penalty clause does not necessarily lead to justice and economic efficiency. From the perspective of modern economic law, a penalty clause can be constructive when it is applied in the contract with a clear economic purpose; otherwise, it should be viewed with greater consideration and, in necessary cases, the possibility of adjusting the clause should be provided. Accordingly, it seems necessary to revise article 230 of the Iranian Civil Code so that in the cases of excess and unfairness, the court can adjust the amount of the penalty clause and reduce its unfair consequences, without questioning the principle of partis' autonomy in the entire contract. مزایای غیرقابل‌انکار وجه التزام، ازجمله عدم نیاز به اثبات ورود خسارت و رابطه سببیت میان فعل زیان‌بار و ضرر وارده، متعاملین را به درج چنین شرطی ترغیب می‌کند. ماده 230 قانون مدنی، که انصراف به موضوع وجه التزام دارد، مقرر داشته است: «اگر در ضمن معامله شرط شده باشد که در صورت تخلف متخلف مبلغی را به‌عنوان خسارت تأدیه نماید، حاکم نمی‌تواند او را به بیشتر یا کمتر از آنچه که ملزم شده‌ است محکوم نماید.» نص فوق چنین به ذهن متبادر می‌کند که وجه التزام، هرچند گزاف، لازم‌الاتباع است. درحالی‌که در حقوق کشور انگلستان وجه التزام گزاف که از آن به‌شرط کیفری تعبیر می‌شود، برخلاف شرط خسارت مقطوع، لازم‌الاجرا نبوده است؛ زیرا مطابق تحلیل کلاسیک اندیشمندان اقتصادی، شرط کیفری مانع تحقق کارایی و نقض کارآمد قرارداد می‌شود. بااین‌حال در تحلیل نوین نهاد مزبور، چنین شرطی نه‌تنها مانع تحقق کارایی نبوده، بلکه عاملی برای تسهیل نقض کارآمد قرارداد است. مطابق خوانش جدید، شرط صرفاً در مواردی که نقش اقتصادی خاصی در قرارداد ایفا نکرده و غیرمنصفانه است، نباید معتبر شمرده شود. در پژوهش حاضر سعی بر آن است که با نگاهی تطبیقی و از طریق پیشنهاد بازنگری در ماده 230 قانون مدنی، رویکرد پیش‌گفته لحاظ شود و اعتبار شرط وجه التزام گزاف، در فرضی که نقش اقتصادی خاصی ایفا نمی‌کند و وجود آن در قرارداد غیرمنصفانه است، بررسی شود.

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_104635_0d2e324c98906b106d3bca60fa8cbc09.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 Components of the New Approach to the Role of the Judge of Execution of Criminal Sentences مؤلفه های رویکرد نوین به جایگاه قاضی اجرای احکام کیفری 143 158 105093 10.48308/jlr.2024.230291.2430 FA محمدمهدی ساقیان استادیار، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران معرفت نجفی دانشجوی دکتری، دانشکده حقوق، الهیات و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی: واحد قشم، قشم، ایران (نویسنده مسئول) marefatnajafi@yahoo.com Journal Article 2023 01 17 Punishment and its execution have consistently stood as some of the most complex and controversial aspects of criminal justice throughout the evolution of criminal law. From early legal systems to modern frameworks, the enforcement of penalties has always raised numerous philosophical, legal, and practical questions. In contemporary criminal law, punishment is not merely a final outcome of the judicial process but is recognized as one of the most critical phases in the broader criminal justice system. It is no longer seen as a purely administrative follow-up after the sentencing, but as an integral part of the criminal proceedings. In practice, the implementation phase represents the point at which the coordinated efforts of various components of the criminal justice system— including law enforcement, judiciary, correctional institutions, and other actors—converge to enforce the punishment on the convicted individual. This stage not only involves the execution of a court order but also reflects broader societal objectives, including deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and the protection of public interests. Moreover, the execution stage directly affects the rights and dignity of the convict as well as the interests of victims and society. Given this importance, the execution of criminal sentences has increasingly become a focus of scholarly debate and legislative reform. Modern trends emphasize that this phase should not be purely mechanical or punitive; rather, it must be humane, individualized, and oriented toward the long-term goals of social reintegration. The humanization of punishment is a growing theme in comparative criminal law, highlighting that punishment serves its purpose best when it contributes to preventing reoffending and restoring social order, not merely causing suffering and social exclusion. Some advanced legal systems, such as that of France, have introduced significant structural reforms to elevate the execution phase to a judicial process. In this model, the “Sentence Enforcement Judge” is not merely an executive authority, but a judicial authority with real powers. This judge can interpret, modify, or adapt the sentence execution according to the individual circumstances of the convict, progress in rehabilitation programs, and the requirements of justice and proportionality of the sentence. A notable feature of the French system is the authority granted to the sentence enforcement judge to adjust certain aspects of a punishment without returning the matter to the sentencing court. This approach reflects a recognition that sentencing should not be static or identical for everyone; rather, it should be flexible and responsive to the individual situation of the convict and the needs of public safety. In practice, such discretion allows for conditional release, sentence modification, and the use of alternatives to imprisonment in appropriate circumstances. The model also relies on the principles of restorative justice, which aim to repair the harm caused by the crime and reintegrate the offender into society. By placing the judge at the center of the sentence enforcement phase, the process of sentencing goes beyond mere administrative formalities and aligns with the principles of fairness, humanity, and individualization of punishment. Rehabilitation programs, vocational training, and psychological counseling often become central components of the sentence, and the sentencing judge oversees these elements to ensure that they are in the best interests of both the convict and society. By contrast, in many other legal systems, including Iran, the execution phase is largely administrative in nature. Although the responsible official may hold the title “Judge of Sentence Enforcement,” the role is often limited to overseeing formal and administrative aspects of the execution of sentences. Independent judicial discretions is minimal, and decisions rarely adapt to the evolving conditions of the offender or society. As a result the system relies too much on formality and formalism, and opportunities for rehabilitation and reintegration are not fully realized. These limitations pose significant challenges. Without meaningful judicial oversight, the execution of sentences may fail to account for individual differences among offenders, and opportunities for parole, suspension, or alternatives to incarceration will not be used effectively. Modern criminal justice theories increasingly support the idea that effective sentence enforcement requires trained, empowered judges who can respond to real-world complexities rather than apply rigid rules mechanically. Scholars and reform advocates have suggested several measures for improvement. First, specialized and ongoing training should be provided to sentence enforcement judges, focusing on psychology, criminology, and restorative justice principles. Second, the law should expand their powers to make decisions tailored to the individual circumstances of the convicted person. Third, the justice system should actively support rehabilitation programs, community sanctions, and alternatives to incarceration in safe conditions. In summary, the execution of criminal punishments is far more than the mechanical fulfillment of a court ruling. It represents the stage where justice is either completed or undermined, depending on how thoughtfully and fairly it is conducted. Legal systems that treat this phase as a core judicial process—rather than a mere administrative duty—are more likely to achieve the deeper goals of criminal justice. By granting real judicial powers, promoting individualization of punishments, and integrating rehabilitation programs, the criminal justice system can serve both the interests of society and the convicted individual, and bring punishment to its true purpose: justice, restoration, and sustainable social stability. کیفر و اجرای آن همواره از چالش‌برانگیزترین موضوعات عرصه عدالت کیفری در طول تاریخ حقوق کیفری محسوب می‌شوند. امری که در دوره مدرن حقوق کیفری نیز به‌عنوان یکی از مهم‌ترین مراحل فرایند کیفری و جزوی از مفهوم دادرسی کیفری تلقی می‌شود؛ به‌گونه‌ای‌که در عمل مرحله‌ای است که منجر به تلاقی تلاش‌های کنشگران نظام عدالت کیفری در محکوم کردن شخص مستحق محکومیت و اجرای کیفری است که اهداف برجسته‌ای چون بازدارندگی، اصلاح و بازپروری را در کنار تأمین منافع جامعه و قربانی جرم دنبال می‌کند. بر این‌اساس، حساسیت‌های مرحله اجرای احکام کیفری و بایسته‌های مربوط به اشخاص درگیر در این مرحله سبب شده تا توجه‌های زیادی در این زمینه در پهنه نظام‌های حقوق کیفری کشورهای گوناگون ایجاد شود. در این‌راستا، در برخی کشورها همچون فرانسه، با تلقی مرحله اجرای احکام کیفری به‌عنوان یکی از مراحل قضایی دادرسی و قاضی محسوب شدن مجری احکام، اقدام به واگذاری برخی اختیارات قضایی همچون امکان تعدیل کیفرهای تعیین‌شده در مرحله دادرسی را بدون ارجاع به دادگاه صادرکننده حکم فراهم کرده‌اند. امری که در عمل موجب ایجاد شأن قضایی برای قاضی اجرای احکام در برخی موارد قانونی شده‌ است. این درحالی است که در پهنه نظام دادرسی کیفری در ایران، هرچند با تصویب قانون آیین دادرسی کیفری مصوب 1392 و به‌موجب ماده 489 آن، نهاد قاضی اجرای احکام کیفری به‌عنوان یک مقام قضایی نسبتاً مستقل مورد شناسایی قرار گرفته است، قاضی اجرا از شأن قضاوتی به‌دور بوده و پررنگ بودن جنبه اجرایی و نظارتی منجر به اداری شدن شأن مقامات قضایی در این حوزه شده‌ است. با‌وجود این، به‌نظر می‌رسد تلاش برای شکل‌دهی به شأن قضایی قضات اجرای احکام در متناسب‌سازی و شخصی‌سازی مجازات‌ها مؤثر باشد و بتواند گامی مطلوبی را در راستای تحقق اهداف نظام عدالت کیفری ایجاد کند.

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105093_24f1bfac83b0b301825612f6acb6cb01.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 Independence versus Accountability: A Reflection on Judicial Oversight in the United States Legal System استقلال یا پاسخگویی: تأملی بر نهاد نظارت قضایی در نظام حقوقی ایالات متحده 159 178 104651 10.48308/jlr.2024.234859.2685 FA آیت اله جلیلی استادیار، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران فرشید دهقان دکتری، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران مهراد مومن دانشجوی دکتری، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران (نویسنده مسئول) m.momen@stu.qom.ac.ir Journal Article 2024 03 03 Beyond other power structures, it is the Judiciary that creates the most significant challenges and requirements within the framework of the doctrine of separation of powers. As Montesquieu and some jurists contended, the Judiciary, in contrast to the Legislature, has no restrictive function. This holds true insofar as it concerns ordinary judges, who are strictly bound by and committed to the law and lack the authority to adjudicate the validity of laws. However, this is not entirely the case for American-style supreme courts and constitutional courts, which can effectively confine the legislative authority of lawmakers within the boundaries of the Constitution. nevertheless, the separation of powers does not inherently entail courts' independence in general or constitutional courts in particular. Perhaps if there were a fused legislative and executive branch, both subject to the effective oversight of an independent constitutional court, this relationship would be observed more clearly. The most crucial doctrine in analyzing the legal accountability of government is the separation of powers. The essence of this doctrine lies in the Legislature enacting laws, the Executive enforcing them, and the Judiciary - within the framework of adjudicating individual disputes - determining whether the law has been correctly interpreted and applied. This tripartite division of functions prevents the excessive concentration of power in any single branch of government, enables each branch to counterbalance the others, and ensures that legal disputes concerning governmental authority are resolved with utmost integrity by an independent judiciary under the rule of law. The phrase "rule of law" is a slogan that has been invoked throughout history for numerous political purposes. The rule of law means that no individual, regardless of their position, is "above" the law. Hence, the emphasis on "accountability" is one of the cornerstones of good governance and a key issue. Holding political leaders publicly accountable is a fundamental characteristic of representative democracy. Here, the judge serves as an intermediary between the government and citizens. However, in this study, what matters is understanding how a judicial system balances concerns regarding independence with those regarding accountability – The question can be considered only after which one can ponder whether the system conducts this action in a manner that would yield an effective judiciary. If independence means freedom from the oversight of other government branches and voters, how can we prevent judicial negligence or abuse of the law? Judicial accountability is a fundamental democratic imperative in federal and state systems like the those of the United States. Simply put, judges must be accountable to the people for their role in upholding the Constitution through fair and impartial enforcement of the law. Yet, judicial accountability is a concept often misunderstood at best and abused at worst. It has become a rallying cry for those who, in reality, seek to dictate fundamental judicial outcomes. The notion of accountability is appealing in itself. Judges who reach decisions contrary to the will of the majority of other judges ought to be "accountable." Meanwhile, the Drafters embedded the concept of judicial independence within the judiciary as a means of safeguarding the rule of law. Judicial independence is a vital mechanism empowering judges to make decisions that may be unpopular yet correct, thereby affirming the principle that no person or group, however powerful, is above the law. It also sustains the ideal that the rule of law protects minorities from the tyranny of the majority. In addressing judicial oversight and the realization of independence or the emphasis on accountability by this structure, this study takes a deeper look at the U.S. legal system and its various dimensions. Judicial independence implies that the judiciary should not fear sanctions for the decisions it makes. Accordingly, an independent judiciary can protect individual rights against unlawful encroachment or abuse of power by the government. However, if this independence is exercised without restraint, it may itself become a source of irreparable harm. Thus, an independent judiciary must also be accountable for its actions. But assuming this independence, to whom is the judiciary accountable? Does the principle of governmental accountability apply to the judiciary as well? This study seeks to demonstrate that independence and accountability are interdependent and two sides of the same coin in the judicial system - in a sense, they are not contradictory but complementary. Judicial independence from other policymakers in society increases the potential for delayed decision-making, disregard for certain evidence, and erroneous or legally irrelevant rulings. Independent judges, though a necessary condition for the rule of law, can also pose a threat to it - in a sense, if judicial supremacy expands, the rule of law will not be realized. Despite extensive scholarly literature on judicial oversight in Iranian public law, the issue of independence and accountability, with an absolute emphasis on the U.S. legal system and relying solely on non-Iranian scholars, has been less explored. Therefore, this study employs a descriptive-analytical method, drawing on research literature and conventional approaches in the U.S. legal system, to examine this issue under several headings. First: What is the basis of accountability and its conceptual meaning? Next, we analyze the challenges between the role of the judicial structure in the U.S. presidential system and then elucidate what is known as public opinion and the nature of democracy. Finally, we examine and explain the stance of independence or accountability in the realm of judicial oversight. The findings of the study indicate that judicial accountability is a necessary but insufficient condition for realizing the rule of law. Moreover, many commentators argue that judicial independence and democratic accountability are intertwined in an irreconcilable tension. However, this study emphasizes that these competing ideals are not ends in themselves but means to a more significant goal: the realization of an efficient judicial system with acceptable performance. Nevertheless, in pursuit of this goal, the U.S. Constitution grants judges broad independence while placing them within an institution subject to intense political and public scrutiny. استقلال و پاسخ‌گویی دو روی یک سکه در نظام قضایی تلقی می‌شوند؛ به یک معنا، این دو نه در تعارض، بلکه مکمل یکدیگر تعریف می‌شوند. استقلال قضات از سایر متولیان سیاست‌گذاری در جامعه، امکان تعلّل در تصمیم‌گیری، نادیده‌انگاری برخی از ادله موجود، و صدور تصمیمات نادرست یا مبتنی‌بر قوانین غیرمرتبط را افزایش می‌دهد. قضات مستقل، به‌رغم آنکه شرط لازم برای حکومت قانون محسوب می‌شوند، می‌توانند تهدیدی برای آن نیز باشند؛ به یک معنا، اگر حاکمیت قضات تسری یابد، حکومت قانون تحقق نخواهد یافت. یافته‌های این پژوهش که با روش توصیفی- تحلیلی و با تکیه‌بر ادبیات پژوهش و مشی متعارف در نظام حقوقی ایالات متحده آمریکا انجام پذیرفته‌ است، حاکی از آن است که پاسخ‌گویی قضایی شرط لازم، اما ناکافی برای تحقق حکومت قانون است. به‌علاوه، بسیاری از مفسران معتقدند که استقلال قضایی و پاسخ‌گویی دمکراتیک نیز در تنشی آشتی‌ناپذیر با یکدیگر قرار دارند. این درحالی است که پژوهش حاضر تأکید دارد که این آرمان‌های رقیب، خود هدف نیستند، بلکه ابزاری برای یک هدف مهم‌ترند که همان تحقق سیستم قضایی کارآمد با عملکرد مقبول است. مع‌الوصف، به‌دنبال دستیابی به این هدف، قانون اساسی ایالات متحده استقلال گسترده‌ای به قضات داده است و درعین‌حال آنها را در نهادی قرار می‌دهد که در معرض نظارت سیاسی شدید هستند

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_104651_885a3abd96fb844b81d94ea63baeaa2b.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 Analysis of the Effects of Describing the Court's Decision in Appointing Arbitrator:A Comparative Study of Iran's Legal System and Common Law تحلیلی بر آثار توصیف تصمیم دادگاه در تعیین داور (مطالعه تطبیقی نظام حقوقی ایران و کامن لا) 179 194 105179 10.48308/jlr.2024.235417.2716 FA عادل ابراهیم پور اسنجان استادیار، دانشکده حقوق و علوم اجتماعی، دانشگاه تبریز، تبریز، ایران (نویسنده مسئول) ebrahimpooradel@gmail.com مهرداد اعتماد قراملکی دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه تهران: دانشکدگان فارابی، قم، ایران Journal Article 2024 04 18 Over the past few decades, arbitration has established itself as one of the most effective and efficient mechanisms in various legal systems for alternative dispute resolution, particularly in civil and commercial legal contexts. In light of recent developments and the growing trend toward privatized dispute resolution mechanisms, the inclusion of arbitration clauses in contracts results in the exclusion of judicial authorities’ jurisdiction and the allocation of disputes to arbitral tribunals. Nonetheless, the scope and manner of court intervention in the arbitration process remain central concerns. This issue has long attracted scholarly attention from both the viewpoint of protecting the independence of arbitration institution and the need to ensure fair and effective enforcement of arbitration. Although minimal judicial interference is the prevailing principle, courts inevitably play a decisive role at certain pivotal stages, especially in selection and appointment of arbitrators. This intervention, although limited, serves a complementary function in guaranteeing the efficiency of arbitration, particularly where the parties’ agreement is incomplete, ambiguous, or unenforceable, or when one party refuses to fulfill its obligations regarding the appointment of arbitrators.The appointment of an arbitrator by the court constitutes a fundamental and practical issue, the analysis of which necessitates a thorough examination of the legal nature of the court’s decision in this process, whether it is administrative or judicial. This examination is crucial because each attributes entails distinct and conflicting legal consequences particularly regarding the possibility of objection, appeal, and other procedural remedies. In Iranian legal system, the legislator has remained silent on court’s decision description when appointing an arbitrator. This lacuna has led to divergent views within legal doctrine and judicial practice, resulting in varied interpretations and inconsistent case law in similar cases. This study adopts a comparative approach to examine and analyze the issue within both the Iranian legal system and common law jurisdictions. The primary objective is to explore and determine the legal nature of the court’s decision in appointing arbitrators and to elucidate the legal effects and implications associated with its characterization as either administrative or judicial. Some legal scholars and judicial authorities believe that court’s decision regarding the appointment of an arbitrator possesses a judicial nature. This perspective is grounded in the premise that, before reaching such a decision, the court is compelled to ascertain certain substantive and procedural conditions, including the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement, the parties’ competence, the arbitrability of the subject matter, and compliance with mandatory rules related to public order. These considerations necessitate a form of substantive and quasi-adversarial examination by the court, going beyond the mere performance of administrative or formal duties. Accordingly, the court’s decision in this process is not merely confirmatory or procedural but entails a judicial review of the parties’ legal status and their arbitration agreement. Furthermore some distinctions have been made among the various cases of appointing an arbitrator. For instance, when the court appoints an arbitrator on behalf of a party due to that party’s refusal or default, given the existence of a dispute and the necessity to address the claims, the court’s decision is considered judicial in nature and is therefore subject to appeal and review by higher authorities. From this perspective, the judicial description of these types of decisions is based on the adversarial nature of the process and the role of the arbitrator as a substitute for the judge in resolving the dispute. Cosequently, the court's decision in this matter has legal effects similar to judicial rullings and is subject to the same rules governing court decisions with respect to the right of appeal, appellate review, and the principles of fair trial. In contrast to the judicial perspective, another group of scholars argue that the court’s decision regarding the appointment of an arbitrator is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Accordingly, the court’s intervention in the arbitrator appointment process does not stem from the initiation of an adversarial lawsuit. First, the request for arbitrator appointment is inherently not a claim, unlike judicial proceedings, does not require adherence to all formalities of filing a lawsuit. Second, this decision can be delegated by the courts; this is a matter that faces serious limitations in judicial decisions and is considered to be non-judicial in nature.Third, the court’s role in this process is primarily limited to verifying the existence or absence of an arbitration agreement, without the need to hold hearings, examine evidence, or make adversarial determinations on the merits of the dispute. From this standpoint, the court refrains from delving into the substantive issues of the arbitration matter or contract details. Fourth, recognizing the administrative nature of this decision better aligns with the fundamental philosophy of arbitration, which is founded on the principles of independence and limited court intervention. Within the framework of this analysis, even in cases where a preliminary examination of certain conditions (such as the existence of a valid arbitration agreement or the competence of the parties) is necessary, this examination is not considered a judicial proceeding, but is carried out solely in order to fulfill the formal conditions and begin the work of the arbitral authority. This viewpoint, by distinguishing between the two stages of “establishing the arbitration grounds” and “appointing the arbitrator,” holds that although the first stage may be quasi-judicial in nature to some extent, the second stage, namely issuing the final decision to appoint the arbitrator, is of an administrative nature that differs from judicial decisions in terms of structure, purpose, and consequences. Therefore, considering the conceptual analysis and the practical implications of each possible characterization, interpreting the court’s decision appointing an arbitrator as an administrative act appears more convincing. This interpretation not only aligns with the fundamental principles aimed at minimizing court interference in arbitration but also functionally facilitates and expedites the arbitration process while preserving the independence of the arbitral institution. Even in cases where preliminary examinations are conducted, such procedures should not be construed as indicative of the judicial nature of the final decision, because the principle of the administrative nature of arbitrator appointment process remains, and the court's interventions are made solely to ensure the validity and enforceability of the arbitration. امروزه نهاد داوری به‌عنوان یکی از کارآمدترین روش‌های حل‌وفصل اختلافات مدنی و تجاری محسوب ‌می‌شود. با درج شرط داوری در قرارداد یا توافق بر رسیدگی به اختلافات به‌طریق نهاد داوری، صلاحیت محاکم قضایی تخصیص می‌خورد؛ بنابراین در چنین مواردی مداخله دادگاه‌ها در فرایند داوری محدود و به‌صورت حداقلی است. اما در برخی از اختلافات ازجمله انتخاب داور، طرفین دعوا ناگزیر به محاکم رجوع می‌کنند. تعیین داور توسط دادگاه موضوع مهم و کاربردی است که باید ماهیت این تصمیم مورد بررسی قرار گیرد که آیا این تصمیم از ماهیت اداری برخوردار است یا واجد وصف قضایی است؟ بدیهی است، هنگامی که انتخاب داور مستلزم رسیدگی قضایی نباشد، ماهیت تصمیم دادگاه اداری است و در مواقعی که دادگاه‌ها وجود قرارداد یا شرط داوری و اعتبار آن را احراز می‌کنند، به‌صورت قضایی رسیدگی می‌کند و درنتیجه ماهیت تصمیم دادگاه در انتخاب داور قضایی است

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105179_648a29fa3946c8eecfd198495096eacc.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 States' Obligations to Protect the Marine Environment Against Climate Change: An Analysis of the ITLOS Advisory Opinion تعهدات دولت‌ها به حفاظت از محیط زیست دریایی در برابر تغییرات اقلیمی: واکاوی نظریه مشورتی دیوان بین المللی حقوق دریاها 195 214 105129 10.48308/jlr.2024.236198.2762 FA مهناز رشیدی استادیار، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شاهد، تهران، ایران (نویسنده مسئول). ma.rashidi@shahed.ac.ir مهشید آجلی لاهیجی دکتری، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2024 07 14 Climate change and its adverse effects have attracted the attention of the international community since at least the 1990s and numerous efforts have been made to regulate state behavior in tackling climate change, most notably through the adoption of international climate treaties such as the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and the 2015 Paris Agreement. Despite these binding treaty documents, how to deal with the increasing trend of climate change remains one of the most important concerns of the world today. According to the UNFCCC, ‘"Climate Change" means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and is separate from natural climate changes that occur over time’. The adverse impacts of climate change on ecosystems and human life have been well-documented in various scientific reports issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Among the most vulnerable elements of the climate system are the oceans and seas, which cover over 70 percent of the planet’s surface. Notably, the relationship between climate change and seas is a reciprocal one. On the one hand, undeniable scientific evidence points to the severe impacts of climate change on the marine environment, including ocean acidification due to carbon absorption, rising sea temperatures, melting ice, sea-level rise leading to the submersion of low-lying island nations, threats to coral reefs, and harm to marine biodiversity. On the other hand, oceans and seas play a vital role in regulating the Earth’s climate by absorbing and redistributing carbon dioxide and heat, and are considered one of the most important sinks for greenhouse gases. Despite this significant interactions, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the most important international treaty document in the field of the law of the sea, contains no reference to climate change. Given that communities residing in small island developing states (SIDS) are disproportionately affected by the adverse effects of climate change on the oceans, the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (COSIS) submitted a request for an advisory opinion from ITLOS concerning the following two questions: What are the specific obligations of State Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the "UNCLOS"), including under Part XJI: (a) to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment in relation to the deleterious effects that result or are likely to result from climate change, including through ocean warming and sea level rise, and ocean acidification, which are caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere? (b) to protect and preserve the marine environment in relation to climate change impacts, including ocean warming and sea level rise, and ocean acidification? The issuance of the advisory opinion by ITLOS on 21 May 2024 in response to these questions markes a milestone in the articulation of states’ obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment from adverse effects of climate change. In this opinion, ITLOS, as the foremost judicial body in the field of the law of the sea, interpreted the provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS in order to combat climate change. Accordingly, the central research question of this study is: What are the obligations of states under international law, from the perspective of ITLOS, to address the harmful effects of climate change on the marine environment? This article adopts a descriptive-analytical approach to examine the ITLOS advisory opinion and thereby identify and elaborate on the legal obligations of states concerning the impacts of climate change on oceans and seas. Through an in-depth analysis of the Tribunal’s reasoning, it becomes evident that the advisory opinion constitutes an important step toward clarifying and delineating the scope of states’ obligations to eliminate and mitigate the adverse effects of climate change on the marine environment. The findings of this study indicate that, although UNCLOS does not stipulate obligations regarding climate change and its harmful effects, ITLOS, through an evolutionary interpretation, establishes a linkage between two key obligations under the Convention—namely, the duty to prevent, control and reduce marine pollution and the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment—on the one hand, and the need to address climate change on the other hand. The Court has identified anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions as pollution of the marine environment, and the Court’s emphasis on the obligation of States to prevent, control and reduce such pollution, as well as their commitment to ensure that no damage is caused to territories outside the State’s jurisdiction by such pollution, requires that States not only reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions themselves, but also monitor the activities of the private sector in their areas of jurisdiction. This interpretation places a heavier burden of responsibility on major greenhouse gas-emitting countries, particularly industrialized nations. According to the Tribunal, states’ obligations to prevent marine pollution from greenhouse gases and to preserve the marine environment from the adverse effects of climate change are obligations of conduct. In other words, states must exert their best efforts to fulfill these obligations, which are to be assessed based on a stringent due diligence standard. The Tribunal’s emphasis on the application of a stringent due diligence standard for implementing states’ obligations to address climate change in the marine environment necessitates the establishment of national systems, including legislation and enforcement mechanisms, and the monitoring of their effective implementation. Therefore, adopting laws and frameworks aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions to combat marine pollution and to preserve the marine environment from the negative impacts of climate change constitutes part of the states’ obligations under international law of the sea. The Tribunal’s emphasis on the stringent due diligence standard reflects the seriousness with which it regards the issue of climate change impacts on the marine environment صدور نظر مشورتی دیوان بین‌المللی حقوق دریاها در 21 می 2024، نقطه‌عطفی در رابطه با تعهدات دولت‌ها برای حمایت و حفاظت از محیط‌زیست دریایی در برابر تغییرات اقلیمی قلمداد می‌شود. در این نظر، مهم‌ترین مرجع قضایی در حوزه حقوق دریاها، اقدام به تفسیر مفاد کنوانسیون حقوق دریاها 1982 در راستای مقابله با تغییرات اقلیمی کرد. لذا، سؤال اصلی این پژوهش آن است که از نظر ایتلوس، تعهدات دولت‌ها در حقوق بین‌الملل برای مقابله با آثار زیان‌بار تغییرات اقلیمی در پهنه‌های دریایی چیست؟ نتایج این نوشتار، که با روش توصیفی- تحلیلی و با تکیه‌بر منابع کتابخانه‌ای فراهم آمده، نشان‌ می‌دهد، اگرچه کنوانسیون حقوق دریاها تعهداتی را در رابطه با مقابله با تغییرات اقلیمی و رفع آثار زیان‌بار آن مقرر نداشته است، دیوان، با تفسیری تکاملی، میان دو تعهد مندرج در این سند، یعنی تعهد به پیشگیری، کنترل و مقابله با آلودگی دریایی و همچنین تعهد به حفظ محیط‌زیست دریایی از یک سو و مقابله با تغییرات اقلیمی ازسویی دیگر، پیوند برقرار کرده است. همچنین دیوان، معیار مراقبت مقتضی سختگیرانه را به‌عنوان شاخصی برای اجرای تعهدات مذکور درنظر آورده که به معنی ایجاد یک سیستم ملی برای قانون‌گذاری، اجرا و تضمین انجام فعالیت‌های مقابله‌ای با تغییرات اقلیمی است.

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105129_0d535f59b244486cbbe71f0ee436926a.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 Examination of legal status of object of transaction in information-based contracts واکاوی وضعیت حقوقی مورد معامله در قراردادهای اطلاعات‌محور 215 232 105232 10.48308/jlr.2025.237159.2788 FA علی ساعت چی استادیار، دانشکده حقوق و علوم‌سیاسی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران (نویسنده مسئول) alisaatchi@um.ac.ir فائزه تیموری مقدم دانشجوی دکتری، دانشکده حقوق و علوم‌سیاسی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران 0000-0003-4438-6497 Journal Article 2024 10 07 In today's world, where different sciences are rapidly advancing, social exchanges are primarily based on information, which may have various terminological definitions across various sectors. In the Iranian legal system, a definition of information can be found in Paragraph (a) of Article 1 of the “Law on Free Access to Information” enacted in 2009. According to this article, information is defined as “any type of data contained in documents, stored in software form, or recorded by any other means.” It is worth noting that despite the different definitions and types of information in diverse fields, information has gained a special status in contracts between individuals as the subject of the transaction. The aim of information-based contracts is the exchange of information that is not publicly available and is transferable as valuable and intangible assets. Notable examples include the sale of technical knowledge for the production of a product or the provision of specialized consultancy services. The inherent characteristics of information, such as intangibility, simultaneous usability by multiple individuals, increasing value compared to other assets, and easier accessibility, necessitate the independent definition of “information-based contracts, ” identification of transferable types of information, and formulation of legal rules appropriate to this type of contract. Therefore, considering the aforementioned materials and the silence of our country's research literature on information-based contracts, the present study seeks to use a descriptive-analytical approach, while identifying appropriate legal bases for concluding information-based contracts and introducing contractual formats appropriate to the subject of these contracts, to explain the most important effects of information being traded in the field of contract law. The findings of this research indicate that not all types of information are necessarily tradable, and only those with economic value can be accepted as the subject of a transaction. These are generally divided into two main categories: first, specialized information, which usually lacks exclusivity and can be accessed by various experts. Access to this type is often intended to solve temporary problems and usually does not generate specific profits for the user. Second, information with intellectual property aspects, which is entirely exclusive and accessible only through the owner. The commercialization of such information and the mass production of resulting products can bring significant financial benefits. Although access to both types of information requires payment and the presence of an information owner, the main difference lies in the method of use and the resulting financial benefits. Therefore, considering the mentioned differences, it is necessary to draft contractual forms appropriate to each type of information. For this purpose, service provision contracts can be used for specialized information, and license agreements can serve as appropriate formats for the exchange of intellectual information. Regarding the first one, it is necessary to draft a contract that is based on the general provisions of service contracts and specifically tailored to information as the subject matter. This approach can also be observed in European documents as well as certain service contracts, such as construction, design, and treatment contracts. While these contracts fall under the category of service-based contracts, they have their own specific contractual frameworks and terms. Regarding the intellectual property, given the widespread commercialization goals and the nature and characteristics of intellectual property rights, one of the most suitable contractual frameworks for the development and commercial use of intellectual assets is a license agreement, which is also accepted under Iranian law. Another important result of this study is the fundamental distinction between information-based and goods exchange contracts. Given the nature and characteristics of information, the legal rules governing information-based contracts—whether at the stage of formation, execution, or termination—differ fundamentally from those of goods-based contracts. These differences are evident in areas such as contractual expectations and legal remedies. It seems that in all types of information-based contracts, given the specific characteristics and requirements of information as the subject of the transaction, the status of contractual expectations will be different from other contracts. For example, in goods contracts, the contractual expectation that the goods are free of defects at the time of conclusion is accepted (Article 423 of the Civil Code); however, in the context of information-based contracts, such an expectation is not applicable. Since information does not have a physical existence at the time of contract formation, quality assessment generally becomes apparent only after use. Thus, even after contract conclusion, the information may be defective, and invoking legal remedies related to defects may be possible. Also, guaranteeing the absence of any defects in information-based contracts in the field of intellectual property, such as software or inventions, is unreasonable and contrary to prevailing practices, since some degree of error is always present in such information. In this case, beyond the need to reconsider the concept of defect, given the irreversible nature of information, usual legal remedies cannot be applied to defective information, and other legal solutions must necessarily be identified and utilized. Therefore, although one of the purposes of contract termination due to defect in the subject matter is to prevent harm to the parties and return them to their pre-contractual state, this is not possible in information contracts. Because of the intangible nature of information, it cannot be returned, and thus termination of the contract due to a defect would result in the unjust enrichment of one party, which is legally unacceptable. In this case, the subject matter may be considered as destroyed, and according to the first clause of Article 429 of the Civil Code, the only remedy would be to receive compensation (Arsh), without the possibility of contract termination. It is emphasized that this view, due to the nature of information and the impossibility of returning the defective subject matter in information-based contracts, distinguishes such contracts from others «مورد معامله» عبارت است از موضوعی که در قرارداد مورد توافق طرفین واقع می‌شود و برمبنای ماده 214 قانون مدنی و نظر حقوق‌دانان داخلی، به دو قسم «مال» یا «عمل» قابل تفکیک است. ازاین‌رو، قراردادها را نیز می‌توان به دو دسته «قراردادهای کالامحور» و «قراردادهای خدمات‌محور» تقسیم کرد. بااین‌حال، نظر به رشد فناوری و پیشرفت‌های علمی صورت‌گرفته، امروزه با قراردادهایی تحت‌عنوان «قراردادهای اطلاعات‌محور» مواجه هستیم که غرض از انعقاد آن، مبادله اطلاعاتی است که در دسترس همگان نبوده و به‌عنوان مالی باارزش و البته ناملموس، از قابلیت نقل و انتقال برخوردار است. بنابراین با توجه به جایگاه اطلاعات در این قراردادها، باید به این سؤال مهم پاسخ داد که آیا قواعد حقوقی فعلی که از دیرباز درخصوص قراردادهای کالامحور وضع‌ شده، همچنان برای قراردادهای اطلاعات‌محور نیز قابل اعمال است یا این قراردادها قواعد حقوقی ویژه خود را می‌طلبند؟ نتایج این پژوهش حکایت از آن دارد که ازسویی با توجه به ویژگی‌های اطلاعات و ازسوی دیگر اقسام مختلف آن، کلیه قواعد حاکم بر قراردادهای کالا، مناسب قراردادهای اطلاعات‌محور نبوده و بنابراین قراردادهای یادشده جدای از اینکه از برخی جهات همچون «انتظارات قراردادی» و «ضمانت اجرا» با سایر قراردادها متفاوت‌اند که ساختار و احکام خاص خود را نیازمندند. به همین منظور، می‌توان قراردادهای اطلاعات‌محور را برحسب نوع اطلاعات در دو حوزه خدمات و مالکیت فکری جای داد و ضمن تدوین احکام خاص این نوع قراردادها، قالب‌های قراردادی متناسب با آن را نیز معرفی کرد

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105232_12a1eaa11fab8d84ef31f4449244f8a3.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 Lapse of Time in Labour Lawsuits in Light of Administrative Court of Justice Procedure مرور زمان در دعاوی کار در پرتو رویه دیوان عدالت اداری 233 244 105036 10.48308/jlr.2024.233320.2602 FA جواد محمودی استادیار، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شهرکرد، شهرکرد، ایران mahmoudi.javad@sku.ac.ir Journal Article 2023 10 05 Despite detailed research on the origin and effects of the statute of limitations in private law cases, this issue has not been examined much in labour cases. The main question in the present study is whether the application of the statute of limitations in labour lawsuits is generally accepted? What are the current legal positions and the practical procedures of the Administrative Court of Justice on this issue and what are its challenges? The hypothesis is that official authorities and branches of the Court, in light of the legal bill approved by the Revolutionary Council, have been considering the permissibility of the statute of limitations in labour cases for about a decade, but gradually, with the explicit repeal of the provisions of that bill by the Labour Law of 1980, the official procedures in this regard changed and, in a different approach and in line with the protection of the right to work and its branches, the citation to the statute of limitations has been rejected. Overall, the aforementioned development is evaluated as positive and supportive, but some legislative developments in the field of the Administrative Court of Justice, especially in expressing the legal deadlines for appealing against the rulings of the authorities in labour law, can institutionalize the statute of limitations in labour relations, which is not evaluated as fair from the perspective of the protective dimension of labour law. This research is done through a library and descriptive-analytical method examining the laws and judicial procedures. The unanimous decision of the General Board of the Court in 2003, in rejecting the statute of limitations in labour claims, implicitly repeals the unanimous decision of 1996. This development should be evaluated in order to ensure the protective aspects of the labour law and the right to appeal and to consider its rules mandatory. Of course, the 2003 unanimous ruling can be challenged in this regard, as it is based solely on the declaration of the general repeal of the Revolutionary Council's resolution by the 1990 Labour Law, and the Court did not refer to the lack of clarification on the lapse of time in the aforementioned law and the exception of the lapse of time against the originality and application of the right to appeal. In addition, it is obvious that in the case of workers who benefited during the time of the Revolutionary Council's resolution, invoking the existence of the lapse of time is not prohibited. In addition, at present, due to the notification and implementation of the Law of the Administrative Court of Justice Amendment (10/2/2013) and in implementation of Note 2 of Article 16 of that law, the deadline for objecting the final decisions of quasi-judicial authorities (including the authorities subject to Article 157 of the Labour Code, namely the Determination Board and the Labour & Employer Dispute Resolution Board) has been announced as three months for individuals within the country and six months for individuals residing abroad from court ruling delivery date. Filing a lawsuit in the Court to reverse the judgmnt outside the prescribed deadlines is somehow an implicit acknowledgement of the lapse of time in those lawsuits. If this assumption is accepted, the unanimous decision of the General Board of the Court in 2003 has been changed by the intervention of the legislator, and therefore, during the reign of the Court's reform law, lapse of time has been accepted at least in appealing against the final judgment of the relevant authorities subject to the Labour Code. It seems that the Legislator and the judiciary should look at the issue of lapse of time without considering the corresponding provisions in the rules of private law and by considering the aspects of human rights and its close connection with the human dignity of workers and ignore it as much as possible. Apart from that, the Revolutionary Council resolution was passed in an environment where, firstly, the Labor Law approved by the government after the revolution had not yet been passed, and secondly, the passage of the Labor Law was delayed for several years due to fundamental conflicts between the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the jurists of the Guardian Council regarding the necessity of passing that law or being content with hiring the persons rules stipulated in the Civil Code. Unanimous decision of the General Board of the Court in 2003 in rejecting the passage of time in labor lawsuits implicitly repeals the unanimous decision of 1996 of court. This development should be evaluated in order to ensure the protective aspects of the Labour Law and the right to appeal and to consider its rules mandatory. The recognition of lapse of time in labor law is incompatible with the philosophy of its emergence; that is, protecting workers and making labor relations fair. It is better that the legislator and the judges of the Court, in their decisions and opinions, get committed to the requirements of labor law and the need to guarantee the updated fundamental rights of workers. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to the spirit of labor law and to consider the historical, economic, social and human rights reasons for turning to labor law in the country and gradually distancing from jurisprudential rules and articles related to the hiring of individuals in the civil law مرور زمان به‌مثابه یکی از موانع حق دادخواهی در حقوق خصوصی به رسمیت شناخته شده است. به استناد آن مفهوم، برخی حق‌ها به‌دلیل گذشت مدت زمانی از نقض آنها دیگر در پیشگاه دادگاه‌ها قابل مطالبه نیستند. دعاوی کار، برخاسته از متن قانون کار و مقررات اجرایی مربوطه، قرارداد کار و نیز پیمان‌های جمعی، بخش مهمی از رسیدگی‌ها در مراجع شبه‌قضایی مرتبط و نیز دیوان عدالت اداری را تشکیل می‌دهند. باوجود پژوهش‌های مفصل درباره خاستگاه و آثار مرور زمان در دعاوی موضوع حقوق خصوصی، این موضوع در دعاوی کار، چندان مورد بررسی قرار نگرفته است. پرسش اصلی در پژوهش پیش‌رو آن است که آیا اساساً اِعمال مرور زمان در دعاوی کار پذیرفته است؟ موضع قوانین جاری و نیز رویه‌های عملی دیوان عدالت اداری در این باره و چالش‌های آن چیست؟ فرضیه آن است که مراجع رسمی و نیز شعب دیوان در پرتو لایحه قانونی مصوب شورای انقلاب تا حدود یک دهه به جواز مرور زمان در دعاوی کار، نظر داده‌اند، اما به‌تدریج با اعلام نسخ صریح مفاد آن لایحه ازسوی قانون کار 1369 رویه‌های رسمی در این باره، تغییر یافت و در رویکردی متفاوت و در راستای حمایت از حق بر کار و فروعات آن، استناد به مرور زمان، مردود شمرده شده است. در مجموع، تحول یادشده، مثبت و حمایتی ارزیابی می‌شود، ولی برخی تحولات قانونگذاری در حوزه دیوان عدالت اداری، به‌ویژه در بیان مواعد قانونی اعتراض به آرای مراجع موضوع قانون کار می‌تواند مرور زمان در روابط کار را نهادینه سازد که از منظر بُعد حمایتی قانون کار، عادلانه ارزیابی نمی‌شود. نتایج پژوهش پیش‌رو، که تحلیلی و توصیفی است، می‌تواند مورد استفاده عموم کارگران، خط مشی‌گذاران حوزه کار و نیز فعالان کارگری قرار گیرد.

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105036_4993b249e64e00d476dd92a780c1759a.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 Jurisprudential foundations of public order بنیان‌های فقهی حقوقی نظم عمومی 245 264 104613 10.48308/jlr.2024.235691.2728 FA یعقوب علیزاده استادیار، دانشکده الهیات، فقه و حقوق اسلامی، دانشگاه پیام نور، تهران، ایران (نویسنده مسئول) y_alizadeh@pnu.ac.ir Journal Article 2024 05 13 Public order is a fundamental and complex concept in legal systems, simultaneously playing a dual role in preserving social cohesion and limiting individual freedoms. This concept, long a focal point for governments and jurists alike, is considered both a tool for ensuring public peace and security, and a key standard in defining the legal boundaries between citizens and the state. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, public order has a special place because, in addition to its customary and legal aspects, it also has a jurisprudential and religious basis and is tied to the teachings of Islamic Sharia. Thus, explaining its jurisprudential and legal basis is essential for understanding how this concept functions within Iranian law. The core question of this study is: On what foundations is public order in the Islamic Republic of Iran based, and how does it affect the scope of individual and social freedoms? To answer this question, a descriptive-analytical method and a library-based approach have been employed. Jurisprudential sources, Quranic exegesis, statutory laws, the Iranian Constitution, and the views of jurists and legal scholars have been examined to provide a precise picture of the theoretical and practical foundations of public order in Iran’s jurisprudence and legal system. Findings show that public order in Iran is a blend of classical legal elements and principles of Islamic Sharia, making it distinct from its counterpart in secular legal systems. In other words, in Iran’s legal system, public order is not confined solely to preserving security and public peace, but is also intertwined with religious and moral values - a characteristic that fundamentally sets it apart from secular approaches. From an Islamic jurisprudential perspective, security in its various psychological, moral, social, and political dimensions is the core element of public order. The Qur’an outlines instances of disruption to public security -such as moharebeh (armed insurrection), apostasy, fasad fi’l-ard (corruption on earth), and sedition - and emphasizes the need to maintain societal stability as essential for realizing a “virtuous life” (hayat tayyiba). In this framework, adherence to Islamic norms, obedience to divine commands, fulfillment of promises and social solidarity are not only moral virtues but also foundational elements of public order. Shi’a jurisprudence, through institutions like hisbah and institutionalizing the practice of enjoining good and forbidding evil, provides practical mechanisms to prevent disorder and protect the structure of the Islamic society. Accordingly, Shi’a jurists emphasize the “preservation of societal order” (hifz al-nizam) as a key religious imperative, maintaining that a breakdown of social order can even justify suspending certain religious rules to prevent chaos. From this viewpoint, a society lacking security and cohesion not only fails to achieve social justice but also undermines the legitimacy of its government. Moreover, fidelity to promises is presented in religious texts as one of the vital pillars sustaining social order and public trust. In such a way that disregard for collective obligations is considered to be a cause of instability in the entire society. On the other hand, from a legal perspective, public order is explained based on three main elements: public security, public comfort, and public health. Iranian criminal law - particularly in the section on ta’zir punishments - criminalizes behaviors such as armed insurrection, espionage, forming illegal armed groups, blasphemy, destruction of public property, and environmental pollution, all aimed at protecting society from internal and external threats. Public security as a key foundation ensures public calm, prevents violence, and defends territorial integrity, principles strongly emphasized in the Constitution and penal codes. Public peace refers to guaranteeing citizens’ psychological comfort in social, urban, and family environments; laws against social nuisances, noise pollution, unauthorized gatherings, and urban disturbances serve this purpose. The third component, public health, focuses on safeguarding physical and mental well-being and controlling biological hazards and epidemics. Health regulations - overseeing the quality of water, food, and air and combating the spread of contagious diseases - reinforce this pillar of public order. Moreover, in Iran’s legal system, the concepts of “Islamic criteria” and “public interest” complement public order and significantly influence the regulation of freedoms. Article 4 of the Constitution, which subjects all laws to Islamic criteria, has effectively bound public order inseparably to Sharia teachings. This connection is reflected in restrictions on expression, education, employment, and lifestyle, while also reinforcing the legitimacy of Islamic legislation. Moreover, cultural and moral matters are also encompassed under public order in Iran, reflecting a significantly broader interpretation of this concept compared to secular systems. Another important finding is the relationship between public order and citizens’ rights in the Islamic Republic. While public order imposes limits on certain freedoms, its absence would render freedoms meaningless. In other words, rights and liberties cannot be realized without order; at the same time, unrestrained invocation of public order can lead to despotism and the violation of freedoms. Therefore, emphasizing a balance between the two through clear legislation, effective judicial oversight, and adherence to human rights standards is essential for the fair implementation of public order. Although the Iranian Constitution explicitly mentions “public order” only in Article 165, the content of numerous other articles that restrict freedoms invoking public interest, Islamic norms, or public morality have, in effect, served to realize public order. In conclusion, public order in Iran is a multifaceted composite concept shaped by Islamic teachings, jurisprudential principles, legal considerations, and social interests. This concept not only guarantees government continuity and social stability but also provides the foundation for the exercise of legitimate rights and freedoms. A precise understanding of its constituent elements and a delineation of its boundaries from related concepts are essential for effective legislation, fair adjudication, and proper enforcement of the law. Ultimately, strengthening the supportive capacities of public order - while avoiding its instrumentalization -ensures justice, security, and human dignity within the framework of Islamic law. نظم عمومی در همه جوامع از اهمیت بالایی برخوردار است؛ زیرا بستر توسعه و تعالی است. از طرفی رابطه تنگاتنگ نظم عمومی با آزادی‌های فردی و اجتماعی بررسی آن را ضروری ساخته است. نظم عمومی در هر جامعه‌ای تابعی از ارزش‌های آن جامعه است. براین‌اساس، مسئله مورد بررسی در مقاله حاضر این است که بنیان‌های فقهی حقوقی که نظم عمومی بر آن متنی است، کدام است؟ مقاله حاضر توصیفی تحلیلی بوده و با استفاده از روش کتابخانه‌ای به بررسی موضوع مورد اشاره پرداخته شده است. یافته‌های مقاله بر این امر دلالت دارد که امنیت و آسایش عمومی، رعایت موازین اسلامی و عدم سرپیچی از احکام خداوند، مبارزه با کفار و تعدی کنندگان، مقابله با فساد و تفرقه، اعتصام به حبل‌الله و وفای به عهد مهم‌ترین عناصر و بنیان‌های فقهی نظم عمومی است. امنیت عمومی، مصالح عمومی و بهداشت عمومی نیز بنیان‌های حقوقی نظم عمومی از دیدگاه حقوقی است. در فقه و حقوق ایران، نظم عمومی نسبت به آزادی‌های فردی و اجتماعی در اولویت است. نظم عمومی باعث محدودیت‌هایی در برخی آزادی‌های فردی و اجتماعی‌ می‌شود. این وضعیت در حقوق اساسی ایران نیز مصداق داشته و در برخی موارد آزادی‌های فردی با هدف تحقق نظم عمومی محدود شده است. هرچند نظم عمومی زمینه تحقق آزادی‌های فردی و اجتماعی را فراهم می‌کند؛ زیرا در فقدان نظم عمومی، نمی‌توان از تحقق آزادی‌های فردی و اجتماعی سخن به میان آورد، اما به‌نظر می‌رسد لازم است سازوکارهای تقنینی حمایت از آزادی‌های فردی و اجتماعی در مواجهه با نظم عمومی تقویت شود

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_104613_7ca2b97521172285475651e4f63c0b41.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی 1024-0772 28 3 2025 08 23 The Aesthetic Sovereignty; A Theological Approach to A Secular Concept ''The National Sovereignty in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran'' حاکمیّت زیبایی شناسانه؛ نگرشی لاهوتی به مفهومی ناسوتی "مفهومِ حاکمیّت ملی در قانون اساسی جمهوری اسلامی ایران" 265 286 106237 10.48308/jlr.2022.227388.2227 FA کاوه پولادی گروه حقوق، دانشکده علوم انسانی و اجتماعی، دانشگاه کردستان، سنندج، ایران. 0000-0001-6181-7928 Journal Article 2022 06 08 This study aims to achieve two objectives. Initially, it aims to elucidate the notion of national sovereignty as outlined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran through a historical-phenomenological approach. This analysis explores the socio-political processes of the revolutionary forces, specifically the Constitutional Assembly, which resulted in a document influenced by advocates of religious and hybrid ideological viewpoints. The analysis centers on dimensions that illustrate the preeminence of Sharia over modern law, wherein law is evaluated independently of its intrinsic substance and rationale. The legal notion of sovereignty represents a meticulously structured document that, through its brevity, effectively addresses a philosophical dilemma (the conflict between determinism and free will). Nevertheless, owing to its disparate objective, neglect of a systematic legal methodology, and absence of continuity within legal institutions, this refined formulation has not been integrated into the legal domain; rather than fostering unity, it has engendered duality (the legal form itself). This essay, as the concluding segment of a tripartite analysis on national sovereignty in Iran, aims to outline the historical development of this notion. The legal form is shaped by socio-political forces and their arrangement, and it is defined by ideas articulated in a cohesive linguistic structure. This relationship offers an inside viewpoint for comprehending the legal structure. An external perspective is essential to trace the evolution of the form across history and to comprehend its connection to its origin—specifically, the heritage that underlies the form and through which force and cognition reestablish their interplay. This foundation also elucidates the continuity or rupture of a thought. The legacy of the past holds significance within the context of the life-world (Lebenswelt) and imparts historicity to it. The life-world is a product of the ego's intentionality and the resulting intersubjectivity, which is defined within a framework of linguistic, cultural, and other traditions. This place is a sedimented reality that connects past and future generations; it is an encounter through which the formation of the new and the trajectory of communal transformations are established. The analysis of the relationship between legal forms and historical heritage involves initially evaluating each form individually and subsequently in connection to other forms (the relational legal form). In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, referred to as The Aesthetic Sovereignty, the engagement with historical legacy is both antiquarian and selective. In the Constitutional Constitution, referred to as The Janusian Sovereignty (the second segment of the study), we see a fusion of critical and ecclesiastical (antiquarian) interaction. In the period of the legal treatises (Rasa’el) composed before and after the Constitutional Constitution—referred to as Sovereignty as Monarchy (the initial segment of the study)—a discernible thread of critical engagement with historical heritage emerges, wherein local contexts are examined through the lens of universal political theory. The historical development of national sovereignty is shaped by the interplay among these three kinds. The 1980 legislator inherited both forms; however, they continued the conflicts within Constitutional law and perpetuated them. They did not utilize the legal treatises (Rasa’el) from the Constitutional Revolution or their subsequent academic development, thus remaining disconnected from a systematic legal framework. This transpired because of the prevalence of Sharia arguments lacking a legal basis, which ultimately led to confusion. Ultimately, it may be emphasized that the legal form consistently has the capacity to extract purpose from one facet of the past to another and to facilitate renewal, thereby allowing for the revelation of something novel. This potential can consistently reveal history as a primary source and prompt the reexamination and evaluation of the legal framework. Contrary to this potential is the prioritization of a singular characteristic, reducing reality to that element, like to the bed of Procrustes, anticipating its Theseus. نوشتار حاضر دو شریطه داشته است. نخست، جهد نموده به صورت‌بندی قانون‌اساسی ج. ا. پیرامونِ حاکمیّت ملی نزدیک شود. بدین اعتبار، از اسلوبِ پدیدارشناسی‌تاریخی تمتع جسته تا مطالعه را در پرتو نور آورد. در این راستا، به مفصل‌بندی نیروهای اجتماعی سیاسی انقلاب (عام) و مجلس بررسی قانون‌اساسی (خاص) پرداخته که حاصل آن تدوین قانونی با حضور طرفدارانِ منظرگاه الهی و بخشی از دیدگاهی که تلفیقی نام نهادیم، بوده است. سپس از مرتبتِ امر نظری حجاب‌افکنی صورت‌گرفته و دو محورِ تشتت زبان فقهی حقوقی و تلقی از سنخِ حکومت را از نظر گذرانیده است. در فرم حقوقی، حاکمیّت تأسیسی تحریری زیبا داشته؛ اما، در ساحتِ حقوقی سیاسی به ثنویّت منتهی گشته ‌است (فرم حقوقیِ فی‌نفسه). دوم، از آنجایی که نوشتار، پاره واپسین از تتبعات سه‌گانه‌ای پیرامونِ حاکمیّت ملی در ایران است؛ در جست‌وجوی ترسیمِ سیر تاریخیِ مفهوم مزبور و گسست یا استمرار در فهم آن بوده است. بدین آیین، در بخشی به نسبت مجزای هر فرم با معرفتِ تاریخی روی آورده و در بخشی دیگر به نسبت پیوسته فرم‌ها با یکدیگر عنایت ورزیده ‌است (فرم حقوقیِ نسبتی). حاکمیّت مندرج در قانون‌اساسی ج. ا. با تاریخ مواجهه‌ای نگهبانانه و گزینش‌گرانه را تجربه نموده ‌است. قانون‌اساسی مشروطه نیز مواجهه‌ای نقادانه و نگهبانانه با معرفت تاریخی داشته و در رسالات‌ حقوقی آن عصر رگه‌ای از مواجهه انتقادی چشم‌نواز بوده است. النهایه، در این تطور تاریخی، حاکمیّت ملی در منزلگاه آخرین‌اش، تعارضات قانون‌اساسی مشروطه را مرتفع ننموده و بدان استمرار بخشیده‌ است. همچنین، بهره‌ای از رسالات‌حقوقی و سنجش‌های موجود در آن نبرده است.

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_106237_343c514275f79b7d29cbafc47fcd6644.pdf