Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 Assaults on Critical Infrastructure and International Law Assaults on Critical Infrastructure and International Law 3 22 106481 10.48308/jlr.2025.241688.2965 FA Ebrahim Beigzadeh Professor of International Law, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran Corresponding Author Email: ebeigzadeh55@gmail.com Journal Article 2025 09 27 Abstract Introduction Although assaults on critical infrastructure are not a new phenomenon, their occurrence has seen a significant rise in recent years. They might be deliberate, manifested as military attacks or intentional disruption, or unintentional, in the form of natural or technical disasters. In either case, they lead to catastrophic consequences, in particular for civilians, and in some situations may amount to international crimes such as forced displacement or even the deprivation of lives. Given these grave consequences, the current study addresses the main question of whether international law already contains rules prohibiting attacks on critical infrastructure or not. Since such attacks may take place during both armed conflict and peacetime, relevant international regulations must be examined in both contexts. It is also to be noted that, along with physical assaults, cyber operations can similarly target critical infrastructures. Methods To answer this question, the first issue to consider is whether international law provides a definition of critical infrastructure. The research hypothesis is that, despite the absence of a treaty-based definition, a customary one may be inferred from states practice and the positions of international organizations. Moreover, the prohibition of attacks on critical infrastructures in armed conflicts is confirmed by the principles of international humanitarian law—specifically the principle of distinction. This prohibition, though somewhat implicit, is also relevant in peacetime, since such acts may entail violations of the right to life, a fundamental human right. Results and Discussions The findings of the study confirm the research hypothesis that a customary definition of critical infrastructure can be identified under international law, and that attacks on such infrastructure are, in fact, prohibited during armed conflict and in times of peace. The international community has recently started taking action to reinforce this prohibition by recognizing attacks on critical infrastructure as international crimes (specifically, war crimes), though this recognition is currently confined to armed conflict. In this regard, reference is to be made to the two arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against the Russian military authorities for their actions during the war against Ukraine. These warrants were issued as a result of the attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructures, which the ICC recognized as constituting war crimes. Although this represents an initial step, limited to the prosecution of attacks on critical infrastructures in armed conflicts, it should be regarded as a positive development, demonstrating that the international community has finally taken appropriate measures to uphold justice and address impunity. Conclusion Nevertheless, while the definition of critical infrastructure and the rules prohibiting attacks on it are reasonably clear, international law provides no explicit regulation concerning state construction projects that cause severe disruption to the critical infrastructure of neighboring states. For instance, Turkey’s construction of more than twenty dams and nineteen hydroelectric plants on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers has significantly impaired the infrastructure of Syria, Iraq, and even Iran. According to the treaties concluded between Turkey and Syria on the one hand, and Turkey and Iraq on the other, a specific volume of water is required to flow into these two countries (i.e., Syria and Iraq). However, due to Turkey’s activities, the actual amount of water entering their territories has reportedly been reduced to one-tenth of the agreed quantity. It appears that the construction projects undertaken by Turkey have served multiple purposes simultaneously. Indeed, Turkey has not only sought to render the neighboring countries dependent upon it for access to freshwater resources and thereby establish a form of regional hegemony, but has also aimed to disperse opposing Kurdish populations by submerging their villages and residential areas. Furthermore, as a result of these projects, many areas have been inundated by the lakes formed behind the dams. These submerged regions were once the sites of great ancient civilizations and contain archaeological artifacts far older than those of the Ottoman era. By constructing these dams, Turkey has, in effect, contributed to the destruction of these relics, seemingly in an attempt to assert that the Ottoman civilization represents the earliest and most significant civilization in the region. Similarly, Afghanistan’s dam projects on the Helmand and Harirud Rivers have seriously disrupted infrastructure in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan and Khorasan Razavi provinces. By constructing a dam on the Hirmand River and preventing the flow of water into Iran- contrary to the provisions of the 1972 treaty between Iran and Afghanistan- Afghanistan has caused the drying up of the Hamun region of Iran, which lies downstream of the river. These actions have resulted in the displacement and forced migration of thousands of Iranian citizens, residing in that area. Additionally, the construction of a dam on the Harirud River by Afghanistan has severely disrupted the drinking water supply infrastructure of the city of Mashhad in Iran. These situations call for further research into how international law might address such state activities—beyond the mere requirement of consultation—in order to prevent serious harm to neighboring states’ critical infrastructure Abstract Introduction Although assaults on critical infrastructure are not a new phenomenon, their occurrence has seen a significant rise in recent years. They might be deliberate, manifested as military attacks or intentional disruption, or unintentional, in the form of natural or technical disasters. In either case, they lead to catastrophic consequences, in particular for civilians, and in some situations may amount to international crimes such as forced displacement or even the deprivation of lives. Given these grave consequences, the current study addresses the main question of whether international law already contains rules prohibiting attacks on critical infrastructure or not. Since such attacks may take place during both armed conflict and peacetime, relevant international regulations must be examined in both contexts. It is also to be noted that, along with physical assaults, cyber operations can similarly target critical infrastructures. Methods To answer this question, the first issue to consider is whether international law provides a definition of critical infrastructure. The research hypothesis is that, despite the absence of a treaty-based definition, a customary one may be inferred from states practice and the positions of international organizations. Moreover, the prohibition of attacks on critical infrastructures in armed conflicts is confirmed by the principles of international humanitarian law—specifically the principle of distinction. This prohibition, though somewhat implicit, is also relevant in peacetime, since such acts may entail violations of the right to life, a fundamental human right. Results and Discussions The findings of the study confirm the research hypothesis that a customary definition of critical infrastructure can be identified under international law, and that attacks on such infrastructure are, in fact, prohibited during armed conflict and in times of peace. The international community has recently started taking action to reinforce this prohibition by recognizing attacks on critical infrastructure as international crimes (specifically, war crimes), though this recognition is currently confined to armed conflict. In this regard, reference is to be made to the two arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against the Russian military authorities for their actions during the war against Ukraine. These warrants were issued as a result of the attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructures, which the ICC recognized as constituting war crimes. Although this represents an initial step, limited to the prosecution of attacks on critical infrastructures in armed conflicts, it should be regarded as a positive development, demonstrating that the international community has finally taken appropriate measures to uphold justice and address impunity. Conclusion Nevertheless, while the definition of critical infrastructure and the rules prohibiting attacks on it are reasonably clear, international law provides no explicit regulation concerning state construction projects that cause severe disruption to the critical infrastructure of neighboring states. For instance, Turkey’s construction of more than twenty dams and nineteen hydroelectric plants on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers has significantly impaired the infrastructure of Syria, Iraq, and even Iran. According to the treaties concluded between Turkey and Syria on the one hand, and Turkey and Iraq on the other, a specific volume of water is required to flow into these two countries (i.e., Syria and Iraq). However, due to Turkey’s activities, the actual amount of water entering their territories has reportedly been reduced to one-tenth of the agreed quantity. It appears that the construction projects undertaken by Turkey have served multiple purposes simultaneously. Indeed, Turkey has not only sought to render the neighboring countries dependent upon it for access to freshwater resources and thereby establish a form of regional hegemony, but has also aimed to disperse opposing Kurdish populations by submerging their villages and residential areas. Furthermore, as a result of these projects, many areas have been inundated by the lakes formed behind the dams. These submerged regions were once the sites of great ancient civilizations and contain archaeological artifacts far older than those of the Ottoman era. By constructing these dams, Turkey has, in effect, contributed to the destruction of these relics, seemingly in an attempt to assert that the Ottoman civilization represents the earliest and most significant civilization in the region. Similarly, Afghanistan’s dam projects on the Helmand and Harirud Rivers have seriously disrupted infrastructure in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan and Khorasan Razavi provinces. By constructing a dam on the Hirmand River and preventing the flow of water into Iran- contrary to the provisions of the 1972 treaty between Iran and Afghanistan- Afghanistan has caused the drying up of the Hamun region of Iran, which lies downstream of the river. These actions have resulted in the displacement and forced migration of thousands of Iranian citizens, residing in that area. Additionally, the construction of a dam on the Harirud River by Afghanistan has severely disrupted the drinking water supply infrastructure of the city of Mashhad in Iran. These situations call for further research into how international law might address such state activities—beyond the mere requirement of consultation—in order to prevent serious harm to neighboring states’ critical infrastructure

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_106481_2fe993d7430b08153bdc92506ddaca33.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 Analyzing the Element of Negligence in the Context of the Tort of Negligence; Emphasizing on Common Law Analyzing the Element of Negligence in the Context of the Tort of Negligence; Emphasizing on Common Law 23 42 105521 10.48308/jlr.2025.235885.2735 FA Nasrin Mehra Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran Somaye Parhizkary 2. PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran Corresponding Author Email: s_parhizkary@sbu.ac.ir Journal Article 2024 06 09 Introduction Tort is recognized as a type of liability in Common Law, which specifically exists not within the realm of criminal law nor contract-based law, but in a boundary between the two. As an independent legal branch in Common Law, tort primarily focuses on the breach of a duty of care and the subsequent compensation for damages to private individuals. Unlike contractual law, in tort, there is no pre-determined obligation that binds individuals to perform specific duties; rather, the core of tort emphasizes how individuals should behave towards one another. In contrast, tort is fundamentally different from criminal law as well. A tort is neither sufficiently reprehensible nor a violation of norms to warrant a criminal response, nor does it typically provide the requisite mental element for a crime. In criminal law, we deal with the violation of norms and values respected by the community, which the public prosecutor is responsible for pursuing. In contrast, tort involves the breach of a general duty imposed by law upon citizens to frame the standard of careful conduct, situated at a level lower than the values protected by criminal law. Thus, tort is a completely unique institution, distinct from other legal institutions. It comprises a set of rules aimed at compensating for harms resulting from individuals' injurious actions, seeking to provide a deterrent sanction depending on the type of right infringed. Among these, the tort of negligence, as one of its branches, has gained wider application and prevalence. The main foundation of this tort, as its name implies, is built upon the element of negligence, and its sole sanction is compensation for the damage resulting from the negligent acts of others. Nowadays, many incidents occur due to the perpetrator's oversight and failure to consider the consequences of their actions and their failure to foresee circumstances that could lead to dire outcomes and irreparable results. Indeed, not all wrongful acts occur intentionally; sometimes a person commits an act that is blameworthy due to the presence of other elements. Here, although the negligent perpetrator lacks the requisite mental element for committing a crime, by deviating from the behavioral standards of a reasonable person, they have violated the rights of others and may very well possess the potential and risk of becoming an offender in the near future. Therefore, negligence is an initial step that can pave the way for future recklessness, especially when activities arising from negligence openly carry the risk of future harm and loss and are considered a threat to individuals' lives and health. In such circumstances, an evolution in the concept of the mental element of crime, consequently changing the type of liability and transitioning from a compensatory sanction to a more severe punitive sanction, would be more effective in preventing negligent acts and promoting social welfare—a matter that necessitates justifying negligence as a sufficient mental element for committing a crime. Methods This research employs a descriptive-analytical method, relying on library sources and conducting a comparative study particularly within the legal systems of England to examine the possibility of transforming "negligence" into a mental element within the structure of crime. Results and Discussions This research seeks to justify the possibility of criminal liability for a negligent perpetrator under specific conditions by resorting to approaches such as the risk creation approach, the tracing approach, and other related factors. In today's world, risk is accepted as a factor that justifies the imposition of liability and encompasses a wide range of different approaches. In other words, although knowledge is an inherent characteristic of criminal responsibility, and imposing criminal liability on a negligent agent distances us from the fundamental principles of criminal liability, such as the presumption of innocence, those who propose the idea of potential awareness believe that the mere failure to notice the existence of an "unjustifiable risk" itself indicates a blameworthy and serious practical indifference to the interests that the perpetrator's action actually threatens. Indeed, what makes the negligent agent blameworthy is their apparent indifference to the lives and property of others. This theory is further reinforced by the "Tracing Approach." According to this approach, the criminal liability of the accused in cases of negligence lies in their prior criminal acts. Abstractly, the tracing approach posits that fault arising from negligence must be identified by tracing it back to the accused's prior acts or omissions that caused their unawareness of the relevant danger and risk. In fact, negligence should be understood within a broader framework based on the general principle of "prior fault." Prior fault occurs when a person can be held criminally responsible for a subsequent act resulting from their prior criminal behavior.The key point in justifying criminal liability for negligence is tracing the person's carelessness and inadvertent mental state to prove their prior fault, which at a minimum stems from recklessness (the lowest level of criminal liability). Conclusion The influence of modern advancements and innovations on today's society creates a cycle of risks whose failure to be anticipated and, consequently, prevented, can lead to harmful outcomes. Many of the adverse factors humanity currently faces stem from negligence, which allows individuals to evade criminal liability. The sphere of influence of negligence is ongoing, not only in private domains and interpersonal relationships but also in public spheres and areas fundamentally connected to people's lives and property. To this end, establishing criteria for creating a differentiated approach is essential. This means that by considering a standard such as the safeguarding of human life and health, in instances where negligent acts could lead to the loss of these values, a more severe response is warranted, and mere negligence can be considered a basis for imposing criminal liability. Similarly, considerations such as the necessity of environmental preservation can serve as grounds for deviating from the current traditional system. Thus, establishing a differentiated approach that creates a balanced and proportionate relationship between the risk of an activity and the degree of negligence on one hand, and ensuring security and justice for potential victims on the other, is highly significant. Factors such as controlling dangerous activities, risk management, blameworthiness, and holding corporations accountable must be analyzed in light of the scale of activity, profitability, societal benefit, and the advancement of justice to justify a differential treatment of negligence Introduction Tort is recognized as a type of liability in Common Law, which specifically exists not within the realm of criminal law nor contract-based law, but in a boundary between the two. As an independent legal branch in Common Law, tort primarily focuses on the breach of a duty of care and the subsequent compensation for damages to private individuals. Unlike contractual law, in tort, there is no pre-determined obligation that binds individuals to perform specific duties; rather, the core of tort emphasizes how individuals should behave towards one another. In contrast, tort is fundamentally different from criminal law as well. A tort is neither sufficiently reprehensible nor a violation of norms to warrant a criminal response, nor does it typically provide the requisite mental element for a crime. In criminal law, we deal with the violation of norms and values respected by the community, which the public prosecutor is responsible for pursuing. In contrast, tort involves the breach of a general duty imposed by law upon citizens to frame the standard of careful conduct, situated at a level lower than the values protected by criminal law. Thus, tort is a completely unique institution, distinct from other legal institutions. It comprises a set of rules aimed at compensating for harms resulting from individuals' injurious actions, seeking to provide a deterrent sanction depending on the type of right infringed. Among these, the tort of negligence, as one of its branches, has gained wider application and prevalence. The main foundation of this tort, as its name implies, is built upon the element of negligence, and its sole sanction is compensation for the damage resulting from the negligent acts of others. Nowadays, many incidents occur due to the perpetrator's oversight and failure to consider the consequences of their actions and their failure to foresee circumstances that could lead to dire outcomes and irreparable results. Indeed, not all wrongful acts occur intentionally; sometimes a person commits an act that is blameworthy due to the presence of other elements. Here, although the negligent perpetrator lacks the requisite mental element for committing a crime, by deviating from the behavioral standards of a reasonable person, they have violated the rights of others and may very well possess the potential and risk of becoming an offender in the near future. Therefore, negligence is an initial step that can pave the way for future recklessness, especially when activities arising from negligence openly carry the risk of future harm and loss and are considered a threat to individuals' lives and health. In such circumstances, an evolution in the concept of the mental element of crime, consequently changing the type of liability and transitioning from a compensatory sanction to a more severe punitive sanction, would be more effective in preventing negligent acts and promoting social welfare—a matter that necessitates justifying negligence as a sufficient mental element for committing a crime. Methods This research employs a descriptive-analytical method, relying on library sources and conducting a comparative study particularly within the legal systems of England to examine the possibility of transforming "negligence" into a mental element within the structure of crime. Results and Discussions This research seeks to justify the possibility of criminal liability for a negligent perpetrator under specific conditions by resorting to approaches such as the risk creation approach, the tracing approach, and other related factors. In today's world, risk is accepted as a factor that justifies the imposition of liability and encompasses a wide range of different approaches. In other words, although knowledge is an inherent characteristic of criminal responsibility, and imposing criminal liability on a negligent agent distances us from the fundamental principles of criminal liability, such as the presumption of innocence, those who propose the idea of potential awareness believe that the mere failure to notice the existence of an "unjustifiable risk" itself indicates a blameworthy and serious practical indifference to the interests that the perpetrator's action actually threatens. Indeed, what makes the negligent agent blameworthy is their apparent indifference to the lives and property of others. This theory is further reinforced by the "Tracing Approach." According to this approach, the criminal liability of the accused in cases of negligence lies in their prior criminal acts. Abstractly, the tracing approach posits that fault arising from negligence must be identified by tracing it back to the accused's prior acts or omissions that caused their unawareness of the relevant danger and risk. In fact, negligence should be understood within a broader framework based on the general principle of "prior fault." Prior fault occurs when a person can be held criminally responsible for a subsequent act resulting from their prior criminal behavior.The key point in justifying criminal liability for negligence is tracing the person's carelessness and inadvertent mental state to prove their prior fault, which at a minimum stems from recklessness (the lowest level of criminal liability). Conclusion The influence of modern advancements and innovations on today's society creates a cycle of risks whose failure to be anticipated and, consequently, prevented, can lead to harmful outcomes. Many of the adverse factors humanity currently faces stem from negligence, which allows individuals to evade criminal liability. The sphere of influence of negligence is ongoing, not only in private domains and interpersonal relationships but also in public spheres and areas fundamentally connected to people's lives and property. To this end, establishing criteria for creating a differentiated approach is essential. This means that by considering a standard such as the safeguarding of human life and health, in instances where negligent acts could lead to the loss of these values, a more severe response is warranted, and mere negligence can be considered a basis for imposing criminal liability. Similarly, considerations such as the necessity of environmental preservation can serve as grounds for deviating from the current traditional system. Thus, establishing a differentiated approach that creates a balanced and proportionate relationship between the risk of an activity and the degree of negligence on one hand, and ensuring security and justice for potential victims on the other, is highly significant. Factors such as controlling dangerous activities, risk management, blameworthiness, and holding corporations accountable must be analyzed in light of the scale of activity, profitability, societal benefit, and the advancement of justice to justify a differential treatment of negligence

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105521_4be089f22928bac4236661c2dab4efdc.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 Evaluation of the German Constitutional Approach to Combating Political Corruption Evaluation of the German Constitutional Approach to Combating Political Corruption 43 66 105851 10.48308/jlr.2025.239512.2881 FA Seyyed Mojtaba Vaezi ), Full Prof., Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran. Shahram Ebrahimi Associate Professor, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran, Sadegh Moradi , Ph.D. Student and lecturer in law, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran. Journal Article 2025 04 19 In modern societies, it is essential to create appropriate conditions for the active participation of citizens in political life, and political development is a prerequisite and essential co-requisite in this regard. In the meantime, although political development arises from a democratic order and the rule of law, political corruption, on the other hand, disrupts this process and threatens sustainable development, posing a serious threat to democratic structures. It can lead to deviations in policy-making and prevent the government from achieving goals in line with sustainable development. Political corruption, by weakening democratic institutions and reducing public trust, has also become a chronic disease in political systems and has affected the economic development and political stability of countries by creating inequality and injustice, a process that leads to the creation of an unequal society. Corruption can also lead to unfair allocation of resources, foster nepotism, and a lack of transparency in the functioning of government institutions. Among these, Germany is one of the countries known for its serious approach to combating corruption and has taken extensive measures to promote transparency and accountability. In this regard, the authors, to provide implementation suggestions (including providing implementation mechanisms in refining laws, regulating an efficient representation system, strengthening oversight, and increasing transparency and accountability), aim to answer what mechanisms and laws have been used in Germany to combat political corruption. And how can political corruption be overcome through legal reforms? In modern societies, it is essential to create appropriate conditions for the active participation of citizens in political life, and political development is a prerequisite and essential co-requisite in this regard. In the meantime, although political development arises from a democratic order and the rule of law, political corruption, on the other hand, disrupts this process and threatens sustainable development, posing a serious threat to democratic structures. It can lead to deviations in policy-making and prevent the government from achieving goals in line with sustainable development. Political corruption, by weakening democratic institutions and reducing public trust, has also become a chronic disease in political systems and has affected the economic development and political stability of countries by creating inequality and injustice, a process that leads to the creation of an unequal society. Corruption can also lead to unfair allocation of resources, foster nepotism, and a lack of transparency in the functioning of government institutions. Among these, Germany is one of the countries known for its serious approach to combating corruption and has taken extensive measures to promote transparency and accountability. In this regard, the authors, to provide implementation suggestions (including providing implementation mechanisms in refining laws, regulating an efficient representation system, strengthening oversight, and increasing transparency and accountability), aim to answer what mechanisms and laws have been used in Germany to combat political corruption. And how can political corruption be overcome through legal reforms?

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105851_0633d3ca09105d7fdfbd39932de7ce38.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 Why Study Philosophy of Law? Reading Bjarne Melkevik Why Study Philosophy of Law? Reading Bjarne Melkevik 67 82 105631 10.48308/jlr.2025.237767.2816 FA Amir Feizbakhsh PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, Laval University, Quebec, Canada Corresponding Author Email: amir.feizbakhsh.1@ulaval.ca. Bjarne Melkevik Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Laval University, Quebec, Canada. Journal Article 2024 12 03 Abstract Introduction The status of the philosophy of law and its usefulness for legal thought remains one of the key questions in the legal sphere today. The answer to this question not only shapes the perspectives of legal scholars but also influences their practical work in the field of law. However, many legal professionals perceive the philosophy of law as a theoretical concept, disconnected from the practical application of legal principles. This perception has led to distrust and resistance toward it. In contrast to this skeptical view, some scholars have taken a different approach. Among them, Bjarne Melkevik, a distinguished professor of the philosophy of law, argues that this discipline should be understood as an intellectual framework for the modern legal project. From this perspective, the philosophy of law structures legal reasoning and, in doing so, establishes a fundamental link between philosophical thought and legal practice. The present study examines Bjarne Melkevik’s perspective and, through his ideas and works, addresses the question of the significance and value of the philosophy of law. Methods The present study begins with a Doctrinal Legal Research approach, aiming to collect and analyze Bjarne Melkevik’s diverse works in order to identify his fundamental ideas regarding the philosophy of law, legal education, and the public sphere. The selection of these sources has been carried out with the purpose of representing his core views and constructing the theoretical framework of the research. In the second stage, to move beyond mere description toward critical analysis, a Hermeneutic and Critical Discourse Analysis methodology has been employed. At this level, Melkevik’s writings are reinterpreted within the broader discourse of modern legal philosophy and in connection with contemporary legal challenges, thereby opening new horizons on the relationship between philosophy, education, and the social function of law. This approach, inspired primarily by Gadamerian hermeneutics, situates the reading of texts in a living dialogue with current legal issues. Finally, to deepen the findings, a Comparative Method in Legal Philosophy has been applied, allowing Melkevik’s thought - albeit in a condensed form - to be assessed in light of theorists such as Jürgen Habermas and Ronald Dworkin. This combination of doctrinal, hermeneutic, and comparative approaches provides a robust analytical and critical foundation for understanding the role of the philosophy of law within the modern legal project. Results and Discussions The present study evaluates the role of the philosophy of law within the framework of the modern legal project. To examine this issue, Bjarne Melkevik highlights the historical conditions that have contributed to distrust toward the philosophy of law. In particular, he emphasizes the divide between the theoretical and practical dimensions in both philosophical and legal thought. In response to such critiques, Melkevik advocates for a philosophy of law that revitalizes legal discourse, opening new perspectives for addressing contemporary legal challenges. He views this achievement as the outcome of a productive dialogue between law, philosophy, and other branches of legal sciences, one that relies on critical, intersubjective reasoning rather than positivist reductionism or prescriptive metaphysics. Analysis of Melkevik’s works in this study shows that legal reasoning serves as the central link between philosophy and law in his thought. In other words, the proper application of philosophy in law functions as a guiding framework that structures legal principles and arguments while remaining accountable to institutional realities and the demands of democratic discourse. To illustrate this role, Melkevik emphasizes philosophy’s guiding capacity within the legal project and the cultural context of a legal system, which determines its openness to philosophical influence. This guidance is deliberative rather than prescriptive, requiring the testing of reasons across scholarly and public forums to establish what counts as a sound argument in practice. Another key concept in Melkevik’s thought is the public sphere, which he examines in relation to the connection between philosophy and law. In democratic societies, law is not only shaped through legislative processes and judicial decisions but is also scrutinized within public discourse. Within this framework, the philosophy of law plays a fundamental role in shaping perceptions and debates in the public domain, privileging communicative rationality and co-authorship of norms. In this way, it provides a critical and reasoned foundation for legal engagement in the public sphere and treats courts not as ultimate arbiters of ethical meaning but as interlocutors within the processes of argumentation and democratic adjudication. Finally, the relationship between philosophy and law - particularly the balance between its theoretical and practical dimensions - is reinforced through the teaching of the philosophy of law in law schools. Melkevik strongly advocates for integrating this philosophy into legal curricula, arguing that its capacity to guide the modern legal project depends on proper instruction. He contends that students can only fully understand the broader societal role of law through a thorough comprehension of the philosophy of law. From a pedagogical perspective, familiarizing students with what law provides for society is achieved through the study of legal philosophy, which cultivates public reasoning, sensitivity to the cultural dimensions of legality and legitimacy, and the development of argumentative judgment oriented toward democratic deliberation and the health of the legal order. From an educational perspective, students' familiarity with what law provides for society comes from learning the philosophy of law. Conclusion The philosophy of law, as articulated by thinkers such as Bjarne Melkevik, can offer meaningful responses to the critiques that have been raised against it. Moreover, adopting such a philosophical perspective contributes to a renewed understanding of the concept of law, strengthening the modern legal project in its confrontation with the challenges of today’s legal systems. Through this lens, the philosophy of law becomes a living force in rethinking the rational foundations of law. This philosophy serves both as a safeguard for rights and as an instrument for achieving a democratic conception of law. Accordingly, through the teaching of such a philosophy of law, one can answer the question of why it should be studied in the light of thinkers such as Bjarne Melkevik. Abstract Introduction The status of the philosophy of law and its usefulness for legal thought remains one of the key questions in the legal sphere today. The answer to this question not only shapes the perspectives of legal scholars but also influences their practical work in the field of law. However, many legal professionals perceive the philosophy of law as a theoretical concept, disconnected from the practical application of legal principles. This perception has led to distrust and resistance toward it. In contrast to this skeptical view, some scholars have taken a different approach. Among them, Bjarne Melkevik, a distinguished professor of the philosophy of law, argues that this discipline should be understood as an intellectual framework for the modern legal project. From this perspective, the philosophy of law structures legal reasoning and, in doing so, establishes a fundamental link between philosophical thought and legal practice. The present study examines Bjarne Melkevik’s perspective and, through his ideas and works, addresses the question of the significance and value of the philosophy of law. Methods The present study begins with a Doctrinal Legal Research approach, aiming to collect and analyze Bjarne Melkevik’s diverse works in order to identify his fundamental ideas regarding the philosophy of law, legal education, and the public sphere. The selection of these sources has been carried out with the purpose of representing his core views and constructing the theoretical framework of the research. In the second stage, to move beyond mere description toward critical analysis, a Hermeneutic and Critical Discourse Analysis methodology has been employed. At this level, Melkevik’s writings are reinterpreted within the broader discourse of modern legal philosophy and in connection with contemporary legal challenges, thereby opening new horizons on the relationship between philosophy, education, and the social function of law. This approach, inspired primarily by Gadamerian hermeneutics, situates the reading of texts in a living dialogue with current legal issues. Finally, to deepen the findings, a Comparative Method in Legal Philosophy has been applied, allowing Melkevik’s thought - albeit in a condensed form - to be assessed in light of theorists such as Jürgen Habermas and Ronald Dworkin. This combination of doctrinal, hermeneutic, and comparative approaches provides a robust analytical and critical foundation for understanding the role of the philosophy of law within the modern legal project. Results and Discussions The present study evaluates the role of the philosophy of law within the framework of the modern legal project. To examine this issue, Bjarne Melkevik highlights the historical conditions that have contributed to distrust toward the philosophy of law. In particular, he emphasizes the divide between the theoretical and practical dimensions in both philosophical and legal thought. In response to such critiques, Melkevik advocates for a philosophy of law that revitalizes legal discourse, opening new perspectives for addressing contemporary legal challenges. He views this achievement as the outcome of a productive dialogue between law, philosophy, and other branches of legal sciences, one that relies on critical, intersubjective reasoning rather than positivist reductionism or prescriptive metaphysics. Analysis of Melkevik’s works in this study shows that legal reasoning serves as the central link between philosophy and law in his thought. In other words, the proper application of philosophy in law functions as a guiding framework that structures legal principles and arguments while remaining accountable to institutional realities and the demands of democratic discourse. To illustrate this role, Melkevik emphasizes philosophy’s guiding capacity within the legal project and the cultural context of a legal system, which determines its openness to philosophical influence. This guidance is deliberative rather than prescriptive, requiring the testing of reasons across scholarly and public forums to establish what counts as a sound argument in practice. Another key concept in Melkevik’s thought is the public sphere, which he examines in relation to the connection between philosophy and law. In democratic societies, law is not only shaped through legislative processes and judicial decisions but is also scrutinized within public discourse. Within this framework, the philosophy of law plays a fundamental role in shaping perceptions and debates in the public domain, privileging communicative rationality and co-authorship of norms. In this way, it provides a critical and reasoned foundation for legal engagement in the public sphere and treats courts not as ultimate arbiters of ethical meaning but as interlocutors within the processes of argumentation and democratic adjudication. Finally, the relationship between philosophy and law - particularly the balance between its theoretical and practical dimensions - is reinforced through the teaching of the philosophy of law in law schools. Melkevik strongly advocates for integrating this philosophy into legal curricula, arguing that its capacity to guide the modern legal project depends on proper instruction. He contends that students can only fully understand the broader societal role of law through a thorough comprehension of the philosophy of law. From a pedagogical perspective, familiarizing students with what law provides for society is achieved through the study of legal philosophy, which cultivates public reasoning, sensitivity to the cultural dimensions of legality and legitimacy, and the development of argumentative judgment oriented toward democratic deliberation and the health of the legal order. From an educational perspective, students' familiarity with what law provides for society comes from learning the philosophy of law. Conclusion The philosophy of law, as articulated by thinkers such as Bjarne Melkevik, can offer meaningful responses to the critiques that have been raised against it. Moreover, adopting such a philosophical perspective contributes to a renewed understanding of the concept of law, strengthening the modern legal project in its confrontation with the challenges of today’s legal systems. Through this lens, the philosophy of law becomes a living force in rethinking the rational foundations of law. This philosophy serves both as a safeguard for rights and as an instrument for achieving a democratic conception of law. Accordingly, through the teaching of such a philosophy of law, one can answer the question of why it should be studied in the light of thinkers such as Bjarne Melkevik.

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105631_7fe1023ccba18f18d3361994aa623fba.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 The Right of Residence of a Divorcee in Legal Systems of Iran, Iraq and Algeria The Right of Residence of a Divorcee in Legal Systems of Iran, Iraq and Algeria 83 105 106553 10.48308/jlr.2023.231368.2479 FA Mina Salempour P.h.D, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran Corresponding Author Email: mybestgod1@gmail.com Mohammad Roshan Associate Professor, Family Research Institute, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2023 04 26 Introduction Marriage is divinely ordained as a sacred bond between a man and a woman for the establishment of a stable family. Nevertheless, the stability of the family may be threatened by challenges that affect the continuity of love or marital relations. Although divorce is generally disfavored, it is permitted as a last resort to end an unsuccessful marital relationship. Divorce does not always align with the objectives of Islamic law, nor is it always accompanied by the full payment of the wife’s rights. It is common for men to issue divorce without legitimate cause, resulting in significant social issues, including homelessness for divorced women and their children. Provision of housing for divorced women and their children under custody has largely been neglected in legislation, despite the fact that the right to housing is a fundamental and essential right closely linked to a woman’s dignity, personality, and status, which Islamic law strongly recommends. The rising rate of divorce and the displacement of numerous women with their children necessitate a legal review and the enactment of precise protective regulations. The approval of the protection rights of the divorced wife also has a preventive role in divorce and ultimately leads to a decrease in the number of divorces because if the man knows that the divorced woman is under the protection of the law and that in the event of a divorce without a valid reason, he will be obliged to provide her house, he will make a decision with reflection and foresight.This study seeks to answer the question: Is the right to housing for divorced women, based on Quranic verses, Hadiths, and rational arguments, recognizable under Iranian law? To address this question, the concept of housing (Sakani), the conditions for entitlement, and instances of non-entitlement were examined in the legal systems of Iran, Iraq and Algeria. The primary objective of this research is a comparative examination of the right to housing for divorced women in the legal systems of Iraq and Algeria with that of Iran, aiming to propose protective measures to prevent homelessness resulting from unjustified divorces in Iran. Iraq and Algeria were selected because their legal frameworks, like Iran’s, are derived from Islamic law and share common jurisprudential foundations. However, both countries have specific protective mechanisms regarding the housing rights of divorced women, which can provide a basis for comparison and potential solutions for Iranian law. The Iraqi legislature, in the 1983 Right to Residence Law, has provided for the right of a divorced woman to reside for three years under certain conditions and the Algerian Family Law, amended in 2005, has also provided for the right of a divorced woman who has custody of children to claim housing or receive rent. Such provisions aim to reduce the harms and suffering caused by unjust divorce. Methods This study is analytical and comparative in nature. Data were collected from legal sources, including the Iranian Civil Code and the Family Protection Law, as well as jurisprudential sources, Quranic verses, and authentic Hadiths. In the comparative section, the 1983 Iraqi Housing Rights Law and the 2005 amended Algerian Family Law were analyzed. Data were examined through content and comparative analysis to identify the strengths and weaknesses of Iranian law. The research considers legal, social, and human dimensions, allowing an evaluation of the effectiveness of legislation and its alignment with principles of justice and human dignity. Results and Discussions Analysis of Iranian laws reveals that legal protection of divorced women’s housing rights is limited and insufficient. Article 38 of the Family Protection Law and related provisions grant the right to housing only under specific conditions and time constraints, without effective enforcement mechanisms. Custodial divorced women, responsible for their children, face serious economic and housing challenges in the absence of practical enforcement measures. In Iraq, under the 1983 Housing Rights Law, a divorced woman may reside in the marital home for up to three years. This legal protection ensures women’s dignity, economic security, and prevents psychological harm. In Algeria, the 2005 amended Family Law guarantees the right to housing or rental payment for custodial divorced women. These laws not only support women but also serve as a deterrent against misuse of child custody rights by spouses. It is recommended that legislators, drawing on jurisprudential principles and experiences from other legal systems, enact clear and independent regulations regarding the housing rights of divorced women, particularly those with child custody, and recognize it as a right distinct from child support. Effective enforcement mechanisms should also be established to oblige the husband to provide housing or pay rent, thereby preserving the woman’s dignity and ensuring the children’s rights are adequately protected. Conclusion The study concludes that Iranian laws regarding the housing rights of divorced women, particularly custodial divorced women, require serious reform and effective enforcement mechanisms. The experiences of Iraq and Algeria demonstrate that legal recognition of housing rights and their enforcement have significant positive effects in supporting women and children. Legislators, taking into account custody status, the husband’s financial capacity, and the divorced woman’s dignity, can draft efficient laws to secure family well-being, children’s welfare, and social justice Introduction Marriage is divinely ordained as a sacred bond between a man and a woman for the establishment of a stable family. Nevertheless, the stability of the family may be threatened by challenges that affect the continuity of love or marital relations. Although divorce is generally disfavored, it is permitted as a last resort to end an unsuccessful marital relationship. Divorce does not always align with the objectives of Islamic law, nor is it always accompanied by the full payment of the wife’s rights. It is common for men to issue divorce without legitimate cause, resulting in significant social issues, including homelessness for divorced women and their children. Provision of housing for divorced women and their children under custody has largely been neglected in legislation, despite the fact that the right to housing is a fundamental and essential right closely linked to a woman’s dignity, personality, and status, which Islamic law strongly recommends. The rising rate of divorce and the displacement of numerous women with their children necessitate a legal review and the enactment of precise protective regulations. The approval of the protection rights of the divorced wife also has a preventive role in divorce and ultimately leads to a decrease in the number of divorces because if the man knows that the divorced woman is under the protection of the law and that in the event of a divorce without a valid reason, he will be obliged to provide her house, he will make a decision with reflection and foresight.This study seeks to answer the question: Is the right to housing for divorced women, based on Quranic verses, Hadiths, and rational arguments, recognizable under Iranian law? To address this question, the concept of housing (Sakani), the conditions for entitlement, and instances of non-entitlement were examined in the legal systems of Iran, Iraq and Algeria. The primary objective of this research is a comparative examination of the right to housing for divorced women in the legal systems of Iraq and Algeria with that of Iran, aiming to propose protective measures to prevent homelessness resulting from unjustified divorces in Iran. Iraq and Algeria were selected because their legal frameworks, like Iran’s, are derived from Islamic law and share common jurisprudential foundations. However, both countries have specific protective mechanisms regarding the housing rights of divorced women, which can provide a basis for comparison and potential solutions for Iranian law. The Iraqi legislature, in the 1983 Right to Residence Law, has provided for the right of a divorced woman to reside for three years under certain conditions and the Algerian Family Law, amended in 2005, has also provided for the right of a divorced woman who has custody of children to claim housing or receive rent. Such provisions aim to reduce the harms and suffering caused by unjust divorce. Methods This study is analytical and comparative in nature. Data were collected from legal sources, including the Iranian Civil Code and the Family Protection Law, as well as jurisprudential sources, Quranic verses, and authentic Hadiths. In the comparative section, the 1983 Iraqi Housing Rights Law and the 2005 amended Algerian Family Law were analyzed. Data were examined through content and comparative analysis to identify the strengths and weaknesses of Iranian law. The research considers legal, social, and human dimensions, allowing an evaluation of the effectiveness of legislation and its alignment with principles of justice and human dignity. Results and Discussions Analysis of Iranian laws reveals that legal protection of divorced women’s housing rights is limited and insufficient. Article 38 of the Family Protection Law and related provisions grant the right to housing only under specific conditions and time constraints, without effective enforcement mechanisms. Custodial divorced women, responsible for their children, face serious economic and housing challenges in the absence of practical enforcement measures. In Iraq, under the 1983 Housing Rights Law, a divorced woman may reside in the marital home for up to three years. This legal protection ensures women’s dignity, economic security, and prevents psychological harm. In Algeria, the 2005 amended Family Law guarantees the right to housing or rental payment for custodial divorced women. These laws not only support women but also serve as a deterrent against misuse of child custody rights by spouses. It is recommended that legislators, drawing on jurisprudential principles and experiences from other legal systems, enact clear and independent regulations regarding the housing rights of divorced women, particularly those with child custody, and recognize it as a right distinct from child support. Effective enforcement mechanisms should also be established to oblige the husband to provide housing or pay rent, thereby preserving the woman’s dignity and ensuring the children’s rights are adequately protected. Conclusion The study concludes that Iranian laws regarding the housing rights of divorced women, particularly custodial divorced women, require serious reform and effective enforcement mechanisms. The experiences of Iraq and Algeria demonstrate that legal recognition of housing rights and their enforcement have significant positive effects in supporting women and children. Legislators, taking into account custody status, the husband’s financial capacity, and the divorced woman’s dignity, can draft efficient laws to secure family well-being, children’s welfare, and social justice

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_106553_5c4cbde0f435e9c985685a17997c38ce.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 The Role of Public Law Legal Entities in the Criminal Process: from Passive to Active Actors The Role of Public Law Legal Entities in the Criminal Process: from Passive to Active Actors 107 124 105930 10.48308/jlr.2025.238804.2853 FA Jafar Koosha Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran. اکبر Khodabandehlo Ph.D Candidate, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran Corresponding Author Email: a_khodabandeloo@sbu.ac.ir 0009-0007-4335-0878 Journal Article 2025 02 16 Abstract Introduction Legal entities are generally divided into private law legal entities and public law legal entities, and there are differences between them, including the difference in goals, which include the fact that private law legal entities are formed to secure the interests of a limited number of individuals, while public law legal entities are formed to protect and secure public and general interests and meet the needs of the people. One of the issues raised regarding public law legal entities is the legal position of these persons in cases where a crime is committed against them. Regarding cases where a crime is committed against a public law legal entity, two cases may arise. The first case is where direct damage has been caused to the public law legal entity, such as property belonging to the said person being stolen or destroyed. The second case is related to the place where the crime is committed against the subjects whose protection and provision are among the duties of the legal entity, for example, protecting the environment is one of the duties of the Environmental Protection Agency. If a crime such as environmental pollution is committed, this crime has been committed against an issue that the Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for protecting. Methods In this article, using a descriptive-analytical method, while examining Acts, regulations, legal opinions, and judicial practice, we seek to answer these questions: What is the position of public law legal entities in cases where a crime is committed against them? Do they have the position of declaring a crime or do they have the position of plaintiff? What are the effects of each of the positions? And specifically, we seek to answer the question: Do public law legal entities have the right to declare forgiveness for crimes committed against them? Accordingly, we will first examine the legal position of public law legal entities in crimes committed against them, and then we will examine the effects of each position. Results and Discussions In cases where a crime committed against a public law legal entity has caused direct harm to the public law legal entity, there is no doubt that these persons are considered plaintiffs in terms of causing direct harm to them. Where a crime is committed against objects whose protection are among the duties of the legal entity, there is doubt that the public law legal entity is considered plaintiff. In this case, it should be stated that public law legal entities are providers of public services, and these services are provided to meet the needs and provide public benefits, and accordingly, some crimes may occur that disrupt the process of providing services. Accordingly, crimes against the duties of public law legal entities are among the crimes whose victims are members of society, and it cannot be said that these crimes do not have victims, but rather these crimes are among the crimes without direct victims, and since all members of society are considered victims, the public law legal entity, which has the duty to protect and provide that object, is considered plaintiff on behalf of members of society and proceeds to pursue a criminal case as plaintiff. In Some Acts explicitly refer to the plaintiffs being public law legal entities, such as Articles 36 and 37 of the Central Bank Act and Note 4 of Article 1 of the Unorganized Monetary Market Regulation Act regarding the Central Bank being considered as plaintiffs, which in these Acts stipulate that public law legal entities are considered as plaintiffs. In some acts, the legislator, in addition to considering legal entities under public law as plaintiffs, has considered the officers of that legal entity as bailiffs. For example, in Note 2 of section 11 of the Clean Air Law, the Environmental Protection Organization is considered a plaintiff, and Note 1 of Article 32 of the aforementioned law considers the officers of the organization as bailiffs. Considering that the legislator has explicitly referred to legal entities as plaintiff in some specific laws or has specified matters such as exemption from paying court fees, which are considered to be the rights of the plaintiff, it seems that by clarifying the scope of these cases, public law legal entities can be considered as plaintiff in the criminal trial process. Therefore, public law legal entities are considered plaintiffs in the criminal proceedings. Given that public law legal entities are considered plaintiff, they have the rights and duties of a plaintiff in the criminal proceedings. Among the duties of public law legal entities in the criminal proceedings as plaintiff is the need to pay the cost of Proceedings, which in the current laws, the principle is that these persons must pay the cost of Proceedings, unless the legislator has made an exception. Given that these persons are considered plaintiff, the decisions issued by the prosecutor's office and criminal courts must be communicated to them and they have the right to object to the decisions. These individuals have the right to present evidence to prove the subject of their complaint. public law legal entities expected to secure the interests they are responsible for securing and protecting, and in the event of full exercise of the relevant rights, they can declare a voluntary dismissal of the complaint submitted, and they can even waive filing of a complaint in the event of full exercise of the rights before filing a complaint, and in the event of unforgivable crimes, while declaring the occurrence of a crime, they can waive the filing of a criminal case as a plaintiff. Conclusion In Iranian law, considering the Acts that refer to public law legal entities as plaintiffs and considering the existential philosophy of these entities, which is to provide public service, it can be assumed that public law legal entities have the position of plaintiff. they have the rights of plaintiffs, such as the right to complain, the right to present evidence, and the right to object to judicial decisions. In the event that the interests and rights of the public law legal entity are fully satisfied, these individuals have the right to declare a waiver of the criminal complaint. Abstract Introduction Legal entities are generally divided into private law legal entities and public law legal entities, and there are differences between them, including the difference in goals, which include the fact that private law legal entities are formed to secure the interests of a limited number of individuals, while public law legal entities are formed to protect and secure public and general interests and meet the needs of the people. One of the issues raised regarding public law legal entities is the legal position of these persons in cases where a crime is committed against them. Regarding cases where a crime is committed against a public law legal entity, two cases may arise. The first case is where direct damage has been caused to the public law legal entity, such as property belonging to the said person being stolen or destroyed. The second case is related to the place where the crime is committed against the subjects whose protection and provision are among the duties of the legal entity, for example, protecting the environment is one of the duties of the Environmental Protection Agency. If a crime such as environmental pollution is committed, this crime has been committed against an issue that the Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for protecting. Methods In this article, using a descriptive-analytical method, while examining Acts, regulations, legal opinions, and judicial practice, we seek to answer these questions: What is the position of public law legal entities in cases where a crime is committed against them? Do they have the position of declaring a crime or do they have the position of plaintiff? What are the effects of each of the positions? And specifically, we seek to answer the question: Do public law legal entities have the right to declare forgiveness for crimes committed against them? Accordingly, we will first examine the legal position of public law legal entities in crimes committed against them, and then we will examine the effects of each position. Results and Discussions In cases where a crime committed against a public law legal entity has caused direct harm to the public law legal entity, there is no doubt that these persons are considered plaintiffs in terms of causing direct harm to them. Where a crime is committed against objects whose protection are among the duties of the legal entity, there is doubt that the public law legal entity is considered plaintiff. In this case, it should be stated that public law legal entities are providers of public services, and these services are provided to meet the needs and provide public benefits, and accordingly, some crimes may occur that disrupt the process of providing services. Accordingly, crimes against the duties of public law legal entities are among the crimes whose victims are members of society, and it cannot be said that these crimes do not have victims, but rather these crimes are among the crimes without direct victims, and since all members of society are considered victims, the public law legal entity, which has the duty to protect and provide that object, is considered plaintiff on behalf of members of society and proceeds to pursue a criminal case as plaintiff. In Some Acts explicitly refer to the plaintiffs being public law legal entities, such as Articles 36 and 37 of the Central Bank Act and Note 4 of Article 1 of the Unorganized Monetary Market Regulation Act regarding the Central Bank being considered as plaintiffs, which in these Acts stipulate that public law legal entities are considered as plaintiffs. In some acts, the legislator, in addition to considering legal entities under public law as plaintiffs, has considered the officers of that legal entity as bailiffs. For example, in Note 2 of section 11 of the Clean Air Law, the Environmental Protection Organization is considered a plaintiff, and Note 1 of Article 32 of the aforementioned law considers the officers of the organization as bailiffs. Considering that the legislator has explicitly referred to legal entities as plaintiff in some specific laws or has specified matters such as exemption from paying court fees, which are considered to be the rights of the plaintiff, it seems that by clarifying the scope of these cases, public law legal entities can be considered as plaintiff in the criminal trial process. Therefore, public law legal entities are considered plaintiffs in the criminal proceedings. Given that public law legal entities are considered plaintiff, they have the rights and duties of a plaintiff in the criminal proceedings. Among the duties of public law legal entities in the criminal proceedings as plaintiff is the need to pay the cost of Proceedings, which in the current laws, the principle is that these persons must pay the cost of Proceedings, unless the legislator has made an exception. Given that these persons are considered plaintiff, the decisions issued by the prosecutor's office and criminal courts must be communicated to them and they have the right to object to the decisions. These individuals have the right to present evidence to prove the subject of their complaint. public law legal entities expected to secure the interests they are responsible for securing and protecting, and in the event of full exercise of the relevant rights, they can declare a voluntary dismissal of the complaint submitted, and they can even waive filing of a complaint in the event of full exercise of the rights before filing a complaint, and in the event of unforgivable crimes, while declaring the occurrence of a crime, they can waive the filing of a criminal case as a plaintiff. Conclusion In Iranian law, considering the Acts that refer to public law legal entities as plaintiffs and considering the existential philosophy of these entities, which is to provide public service, it can be assumed that public law legal entities have the position of plaintiff. they have the rights of plaintiffs, such as the right to complain, the right to present evidence, and the right to object to judicial decisions. In the event that the interests and rights of the public law legal entity are fully satisfied, these individuals have the right to declare a waiver of the criminal complaint.

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105930_c914078e7ab3ff0080b2ba7de7d0933c.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 A Comparative Study of the Basics, Methods and Limits of Judges ' Involvement in Private Contracts A Comparative Study of the Basics, Methods and Limits of Judges ' Involvement in Private Contracts 125 140 104194 10.48308/jlr.2024.233082.2593 FA Jalal Soltanahmadi Associate Professor, Departmet of Law, Payame Noor University, Tehran, Iran Sara Ebrahimi PhD Candidate, Departmet of Law, Payame Noor University, Tehran, Iran. Corresponding Author Email: sarraebrahimi93@student.pnu.ac.ir Alireza Iranshahi . Assistant Professor, Departmet of Law, Payame Noor University, Tehran, Iran 0000-0001-6567-2981 Journal Article 2023 09 18 Introduction Contract law fundamentally struggles with defining the extent of parties' free will and the permissible limits of external intervention, particularly by judges, In private agreements. In traditional legal systems, such as Iran's, the principle of autonomy of will is a core tenet, leading to skepticism about the feasibility of judicial intervention in private contracts. This skepticism Is rooted in the belief that freely negotiated contracts are the fairest mechanism for performance, and judicial interference undermines individual liberty and autonomy in transactions, and causes uncertainty in the results of transactions. This has led to conflicting judicial practices in the Iranian legal system. Conversely, modern legal systems have moderated the principle of autonomy of will by embracing emerging principles like the principle of good faith, the principle of economic efficiency, and the reliance theory. These principles have paved the way for granting judges broader authority to intervene, resolve contractual disputes, and ensure contractual justice and fairness. The present research addresses this critical Issue by exploring the following central questions: 1. What are the legal foundations for judges' intervention in private contracts across different legal systems? 2. What are the specific methods and procedures through which judges exercise this right? 3. What are the standardized frameworks and limits necessary to prevent arbitrary judicial discretion and its resulting adverse outcomes? The primary objective Is to conduct a comparative study to analyze these principles and methods, and subsequently propose specific legal reforms for the Iranian system. The main goal is to conduct a comparative study to analyze these principles and methods and then present reform proposals for the Iranian legal system in order to free judges from doubt and ensure contractual justice by clearly determining the criteria and methods of judicial intervention. Methods This research employs a descriptive, analytical, and comparative approach to investigate the foundations, methods, and limits of judges' intervention in private contracts. The study Involves a comparative analysis of the Iranian legal system and several modern legal systems, notably the laws of France, Germany, the United States (UCC), and England, alongside relevant international instruments such as the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL). Data collection was performed through library research, focusing on primary legal sources including domestic and foreign statutes, judicial precedents, and scholarly legal doctrine (books and specialized articles). The analytical phase begins with a critical review of the emerging principles justifying intervention (good faith, economic efficiency, and reliance) and assessing their current status In Iranian law. Subsequently, the practical methods of judicial intervention—including judicial modification, contract interpretation, contract completion, and contract revision—are examined and compared with Iranian legal practice, paying particular attention to the 2016 French Civil Code reforms. Finally, based on the comparative findings, essential frameworks for standardizing judicial intervention, such as adherence to principles of fair trial and establishing imperative rules, are developed to inform the reform recommendations. Results and Discussions The comparative study confirms that in modern legal systems, the authority for judicial intervention is firmly established, based on emerging principles. The principle of good faith has been extended even to the negotiation stage, the principle of economic efficiency sometimes prioritizes damage compensation over specific performance, and the reliance theory validates legitimate expectations as a basis for contractual obligation. In contrast, Iranian law has not formally recognized these as general contractual rules, though they are implicitly present in certain specialized statutes (e.g., Commercial Contracts Bill, E-Commerce Law) or in judicial practice through recourse to customary practice and religious principles. The research's findings regarding the methods of judicial intervention reveal four core mechanisms employed by judges to achieve contractual fairness: 1) Judicial Modification (Adjustment): This method involves adjusting obligations in the event of unforeseen circumstances (e.g., Article 1195 of the reformed French Civil Code), In dealings involving contracts lacking bargaining power (e.g., unfair or unconscionable clauses), and through the modification of liquidated damages or the granting of reasonable grace periods to the distressed debtor. French law explicitly grants judges the authority to modify contracts due to unforeseen difficulties. In Iranian law, explicit rules are absent, and reliance on Osr-o-Haraj (hardship) or Implied terms remains contentious. 2) Contract Interpretation: Aims at discerning the parties' common intention, interpretation is standardized in modern systems (e.g., Articles 1188 to 1194 of the French Civil Code) with explicit rules such as interpretation in favor of the debtor or the weaker party in adhesion contracts. In Iranian law, interpretation adheres to the theory of subjective will, but clear, codified rules are lacking in the Civil Code, relying heavily on judicial precedent and Islamic jurisprudence. 3) Contract Completion (Filling Gaps): When a contract is incomplete, judges introduce implied terms to ensure its enforceability. Modern systems standardize completion using law, custom, and the principle of good faith with specific guidelines (e.g., Article 1167 of the French Civil Code). In Iranian law, completion is achieved through reference to the parties' implied will, custom, and supplementary rules. 4) Contract Revision (Correction/Amendment): Distinct from modification (adjustment for Imbalance) and completion (filling gaps), revision involves changing a sound contract for better execution due to unexpected conditions (e.g., technological advances). This concept is not clearly differentiated from modification/completion in Iranian legal literature. Crucially, the study concludes that granting these powers without defined limits leads to arbitrary and undesirable outcomes. Therefore, the scope of judicial Intervention must be explicitly prescribed, in addition to identifying these powers. This framework necessitates adherence to principles of fair trial (impartiality, procedural equality, right to defense), prioritizing the principle of contractual stability, and interpreting terms in light of the entire contract. Furthermore, the development of protective statutes, standard contracts, and standard clauses is essential to provide judges with objective tools for applying relative concepts like good faith. Conclusion Judicial intervention in private contracts is an indispensable requirement for realizing contractual justice In modern legal systems. In the Iranian legal system, despite the absence of explicit recognition of emerging principles (good faith, economic efficiency, reliance) and intervention methods (modification, completion, interpretation, and revision) as general contractual rules, It is recommended to undertake legislative reform. This should explicitly codify these principles and methods, drawing inspiration from leading systems like the French 2016 reform. Specific legal remedies (e.g., rescission and compensation for breaches of good faith) should also be defined for each principle. The exercise of these powers must be strictly confined by an imperative framework, including mandatory compliance with fair trial principles and the use of standardized instruments, to prevent personal bias, alleviate judicial doubt, and maintain transactional stability and trust. Introduction Contract law fundamentally struggles with defining the extent of parties' free will and the permissible limits of external intervention, particularly by judges, In private agreements. In traditional legal systems, such as Iran's, the principle of autonomy of will is a core tenet, leading to skepticism about the feasibility of judicial intervention in private contracts. This skepticism Is rooted in the belief that freely negotiated contracts are the fairest mechanism for performance, and judicial interference undermines individual liberty and autonomy in transactions, and causes uncertainty in the results of transactions. This has led to conflicting judicial practices in the Iranian legal system. Conversely, modern legal systems have moderated the principle of autonomy of will by embracing emerging principles like the principle of good faith, the principle of economic efficiency, and the reliance theory. These principles have paved the way for granting judges broader authority to intervene, resolve contractual disputes, and ensure contractual justice and fairness. The present research addresses this critical Issue by exploring the following central questions: 1. What are the legal foundations for judges' intervention in private contracts across different legal systems? 2. What are the specific methods and procedures through which judges exercise this right? 3. What are the standardized frameworks and limits necessary to prevent arbitrary judicial discretion and its resulting adverse outcomes? The primary objective Is to conduct a comparative study to analyze these principles and methods, and subsequently propose specific legal reforms for the Iranian system. The main goal is to conduct a comparative study to analyze these principles and methods and then present reform proposals for the Iranian legal system in order to free judges from doubt and ensure contractual justice by clearly determining the criteria and methods of judicial intervention. Methods This research employs a descriptive, analytical, and comparative approach to investigate the foundations, methods, and limits of judges' intervention in private contracts. The study Involves a comparative analysis of the Iranian legal system and several modern legal systems, notably the laws of France, Germany, the United States (UCC), and England, alongside relevant international instruments such as the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL). Data collection was performed through library research, focusing on primary legal sources including domestic and foreign statutes, judicial precedents, and scholarly legal doctrine (books and specialized articles). The analytical phase begins with a critical review of the emerging principles justifying intervention (good faith, economic efficiency, and reliance) and assessing their current status In Iranian law. Subsequently, the practical methods of judicial intervention—including judicial modification, contract interpretation, contract completion, and contract revision—are examined and compared with Iranian legal practice, paying particular attention to the 2016 French Civil Code reforms. Finally, based on the comparative findings, essential frameworks for standardizing judicial intervention, such as adherence to principles of fair trial and establishing imperative rules, are developed to inform the reform recommendations. Results and Discussions The comparative study confirms that in modern legal systems, the authority for judicial intervention is firmly established, based on emerging principles. The principle of good faith has been extended even to the negotiation stage, the principle of economic efficiency sometimes prioritizes damage compensation over specific performance, and the reliance theory validates legitimate expectations as a basis for contractual obligation. In contrast, Iranian law has not formally recognized these as general contractual rules, though they are implicitly present in certain specialized statutes (e.g., Commercial Contracts Bill, E-Commerce Law) or in judicial practice through recourse to customary practice and religious principles. The research's findings regarding the methods of judicial intervention reveal four core mechanisms employed by judges to achieve contractual fairness: 1) Judicial Modification (Adjustment): This method involves adjusting obligations in the event of unforeseen circumstances (e.g., Article 1195 of the reformed French Civil Code), In dealings involving contracts lacking bargaining power (e.g., unfair or unconscionable clauses), and through the modification of liquidated damages or the granting of reasonable grace periods to the distressed debtor. French law explicitly grants judges the authority to modify contracts due to unforeseen difficulties. In Iranian law, explicit rules are absent, and reliance on Osr-o-Haraj (hardship) or Implied terms remains contentious. 2) Contract Interpretation: Aims at discerning the parties' common intention, interpretation is standardized in modern systems (e.g., Articles 1188 to 1194 of the French Civil Code) with explicit rules such as interpretation in favor of the debtor or the weaker party in adhesion contracts. In Iranian law, interpretation adheres to the theory of subjective will, but clear, codified rules are lacking in the Civil Code, relying heavily on judicial precedent and Islamic jurisprudence. 3) Contract Completion (Filling Gaps): When a contract is incomplete, judges introduce implied terms to ensure its enforceability. Modern systems standardize completion using law, custom, and the principle of good faith with specific guidelines (e.g., Article 1167 of the French Civil Code). In Iranian law, completion is achieved through reference to the parties' implied will, custom, and supplementary rules. 4) Contract Revision (Correction/Amendment): Distinct from modification (adjustment for Imbalance) and completion (filling gaps), revision involves changing a sound contract for better execution due to unexpected conditions (e.g., technological advances). This concept is not clearly differentiated from modification/completion in Iranian legal literature. Crucially, the study concludes that granting these powers without defined limits leads to arbitrary and undesirable outcomes. Therefore, the scope of judicial Intervention must be explicitly prescribed, in addition to identifying these powers. This framework necessitates adherence to principles of fair trial (impartiality, procedural equality, right to defense), prioritizing the principle of contractual stability, and interpreting terms in light of the entire contract. Furthermore, the development of protective statutes, standard contracts, and standard clauses is essential to provide judges with objective tools for applying relative concepts like good faith. Conclusion Judicial intervention in private contracts is an indispensable requirement for realizing contractual justice In modern legal systems. In the Iranian legal system, despite the absence of explicit recognition of emerging principles (good faith, economic efficiency, reliance) and intervention methods (modification, completion, interpretation, and revision) as general contractual rules, It is recommended to undertake legislative reform. This should explicitly codify these principles and methods, drawing inspiration from leading systems like the French 2016 reform. Specific legal remedies (e.g., rescission and compensation for breaches of good faith) should also be defined for each principle. The exercise of these powers must be strictly confined by an imperative framework, including mandatory compliance with fair trial principles and the use of standardized instruments, to prevent personal bias, alleviate judicial doubt, and maintain transactional stability and trust.

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_104194_c783fc67b384e8fa0a53e2d286acb8a3.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 The Validity of Transaction by Conduct in High-Value Sale The Validity of Transaction by Conduct in High-Value Sale 147 166 105684 10.48308/jlr.2025.238817.2855 FA Seyyed Mahdi Dadmarzi Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Qom, Qom, Iran Amirreza Karimi Suq Bachelor’s Student, Faculty of Law, University of Qom, Qom, Iran. Corresponding Author Email: ar.karimi@stu.qom.ac.ir Journal Article 2025 02 17 Within the Iranian Civil Law framework, despite several jurisprudential theories concerning the validity of transactions through conduct (Mu'āṭāt), their validity in contracts, including sales, is implicitly grounded upon Articles 191 and 193 and explicitly affirmed in Article 339. The legislator has expressly excluded this general rule only in two instances: marriage and, according to some interpretations, the contract of endowment. Nevertheless, in some cases, including high-value transactions, it needs to be examined whether the adequacy of mere conduct for contract formation is sufficient or not. What emerges from the appearance of Article 339 is that, after mutual agreement between the seller and the buyer in respect of the object of the bargain and its price, the sale is concluded by offer and acceptance “literally” or by exchange “by conduct.” Thus, the sale contract will be concluded and creates ownership, which is one of its effects. At first, this interpretation seems correct, and the absoluteness of Article 339 indicates so. However, in this article, by a profound analysis of sources of Iranian laws, jurisprudence and its philosophy, the important role of custom in shaping and correcting transactions by conduct, rational basis, and Sharia, alongside the denial of the aforementioned wrong interpretation, the necessity of using a declarative act, more than mere conduct, which explicitly indicates the intention of a sale, will be demonstrated Within the Iranian Civil Law framework, despite several jurisprudential theories concerning the validity of transactions through conduct (Mu'āṭāt), their validity in contracts, including sales, is implicitly grounded upon Articles 191 and 193 and explicitly affirmed in Article 339. The legislator has expressly excluded this general rule only in two instances: marriage and, according to some interpretations, the contract of endowment. Nevertheless, in some cases, including high-value transactions, it needs to be examined whether the adequacy of mere conduct for contract formation is sufficient or not. What emerges from the appearance of Article 339 is that, after mutual agreement between the seller and the buyer in respect of the object of the bargain and its price, the sale is concluded by offer and acceptance “literally” or by exchange “by conduct.” Thus, the sale contract will be concluded and creates ownership, which is one of its effects. At first, this interpretation seems correct, and the absoluteness of Article 339 indicates so. However, in this article, by a profound analysis of sources of Iranian laws, jurisprudence and its philosophy, the important role of custom in shaping and correcting transactions by conduct, rational basis, and Sharia, alongside the denial of the aforementioned wrong interpretation, the necessity of using a declarative act, more than mere conduct, which explicitly indicates the intention of a sale, will be demonstrated

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105684_f240be0eec311a882a50b05ed752599f.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 Regulating Organized Market for Petrochemical Products: A reflection on the Conflicting Rules Regulating Organized Market for Petrochemical Products: A reflection on the Conflicting Rules 167 186 105462 10.48308/jlr.2025.237591.2808 FA Mohammad Arian Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran. Corresponding Author Email: mo_arian@sbu.ac.ir Abbas Ehzari PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2024 11 16 Introduction Commodity exchange market is an organized and self-regulating market in which the sale and purchase of commodities take place based on predetermined rules. The regulation of organized market for commodities and its actors has special requirements, the lack of attention to which may distort its functioning and effective role in the country's economy. In order to meet these requirements, it is necessary for the market to have the power of self-regulation so that its managers can ensure the health of the market by imposing special regulations. In recent years, the supply and pricing of some commodities, such as petrochemical products, have been subject to regulatory intervention by entities outside the organized market of petrochemical products due to the existence of economic sanctions and restrictions on the supply of raw materials. Such an intervention has made serious challenges to the proper functioning of this market. In general, regulatory intervention poses this serious risk that the rules imposed by external entities may not be in line with the specific requirements of the market, and this raises the question of whether the rules currently imposed by the Working Group on the Market Regulation (MRWG) are in line with the specific rules of the organized commodity market? another question that has to be answered is that if there is any conflict/s, are there any solution/s that can be proposed for removing the conflicting situation/s? The present study seeks to achieve these goals by identifying the authorities active in the field of regulating the petrochemical products market and explaining their legal status, as well as determining to what extent the rules established by the aforementioned authorities conflict with each other and what solution or solutions can be considered to overcome the conflicting condition/s. Methods To achieve the mentioned goals, this research will try to criticize and evaluate the regulations imposed on the organized market for petrochemical products relying on existing library resources. Results and Discussions The findings of this research indicate that some of the rules imposed by the Working Group on the Market Regulation regarding the minimum offering, price determination, and information disclosure in the three stages of pre-offering, offering, and settlement of funds in the Commodity and Energy Exchanges are in conflict with the provisions contained in the relevant guidelines on the mentioned exchanges. In order to save the legal status of the fundamental principles governing commodity exchanges, including free competition, transparency, non-monopoly, etc., it is necessary to resolve the conflict in favor of the main rules governing the aforementioned exchanges, because the conflicting rules in the Market Regulation Directive, as described in this research, are explicitly contrary to Article 36, Clause C of the Permanent Rules Act and Articles 17 and 18 of the Law on the Development of New Financial Instruments and Institutions. Therefore, the aforementioned conflicting regulations have no validity against the laws enacted by the Parliament. On the other hand, based on Sub-section 2, Clause "T" of the Decision of Presidential Special Representatives on Designating Members of the Specialized Working Groups of the Targeted Subsidies Department and their Detailed Duties, the Working Group on the Market Regulation and the Petrochemical Specialized Committee do not have the authority to determine prices or minimum offering or require disclosure of information without complying with the rules governing commodity exchanges. It is worth noting that, contrary to what was stated above, the competent authorities of commodity exchanges in practice comply with the provisions of the Market Regulation Directive in order to resolve the conflict. This practical solution of the said authorities does not mean that the conflicting rules in the Market Regulation Directive have legality, and the admission of the provisions of the Directive in question by the aforementioned authorities to the detriment of the specific rules governing commodity exchanges will gradually weaken the legal status of commodity exchanges and their fundamental principles. Although the government (i.e. Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade- Market Regulation Working Group) has assumed legislative power for itself by invoking the sanctions imposed on the country and intervenes to regulate the market by announcing base price or minimum offering and other interventions in the organized market of petrochemical products, as mentioned above, the Working Group on the Market Regulation and the Petrochemical Specialized Committee have no authority to make regulations in this field, and their authority is limited to coordinating and supervising the determination of tariffs and pricing. Furthermore, should the sanctions require the government to provide the petrochemicals with subsidized raw materials and feedstocks in order to manage the domestic market, and in return, the government expects that the prices of products be determined by the order of the Working Group on the Market Regulation, it is suggested that the supply of petrochemical products or other specific products affected by the sanctions be managed outside the organized commodity market, so that the special rules governing organized commodity markets do not limit the government's authority to manage the market of these products. Conclusion The offering of petrochemical products on the commodity exchange and government intervention in their supply and sale processes contradict the function, nature, and essence of the organized markets and the general principles governing them. In practice, as mentioned, such a strategy will weaken in long term the position of the commodity exchange in the country. Therefore, as a practical solution to overcome the aforementioned situation, it is suggested that any stakeholder in the commodity exchanges can pursue the annulment of these conflicting regulations by filing a complaint to the Administrative Court of Justice Introduction Commodity exchange market is an organized and self-regulating market in which the sale and purchase of commodities take place based on predetermined rules. The regulation of organized market for commodities and its actors has special requirements, the lack of attention to which may distort its functioning and effective role in the country's economy. In order to meet these requirements, it is necessary for the market to have the power of self-regulation so that its managers can ensure the health of the market by imposing special regulations. In recent years, the supply and pricing of some commodities, such as petrochemical products, have been subject to regulatory intervention by entities outside the organized market of petrochemical products due to the existence of economic sanctions and restrictions on the supply of raw materials. Such an intervention has made serious challenges to the proper functioning of this market. In general, regulatory intervention poses this serious risk that the rules imposed by external entities may not be in line with the specific requirements of the market, and this raises the question of whether the rules currently imposed by the Working Group on the Market Regulation (MRWG) are in line with the specific rules of the organized commodity market? another question that has to be answered is that if there is any conflict/s, are there any solution/s that can be proposed for removing the conflicting situation/s? The present study seeks to achieve these goals by identifying the authorities active in the field of regulating the petrochemical products market and explaining their legal status, as well as determining to what extent the rules established by the aforementioned authorities conflict with each other and what solution or solutions can be considered to overcome the conflicting condition/s. Methods To achieve the mentioned goals, this research will try to criticize and evaluate the regulations imposed on the organized market for petrochemical products relying on existing library resources. Results and Discussions The findings of this research indicate that some of the rules imposed by the Working Group on the Market Regulation regarding the minimum offering, price determination, and information disclosure in the three stages of pre-offering, offering, and settlement of funds in the Commodity and Energy Exchanges are in conflict with the provisions contained in the relevant guidelines on the mentioned exchanges. In order to save the legal status of the fundamental principles governing commodity exchanges, including free competition, transparency, non-monopoly, etc., it is necessary to resolve the conflict in favor of the main rules governing the aforementioned exchanges, because the conflicting rules in the Market Regulation Directive, as described in this research, are explicitly contrary to Article 36, Clause C of the Permanent Rules Act and Articles 17 and 18 of the Law on the Development of New Financial Instruments and Institutions. Therefore, the aforementioned conflicting regulations have no validity against the laws enacted by the Parliament. On the other hand, based on Sub-section 2, Clause "T" of the Decision of Presidential Special Representatives on Designating Members of the Specialized Working Groups of the Targeted Subsidies Department and their Detailed Duties, the Working Group on the Market Regulation and the Petrochemical Specialized Committee do not have the authority to determine prices or minimum offering or require disclosure of information without complying with the rules governing commodity exchanges. It is worth noting that, contrary to what was stated above, the competent authorities of commodity exchanges in practice comply with the provisions of the Market Regulation Directive in order to resolve the conflict. This practical solution of the said authorities does not mean that the conflicting rules in the Market Regulation Directive have legality, and the admission of the provisions of the Directive in question by the aforementioned authorities to the detriment of the specific rules governing commodity exchanges will gradually weaken the legal status of commodity exchanges and their fundamental principles. Although the government (i.e. Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade- Market Regulation Working Group) has assumed legislative power for itself by invoking the sanctions imposed on the country and intervenes to regulate the market by announcing base price or minimum offering and other interventions in the organized market of petrochemical products, as mentioned above, the Working Group on the Market Regulation and the Petrochemical Specialized Committee have no authority to make regulations in this field, and their authority is limited to coordinating and supervising the determination of tariffs and pricing. Furthermore, should the sanctions require the government to provide the petrochemicals with subsidized raw materials and feedstocks in order to manage the domestic market, and in return, the government expects that the prices of products be determined by the order of the Working Group on the Market Regulation, it is suggested that the supply of petrochemical products or other specific products affected by the sanctions be managed outside the organized commodity market, so that the special rules governing organized commodity markets do not limit the government's authority to manage the market of these products. Conclusion The offering of petrochemical products on the commodity exchange and government intervention in their supply and sale processes contradict the function, nature, and essence of the organized markets and the general principles governing them. In practice, as mentioned, such a strategy will weaken in long term the position of the commodity exchange in the country. Therefore, as a practical solution to overcome the aforementioned situation, it is suggested that any stakeholder in the commodity exchanges can pursue the annulment of these conflicting regulations by filing a complaint to the Administrative Court of Justice

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105462_ddf40c65026844bb0f945c360b641957.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 The Necessity of Announcing the Revocation of a Contract to the Other Party The Necessity of Announcing the Revocation of a Contract to the Other Party 187 204 105180 10.48308/jlr.2024.235979.2754 FA Hossein Mokhtari Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Judicial Sciences and Administrative Services, Tehran, Iran. Corresponding Author Email: hmokhtari58@gmail.com Mahmoud Yousefvand Assistant Professor, Humanities Higher Education Complex, Al-Mustafa International University, Qom, Iran Seyed Ali Pakzadian L.L.M., Faculty of Law, University of Judicial Sciences and Administrative Services, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2024 07 23 Introduction The right to rescind a contract (termination) is a well-established and widely recognized right in Iranian civil law, arising either from statutory provisions or through stipulations agreed upon by the contracting parties. With the expansion of modern trade and the increasing complexity of contractual relationships, the question of how and under what conditions this right may be exercised has gained renewed importance. The central question of this research is whether the exercise of the right of rescission (termination) without notifying the other party is valid and effective in Islamic jurisprudence and Iranian law, or whether such notification constitutes a necessary condition for its legal effect. Although Article 449 of the Iranian Civil Code provides that “termination is effected by any expression or act indicating such intention,” judicial practice has, in numerous cases, regarded rescission without notice as legally ineffective. From the perspective of legal scholars and jurists, two different approaches are identifiable: one emphasizing the sufficiency of the rescinding party’s unilateral intention, and the other insisting on the necessity of informing the counterparty to ensure the enforceability of the termination. The purpose of this study is to analyze these two approaches and to establish a coherent jurisprudential and legal foundation for the obligation to notify the other party of termination, as well as to determine the legal consequences of failing to do so. Methods This study employs a descriptive–analytical method. First, the conceptual foundations and legal characteristics of termination were examined through the analysis of jurisprudential sources, relevant articles of the Iranian Civil Code, and the opinions of jurists and legal scholars. Subsequently, the study reviewed judicial precedents and decisions of Iranian courts, particularly the rulings of the Supreme Court and advisory opinions issued by the Legal Department of the Judiciary. In the next stage, several jurisprudential maxims and legal principles were evaluated as potential theoretical bases for the obligation to notify, including the rules of Lā Ḍarar (No Harm), Nafī al-ʿUsr wa al-Ḥaraj (No Hardship), Ḍamān al-Ghurūr (Liability for Deception), Nafī Ikhtilāl al-Niẓām (No Disruption of Order), as well as the principles of Public Order and Good Faith. Finally, the data were analyzed through logical interpretation and deductive reasoning within the framework of Iranian private law. Results and discussion The findings show that, while Iranian law does not explicitly stipulate notification as a condition for the validity of rescission, judicial interpretation has effectively treated it as such for practical and equitable reasons. Numerous court rulings—including the Supreme Court’s binding decision of 2008—have held that notification to the counterparty is essential for the termination to produce legal effects. The study of the opinions of the General Legal Department of the Judiciary also confirms this perception. Advisory opinion No. 1870/96/7 (dated November 6, 2017) issued by the Legal Department of the Judiciary confirmed that although termination becomes effective upon declaration, notification to the other party is necessary to prevent adverse consequences. From a jurisprudential standpoint, several Islamic legal principles justify this requirement. The Rule of No Harm (Lā Ḍarar) prohibits any act or omission causing harm to another; thus, the silence of the rescinding party, leading to damage for the other contracting party or third persons, is inconsistent with this rule. The Rule of No Hardship (Nafī al-ʿUsr wa al-Ḥaraj) also applies whenever failure to notify results in unbearable hardship, making the duty of notification a means of relieving such hardship. Under the Rule of Liability for Deception (Ḍamān al-Ghurūr), any person whose behavior deceives another and causes harm must compensate the injured party; therefore, a party who terminates without notice may be liable for the losses of others who reasonably relied on the appearance of validity. In addition, the Rule of No Disruption of Order (Nafī Ikhtilāl al-Niẓām) implies that no conduct should disturb social and economic order. Failing to notify the other party can lead to void or unauthorized transactions (so-called Fuduli contracts), multiple lawsuits, and general instability in market confidence. The Principle of Public Order likewise requires the maintenance of stability and predictability in contractual relations and thus mandates notification as a necessary element of effective termination. Finally, the Principle of Good Faith obliges parties to act honestly and fairly, which entails the duty to inform the other side when terminating a contract, in order to prevent unnecessary loss or deception. Therefore, although termination technically occurs through a unilateral act of will, its legal enforceability and evidentiary reliability depend on notifying the counterparty. Without such notification, the rescission remains incomplete and unenforceable against others, and the rescinding party may bear civil liability for the damages caused to the other party or bona fide third persons. Conclusion This research concludes that notifying the counterparty of termination is not a condition of validity, but it is a condition of enforceability and reliance. Hidden or uncommunicated termination, although valid in form, is ineffective in substance due to its harmful economic and social consequences. Jurisprudential maxims and legal principles, all support the necessity of such notification and judicial practice has also been established along this line. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Iranian Civil Code, particularly Article 449, be amended and expressly recognize notification as a requirement for the enforceability of termination in order to prevent the emergence of judicial disputes, an increase in lawsuits and damages resulting from hidden termination. This reform would enhance legal certainty, protect third-party reliance, and strengthen the principles of contractual justice and public order within the Iranian legal system Introduction The right to rescind a contract (termination) is a well-established and widely recognized right in Iranian civil law, arising either from statutory provisions or through stipulations agreed upon by the contracting parties. With the expansion of modern trade and the increasing complexity of contractual relationships, the question of how and under what conditions this right may be exercised has gained renewed importance. The central question of this research is whether the exercise of the right of rescission (termination) without notifying the other party is valid and effective in Islamic jurisprudence and Iranian law, or whether such notification constitutes a necessary condition for its legal effect. Although Article 449 of the Iranian Civil Code provides that “termination is effected by any expression or act indicating such intention,” judicial practice has, in numerous cases, regarded rescission without notice as legally ineffective. From the perspective of legal scholars and jurists, two different approaches are identifiable: one emphasizing the sufficiency of the rescinding party’s unilateral intention, and the other insisting on the necessity of informing the counterparty to ensure the enforceability of the termination. The purpose of this study is to analyze these two approaches and to establish a coherent jurisprudential and legal foundation for the obligation to notify the other party of termination, as well as to determine the legal consequences of failing to do so. Methods This study employs a descriptive–analytical method. First, the conceptual foundations and legal characteristics of termination were examined through the analysis of jurisprudential sources, relevant articles of the Iranian Civil Code, and the opinions of jurists and legal scholars. Subsequently, the study reviewed judicial precedents and decisions of Iranian courts, particularly the rulings of the Supreme Court and advisory opinions issued by the Legal Department of the Judiciary. In the next stage, several jurisprudential maxims and legal principles were evaluated as potential theoretical bases for the obligation to notify, including the rules of Lā Ḍarar (No Harm), Nafī al-ʿUsr wa al-Ḥaraj (No Hardship), Ḍamān al-Ghurūr (Liability for Deception), Nafī Ikhtilāl al-Niẓām (No Disruption of Order), as well as the principles of Public Order and Good Faith. Finally, the data were analyzed through logical interpretation and deductive reasoning within the framework of Iranian private law. Results and discussion The findings show that, while Iranian law does not explicitly stipulate notification as a condition for the validity of rescission, judicial interpretation has effectively treated it as such for practical and equitable reasons. Numerous court rulings—including the Supreme Court’s binding decision of 2008—have held that notification to the counterparty is essential for the termination to produce legal effects. The study of the opinions of the General Legal Department of the Judiciary also confirms this perception. Advisory opinion No. 1870/96/7 (dated November 6, 2017) issued by the Legal Department of the Judiciary confirmed that although termination becomes effective upon declaration, notification to the other party is necessary to prevent adverse consequences. From a jurisprudential standpoint, several Islamic legal principles justify this requirement. The Rule of No Harm (Lā Ḍarar) prohibits any act or omission causing harm to another; thus, the silence of the rescinding party, leading to damage for the other contracting party or third persons, is inconsistent with this rule. The Rule of No Hardship (Nafī al-ʿUsr wa al-Ḥaraj) also applies whenever failure to notify results in unbearable hardship, making the duty of notification a means of relieving such hardship. Under the Rule of Liability for Deception (Ḍamān al-Ghurūr), any person whose behavior deceives another and causes harm must compensate the injured party; therefore, a party who terminates without notice may be liable for the losses of others who reasonably relied on the appearance of validity. In addition, the Rule of No Disruption of Order (Nafī Ikhtilāl al-Niẓām) implies that no conduct should disturb social and economic order. Failing to notify the other party can lead to void or unauthorized transactions (so-called Fuduli contracts), multiple lawsuits, and general instability in market confidence. The Principle of Public Order likewise requires the maintenance of stability and predictability in contractual relations and thus mandates notification as a necessary element of effective termination. Finally, the Principle of Good Faith obliges parties to act honestly and fairly, which entails the duty to inform the other side when terminating a contract, in order to prevent unnecessary loss or deception. Therefore, although termination technically occurs through a unilateral act of will, its legal enforceability and evidentiary reliability depend on notifying the counterparty. Without such notification, the rescission remains incomplete and unenforceable against others, and the rescinding party may bear civil liability for the damages caused to the other party or bona fide third persons. Conclusion This research concludes that notifying the counterparty of termination is not a condition of validity, but it is a condition of enforceability and reliance. Hidden or uncommunicated termination, although valid in form, is ineffective in substance due to its harmful economic and social consequences. Jurisprudential maxims and legal principles, all support the necessity of such notification and judicial practice has also been established along this line. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Iranian Civil Code, particularly Article 449, be amended and expressly recognize notification as a requirement for the enforceability of termination in order to prevent the emergence of judicial disputes, an increase in lawsuits and damages resulting from hidden termination. This reform would enhance legal certainty, protect third-party reliance, and strengthen the principles of contractual justice and public order within the Iranian legal system

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105180_d57e4deab2dbebeb75d6fed17b075d60.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 A Critical Approach to the Criteria Justifying the Right to be Wrong with an Emphasis on the Analytical Foundations of the Philosophy of Right A Critical Approach to the Criteria Justifying the Right to be Wrong with an Emphasis on the Analytical Foundations of the Philosophy of Right 205 226 104503 10.48308/jlr.2024.234136.2635 FA Mahdi Zare Ph.D., Faculty of Law & Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran Corresponding Author Email: mahdi.zare@ut.ac.ir Hamed Nikoonahad Assistant Professor, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2023 12 13 Introduction This study adopts a critical–analytical approach to examine one of the most controversial issues in the philosophy of right and contemporary human-rights theory—namely, the possibility and justification of the so-called “right to do/be wrong.” This notion refers to an individual’s entitlement to engage in actions that may be regarded as morally or socially wrong, while the legal or political system nonetheless refrains from prohibiting or punishing them. The main research question is whether legal justification processes in modern human rights are capable of justifying this right? Methods The article begins by tracing the historical and philosophical roots of the concept of right. Prior to the Renaissance, rights were defined through an inseparable connection with moral norms, and the legitimacy of law was contingent on its conformity with ethical criteria. After the Renaissance, however, the conceptual distinction between being right and having a right emerged, Accordingly, the possibility of enacting laws arose that, although not morally justified, were considered rights based on the will of the legislator or the public interest. From this development, the idea of “right to do wrong”emerged. To analyze this idea, reference has been made to the two fundamental schools of philosophy of law - utilitarianism and voluntarism - in order to establish a criterion for justifying the right to be imposed. Results and Discussions In the school of utilitarianism, the foundation of law is based on the principle of profit or the greatest public happiness. From the perspective of Bentham and his followers, law and right are justified when they create the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people. However, the article shows that this approach fails to explain right over wrong, because "profit" is a relative and individual concept and cannot be a comprehensive basis for human rights. On the other hand, utilitarianism, by focusing excessively on material pleasure, ignores spiritual and moral values such as altruism or sacrifice, and therefore does not have the comprehensiveness necessary to justify this right. Voluntarism, rooted in Kantian moral philosophy, conceives of rights as expressions of individual will and autonomy. Under this view, a person holds a right only when able to exercise or waive it by choice. However, this theory also exhibits critical deficiencies when used to justify the right to do wrong. It applies only to those capable of free will, whereas children and the mentally incapacitated are also recognized as rights-bearers Furthermore, in cases such as the right to life, which is obligatory, the concept of will cannot play an explanatory role. Therefore, both schools of thought are weak in their theoretical and moral explanation of right over wrong. To further evaluate these shortcomings, the paper turns to Western thinkers’ discussions of related themes—the separation of law and morality, the state’s role in cultural formation, and civil disobedience. In the first debate, the separation of law from morality is analyzed as the primary foundation for recognizing a right to do wrong. Legal positivists such as Bentham, Austin, and Waldron argue that moral obligations cannot serve as criteria for legislation. Law is formed solely on the basis of social contract and practical interests. From this perspective, it is legally permissible for an individual to act in ways that morality deems wrong. In contrast, philosophers such as Cicero, Augustine, Ripert, and Simmonds uphold an intrinsic link between law and morality, insisting that “an unjust law is not law.” They warn that severing moral principles from legal validity leads to the collapse of justice and human dignity. On this reading, lawmakers have no right to enact rules contrary to moral fundamentals, and the acceptance of a right to do wrong effectively dissolves the ethical boundaries essential to a just legal order. The second axis of discussion concerns the role of the state in cultural formation. The first view, which emphasizes the neutrality of the state, believes that the state should not interfere in cultural and moral affairs, because this leads to cultural tyranny and the restriction of individual freedoms. This approach considers the right to be wrong as a natural consequence of respect for human autonomy. In contrast, the second approach emphasizes the responsibility of the state in the cultural guidance of society. Thinkers such as Plato, Hobbes, and, in certain respects, Adam Smith, maintain that in order to preserve order, social cohesion, and public virtue, the state must exercise some degree of cultural oversight. From this angle, absolute neutrality toward moral error fails to secure liberty and instead erodes the ethical foundations of community life. The author concludes that the government, as an institution arising from the public will, must play a guiding and cultural engineering role within the framework of fixed moral principles and not allow the right to be wrong to lead to public obscenity.The third issue examined is the relationship between the right to do wrong and civil disobedience. Civil disobedience is defined as a conscious, non-violent breach of unjust laws. If a right to do wrong were accepted, acts of civil disobedience might be interpreted as legitimate exercises of that right. Theorists such as Ronald Dworkin view civil disobedience as a moral form of protest permissible when normal political channels for reform have been exhausted. Critics, however, stress the ethical duty to obey the law, arguing that political legitimacy requires universal compliance with enacted norms, even when they conflict with individual conviction. Synthesizing these views, the paper concludes that civil disobedience can be morally defensible only within a specific ethical framework that challenges injustice; it cannot be justified as an unconditional manifestation of a right to do wrong. Conclusion In its final analysis, the article asserts that the existing philosophical foundations for legitimizing the “right to do wrong” are conceptually and normatively fragile. Both the will-based and utility-based theories of right suffer from analytical and moral deficiencies and thus fail to offer a persuasive basis for recognizing such a right. Moreover, the persistent lack of consensus among western theorists on the interrelation of law and morality, the cultural obligations of the state, and the limits of individual liberty underscores that the right to do wrong has yet to secure a stable theoretical position within the corpus of human-rights thought. In fact, accepting such a right without relying on a moral and rational basis causes a disconnect between rights and justice and may lead to a decline in moral standards and social laxity. Finally, it is emphasized that if the right to be wrong is to be accepted within the framework of human rights, new reasons and foundations must be presented to justify it; foundations that can simultaneously balance individual freedom and moral responsibility. Until such a foundation is formed, the "right to be wrong" cannot be recognized as a legitimate and sustainable right in the contemporary human rights system Introduction This study adopts a critical–analytical approach to examine one of the most controversial issues in the philosophy of right and contemporary human-rights theory—namely, the possibility and justification of the so-called “right to do/be wrong.” This notion refers to an individual’s entitlement to engage in actions that may be regarded as morally or socially wrong, while the legal or political system nonetheless refrains from prohibiting or punishing them. The main research question is whether legal justification processes in modern human rights are capable of justifying this right? Methods The article begins by tracing the historical and philosophical roots of the concept of right. Prior to the Renaissance, rights were defined through an inseparable connection with moral norms, and the legitimacy of law was contingent on its conformity with ethical criteria. After the Renaissance, however, the conceptual distinction between being right and having a right emerged, Accordingly, the possibility of enacting laws arose that, although not morally justified, were considered rights based on the will of the legislator or the public interest. From this development, the idea of “right to do wrong”emerged. To analyze this idea, reference has been made to the two fundamental schools of philosophy of law - utilitarianism and voluntarism - in order to establish a criterion for justifying the right to be imposed. Results and Discussions In the school of utilitarianism, the foundation of law is based on the principle of profit or the greatest public happiness. From the perspective of Bentham and his followers, law and right are justified when they create the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people. However, the article shows that this approach fails to explain right over wrong, because "profit" is a relative and individual concept and cannot be a comprehensive basis for human rights. On the other hand, utilitarianism, by focusing excessively on material pleasure, ignores spiritual and moral values such as altruism or sacrifice, and therefore does not have the comprehensiveness necessary to justify this right. Voluntarism, rooted in Kantian moral philosophy, conceives of rights as expressions of individual will and autonomy. Under this view, a person holds a right only when able to exercise or waive it by choice. However, this theory also exhibits critical deficiencies when used to justify the right to do wrong. It applies only to those capable of free will, whereas children and the mentally incapacitated are also recognized as rights-bearers Furthermore, in cases such as the right to life, which is obligatory, the concept of will cannot play an explanatory role. Therefore, both schools of thought are weak in their theoretical and moral explanation of right over wrong. To further evaluate these shortcomings, the paper turns to Western thinkers’ discussions of related themes—the separation of law and morality, the state’s role in cultural formation, and civil disobedience. In the first debate, the separation of law from morality is analyzed as the primary foundation for recognizing a right to do wrong. Legal positivists such as Bentham, Austin, and Waldron argue that moral obligations cannot serve as criteria for legislation. Law is formed solely on the basis of social contract and practical interests. From this perspective, it is legally permissible for an individual to act in ways that morality deems wrong. In contrast, philosophers such as Cicero, Augustine, Ripert, and Simmonds uphold an intrinsic link between law and morality, insisting that “an unjust law is not law.” They warn that severing moral principles from legal validity leads to the collapse of justice and human dignity. On this reading, lawmakers have no right to enact rules contrary to moral fundamentals, and the acceptance of a right to do wrong effectively dissolves the ethical boundaries essential to a just legal order. The second axis of discussion concerns the role of the state in cultural formation. The first view, which emphasizes the neutrality of the state, believes that the state should not interfere in cultural and moral affairs, because this leads to cultural tyranny and the restriction of individual freedoms. This approach considers the right to be wrong as a natural consequence of respect for human autonomy. In contrast, the second approach emphasizes the responsibility of the state in the cultural guidance of society. Thinkers such as Plato, Hobbes, and, in certain respects, Adam Smith, maintain that in order to preserve order, social cohesion, and public virtue, the state must exercise some degree of cultural oversight. From this angle, absolute neutrality toward moral error fails to secure liberty and instead erodes the ethical foundations of community life. The author concludes that the government, as an institution arising from the public will, must play a guiding and cultural engineering role within the framework of fixed moral principles and not allow the right to be wrong to lead to public obscenity.The third issue examined is the relationship between the right to do wrong and civil disobedience. Civil disobedience is defined as a conscious, non-violent breach of unjust laws. If a right to do wrong were accepted, acts of civil disobedience might be interpreted as legitimate exercises of that right. Theorists such as Ronald Dworkin view civil disobedience as a moral form of protest permissible when normal political channels for reform have been exhausted. Critics, however, stress the ethical duty to obey the law, arguing that political legitimacy requires universal compliance with enacted norms, even when they conflict with individual conviction. Synthesizing these views, the paper concludes that civil disobedience can be morally defensible only within a specific ethical framework that challenges injustice; it cannot be justified as an unconditional manifestation of a right to do wrong. Conclusion In its final analysis, the article asserts that the existing philosophical foundations for legitimizing the “right to do wrong” are conceptually and normatively fragile. Both the will-based and utility-based theories of right suffer from analytical and moral deficiencies and thus fail to offer a persuasive basis for recognizing such a right. Moreover, the persistent lack of consensus among western theorists on the interrelation of law and morality, the cultural obligations of the state, and the limits of individual liberty underscores that the right to do wrong has yet to secure a stable theoretical position within the corpus of human-rights thought. In fact, accepting such a right without relying on a moral and rational basis causes a disconnect between rights and justice and may lead to a decline in moral standards and social laxity. Finally, it is emphasized that if the right to be wrong is to be accepted within the framework of human rights, new reasons and foundations must be presented to justify it; foundations that can simultaneously balance individual freedom and moral responsibility. Until such a foundation is formed, the "right to be wrong" cannot be recognized as a legitimate and sustainable right in the contemporary human rights system

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_104503_9e59e420aa17229bc38f0d5861dc721d.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 The Legal Framework for Compensation of Training Costs for Football Players by Clubs: Training Compensation and Solidarity Mechanism The Legal Framework for Compensation of Training Costs for Football Players by Clubs: Training Compensation and Solidarity Mechanism 227 246 105543 10.48308/jlr.2025.237327.2794 FA Amirsaed Vakil Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law & Political Sciences, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. Corresponding Author Email: vakil.a@ut.ac.ir Sepideh Ahmadianfard L.L.M Student, Faculty of Law & Political Sciences, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran 0009-0006-8945-400X Alireza Rezakhani L.L.M Student, Faculty of Law & Political Sciences, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2024 10 22 Introduction and Objectives The compensation system for football training costs is a crucial part of the professional football framework and plays a significant role in the development of youth football. The origins of this system trace back to the Bosman case ruled by the Court of Justice of the European Union(CJEU). Following this ruling, FIFA and UEFA jointly designed regulations to compensate clubs for the costs of training young players, leading to the creation of two frameworks: Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism. The central question of this article is: What is the nature and legal framework of Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism, and what objectives do they pursue? Given the legal challenges associated with these frameworks and the lack of awareness among clubs about some of these challenges, the primary goal of this article is to provide a comprehensive analysis of Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism, thereby enhancing public understanding and awareness of these systems. Methods The research method employed in this article is descriptive-analytical, and the data collection approach is library-based. In the descriptive section, the fundamental concepts and legal foundations of Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism are elucidated, while the analytical section examines and evaluates these concepts, revealing their interrelationships and distinctions. The article pays particular attention to select jurisprudence from the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) to provide a more in-depth description and analysis of Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism, as well as the practical challenges involved in resolving related disputes. Results and Discussions The primary origins of the system for compensating football player training costs trace back to the Bosman case before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). CJEU, in the Bosman case, obligated EU member states to adhere to the right of freedom of movement for workers as outlined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Accordingly, football players must be free to transfer to new teams, and compensation must be paid to training clubs for the costs of developing these players. Ultimately, following tripartite negotiations among FIFA, UEFA, and the European Union, new provisions were incorporated into the international transfer regulations. The revised and updated version of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, promulgated in 2001, established the foundational legal frameworks for both Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism. Training Compensation was proposed to maintain competitive balance among football clubs, enabling them to develop young players while receiving fair compensation for their efforts. The international regulations governing Training Compensation are detailed in Article 20 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and its Annex 4. Annex 4 outlines exceptions for FIFA members within the European Union and the European Economic Area, reflecting aspects of EU law, including the principle of freedom of movement for workers. These provisions apply exclusively to players transferred between associations that are members of the European Union. Training Compensation is paid when a player is registered as a professional for the first time before the age of 23 and signs a professional contract with a club, or when the player is transferred from their training club or origin to another club before turning 23. According to Annex 4 of FIFA's transfer regulations, the latter scenario must occur between two different associations. Based on Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of FIFA's transfer regulations, each football federation is required to establish a system to reward clubs that invest in the development of young players. According to Article 10 of FIFA's transfer regulations, a loan transfer is classified as a transfer. Additionally, if the transfer is international, an International Transfer Certificate (ITC) is required. Training Compensation is awarded to the training club in the event of a player's transfer, whether temporary or permanent. If multiple clubs have contributed to a player's training, the Training Compensation shall be distributed among them in proportion to the period of training the player underwent at each club during his formative years. Furthermore, the right to claim Training Compensation is extinguished in the following circumstances: if the training club unjustifiably terminates the player's contract; if the player transfers to a club categorized by FIFA as a fourth-tier team; or if the player attains amateur status. Under the Solidarity Mechanism, as outlined in Article 21, if a professional football player is transferred to another club before the expiration of their contract, all clubs that contributed to the player's development receive a proportionate share of the total transfer fee. Notably, the Solidarity Mechanism applies exclusively to international transfers; Therefore, if a player is transferred to a club that, along with the player's training club, is affiliated with the same national football federation, the Solidarity Mechanism shall not be applied. However, some federations have incorporated this mechanism into their national regulations. In the Solidarity Mechanism, transfers can occur at any age, and compensation can be claimed if an international transfer takes place before the end of the player's professional contract. Despite the established principles in the regulations governing Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism, their implementation faces similar challenges. Key issues include disputes over the duration and costs of training periods. Conclusion Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism incentivize clubs to invest in training young players and receive remuneration for their efforts. The key distinction lies in their scope and purpose: Training Compensation is subject to age limitations and is focused on reimbursing training costs, whereas the Solidarity Mechanism has no age restrictions and pursues a broader objective of promoting solidarity within the football community. In both frameworks, the nature of the transfer (permanent or loan) does not affect the payment obligations. Introduction and Objectives The compensation system for football training costs is a crucial part of the professional football framework and plays a significant role in the development of youth football. The origins of this system trace back to the Bosman case ruled by the Court of Justice of the European Union(CJEU). Following this ruling, FIFA and UEFA jointly designed regulations to compensate clubs for the costs of training young players, leading to the creation of two frameworks: Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism. The central question of this article is: What is the nature and legal framework of Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism, and what objectives do they pursue? Given the legal challenges associated with these frameworks and the lack of awareness among clubs about some of these challenges, the primary goal of this article is to provide a comprehensive analysis of Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism, thereby enhancing public understanding and awareness of these systems. Methods The research method employed in this article is descriptive-analytical, and the data collection approach is library-based. In the descriptive section, the fundamental concepts and legal foundations of Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism are elucidated, while the analytical section examines and evaluates these concepts, revealing their interrelationships and distinctions. The article pays particular attention to select jurisprudence from the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) to provide a more in-depth description and analysis of Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism, as well as the practical challenges involved in resolving related disputes. Results and Discussions The primary origins of the system for compensating football player training costs trace back to the Bosman case before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). CJEU, in the Bosman case, obligated EU member states to adhere to the right of freedom of movement for workers as outlined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Accordingly, football players must be free to transfer to new teams, and compensation must be paid to training clubs for the costs of developing these players. Ultimately, following tripartite negotiations among FIFA, UEFA, and the European Union, new provisions were incorporated into the international transfer regulations. The revised and updated version of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, promulgated in 2001, established the foundational legal frameworks for both Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism. Training Compensation was proposed to maintain competitive balance among football clubs, enabling them to develop young players while receiving fair compensation for their efforts. The international regulations governing Training Compensation are detailed in Article 20 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and its Annex 4. Annex 4 outlines exceptions for FIFA members within the European Union and the European Economic Area, reflecting aspects of EU law, including the principle of freedom of movement for workers. These provisions apply exclusively to players transferred between associations that are members of the European Union. Training Compensation is paid when a player is registered as a professional for the first time before the age of 23 and signs a professional contract with a club, or when the player is transferred from their training club or origin to another club before turning 23. According to Annex 4 of FIFA's transfer regulations, the latter scenario must occur between two different associations. Based on Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of FIFA's transfer regulations, each football federation is required to establish a system to reward clubs that invest in the development of young players. According to Article 10 of FIFA's transfer regulations, a loan transfer is classified as a transfer. Additionally, if the transfer is international, an International Transfer Certificate (ITC) is required. Training Compensation is awarded to the training club in the event of a player's transfer, whether temporary or permanent. If multiple clubs have contributed to a player's training, the Training Compensation shall be distributed among them in proportion to the period of training the player underwent at each club during his formative years. Furthermore, the right to claim Training Compensation is extinguished in the following circumstances: if the training club unjustifiably terminates the player's contract; if the player transfers to a club categorized by FIFA as a fourth-tier team; or if the player attains amateur status. Under the Solidarity Mechanism, as outlined in Article 21, if a professional football player is transferred to another club before the expiration of their contract, all clubs that contributed to the player's development receive a proportionate share of the total transfer fee. Notably, the Solidarity Mechanism applies exclusively to international transfers; Therefore, if a player is transferred to a club that, along with the player's training club, is affiliated with the same national football federation, the Solidarity Mechanism shall not be applied. However, some federations have incorporated this mechanism into their national regulations. In the Solidarity Mechanism, transfers can occur at any age, and compensation can be claimed if an international transfer takes place before the end of the player's professional contract. Despite the established principles in the regulations governing Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism, their implementation faces similar challenges. Key issues include disputes over the duration and costs of training periods. Conclusion Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism incentivize clubs to invest in training young players and receive remuneration for their efforts. The key distinction lies in their scope and purpose: Training Compensation is subject to age limitations and is focused on reimbursing training costs, whereas the Solidarity Mechanism has no age restrictions and pursues a broader objective of promoting solidarity within the football community. In both frameworks, the nature of the transfer (permanent or loan) does not affect the payment obligations.

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105543_6525277270dac230046088d20abcd4f8.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 Human Rights Dimensions of Lethal Artificial Intelligence: Meaningful Human Control as a Legal Necessity in the International Human Rights System Human Rights Dimensions of Lethal Artificial Intelligence: Meaningful Human Control as a Legal Necessity in the International Human Rights System 247 266 106480 10.48308/jlr.2025.240735.2928 FA Seyedeh Latifeh Hossein i , professor assistant, Department of Law, Faculty of Social Sciences and Economics, Alzahra University, Tehran, Iran Narges Hosseini University lecturer and researcher in international law, Tehran, Iran Mohammadmahdi Hosseinmardi Assistant Prof, Department of Islamic teachings, Payame Noor University, Tehran, Iran, Journal Article 2025 07 18 Introduction In the past decade, the development of emerging technologies, especially in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), has fundamentally transformed military and security decision-making. One of the most notable manifestations of this transformation is the emergence of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) —systems capable of identifying, selecting, and attacking targets without direct human intervention. Despite their advantages, such as reducing human casualties on the battlefield and increasing operational speed, these technologies pose profound challenges in terms of ethics, accountability, and, most critically, human rights compliance. One of the primary concerns in this domain is the removal of the human element from lethal decision-making and its impact on fundamental human rights. In this context, the concept of "meaningful human control" has gained prominence within the international legal community as a legal imperative to prevent human rights violations and to preserve human dignity. The central issue of this research is to examine the human rights implications of deploying lethal AI systems in situations where meaningful human control over life-and-death decisions is absent. Specifically, the research aims to demonstrate how the removal or weakening of human oversight can lead to violations of the right to life, human dignity, and other rights guaranteed under the international human rights framework. The study is based on the premise that human control is not merely an ethical or operational requirement but a legal necessity to ensure compliance with human rights norms. Accordingly, the main research question is framed as follows: "What are the consequences of the absence of meaningful human control over decision-making by lethal systems for the protection and guarantee of human rights? " In addition to these concerns, the rapid acceleration of AI capabilities and their integration into security infrastructures have created a regulatory gap that international legal systems have yet to adequately address. Existing human rights instruments were drafted in an era when autonomous decision-making in warfare was unimaginable, resulting in uncertainty regarding how traditional legal norms apply to machines that operate without human judgment or moral reasoning. This gap not only complicates the interpretation of states’ human rights obligations but also raises questions about foreseeability, accountability, and the ability of victims to seek effective remedies. As states increasingly rely on automated systems in high-stakes environments, the urgency of establishing clear legal standards for human oversight becomes even more apparent, reinforcing the necessity of meaningful human control as a foundational safeguard in the international human rights system. The primary innovation of this study lies in presenting a systematic legal framework for analyzing the necessity of human control in relation to each fundamental human right. Previous literature has largely addressed human control from ethical or military standpoints. This research, for the first time, provides a detailed legal explanation of the connection between the lack of human control and specific threats to human rights, grounded in existing legal rules and documents. It also offers a critical analysis of gaps in the literature concerning legal accountability in the absence of oversight and the challenges of remedying harm to victims. Moreover, the study underscores that the legitimacy of any future regulatory framework depends on states’ willingness to integrate transparency, oversight, and ethical review mechanisms into the development cycle of lethal AI systems. Methods This research adopts a descriptive-analytical method with a qualitative approach. Data is collected through library-based research, analysis of international legal instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), interpretations by human rights bodies like the Human Rights Committee, and expert reports including those of the Group of Governmental Experts under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The study also engages in comparative analysis of international practices and national positions regarding the necessity of human control, aiming to provide a more accurate picture of existing challenges and potential legal solutions. Results and Discussion The main findings of this study are: a) The removal or weakening of the human element in lethal decision-making challenges the principle of human dignity, as dignity requires that any decision to take life be made within the framework of human understanding of context, motive, and consequences. b) In the absence of human control, guaranteeing the right to life based on the principles of necessity and proportionality becomes impossible or severely constrained, as algorithms lack the capacity for human-like assessment of threats, necessity of force, and proportionality. c) Legal accountability—whether civil, criminal, or international—faces a vacuum in the absence of human control, since existing legal systems attribute responsibility to human agents, not to machines or algorithms. d) Fundamental human rights such as the prohibition of discrimination, the right to a fair trial, and the right to access justice are also significantly threatened by autonomous decision-making, as such systems often lack transparency, accountability, and mechanisms for review. Conclusion Lethal artificial intelligence represents one of the most complex challenges of the 21st century in the fields of technology and law, necessitating a rethinking of classical human rights concepts. The findings of this study demonstrate that meaningful human control is not only a tool for ensuring the moral legitimacy of lethal decisions but also a legal imperative to safeguard fundamental rights such as the right to life, human dignity, and accountability. The absence of such control disrupts the chain of accountability, increases the risk of human rights violations, and undermines the rule of law. Therefore, the international community must take steps toward adopting binding international norms that mandate effective human control over lethal systems. Only through such action can the coexistence of emerging technologies and human rights in a just and humane world be secured. The findings of this research have significant implications for international policymaking, technological regulation, and the enhancement of human rights protection mechanisms. From a policymaking perspective, the study emphasizes the need for binding international regulations to ensure the preservation of human control in the design, development, and deployment of lethal systems. These findings can serve as a foundation for treaty negotiations at the United Nations or for reinforcing the Human Rights Council's agenda on AI. Legally, the findings may be invoked in international litigation or in defense of victims of human rights violations caused by autonomous actions. Furthermore, the analysis can assist states currently formulating national AI policies in aligning their frameworks with human rights obligations Introduction In the past decade, the development of emerging technologies, especially in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), has fundamentally transformed military and security decision-making. One of the most notable manifestations of this transformation is the emergence of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) —systems capable of identifying, selecting, and attacking targets without direct human intervention. Despite their advantages, such as reducing human casualties on the battlefield and increasing operational speed, these technologies pose profound challenges in terms of ethics, accountability, and, most critically, human rights compliance. One of the primary concerns in this domain is the removal of the human element from lethal decision-making and its impact on fundamental human rights. In this context, the concept of "meaningful human control" has gained prominence within the international legal community as a legal imperative to prevent human rights violations and to preserve human dignity. The central issue of this research is to examine the human rights implications of deploying lethal AI systems in situations where meaningful human control over life-and-death decisions is absent. Specifically, the research aims to demonstrate how the removal or weakening of human oversight can lead to violations of the right to life, human dignity, and other rights guaranteed under the international human rights framework. The study is based on the premise that human control is not merely an ethical or operational requirement but a legal necessity to ensure compliance with human rights norms. Accordingly, the main research question is framed as follows: "What are the consequences of the absence of meaningful human control over decision-making by lethal systems for the protection and guarantee of human rights? " In addition to these concerns, the rapid acceleration of AI capabilities and their integration into security infrastructures have created a regulatory gap that international legal systems have yet to adequately address. Existing human rights instruments were drafted in an era when autonomous decision-making in warfare was unimaginable, resulting in uncertainty regarding how traditional legal norms apply to machines that operate without human judgment or moral reasoning. This gap not only complicates the interpretation of states’ human rights obligations but also raises questions about foreseeability, accountability, and the ability of victims to seek effective remedies. As states increasingly rely on automated systems in high-stakes environments, the urgency of establishing clear legal standards for human oversight becomes even more apparent, reinforcing the necessity of meaningful human control as a foundational safeguard in the international human rights system. The primary innovation of this study lies in presenting a systematic legal framework for analyzing the necessity of human control in relation to each fundamental human right. Previous literature has largely addressed human control from ethical or military standpoints. This research, for the first time, provides a detailed legal explanation of the connection between the lack of human control and specific threats to human rights, grounded in existing legal rules and documents. It also offers a critical analysis of gaps in the literature concerning legal accountability in the absence of oversight and the challenges of remedying harm to victims. Moreover, the study underscores that the legitimacy of any future regulatory framework depends on states’ willingness to integrate transparency, oversight, and ethical review mechanisms into the development cycle of lethal AI systems. Methods This research adopts a descriptive-analytical method with a qualitative approach. Data is collected through library-based research, analysis of international legal instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), interpretations by human rights bodies like the Human Rights Committee, and expert reports including those of the Group of Governmental Experts under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The study also engages in comparative analysis of international practices and national positions regarding the necessity of human control, aiming to provide a more accurate picture of existing challenges and potential legal solutions. Results and Discussion The main findings of this study are: a) The removal or weakening of the human element in lethal decision-making challenges the principle of human dignity, as dignity requires that any decision to take life be made within the framework of human understanding of context, motive, and consequences. b) In the absence of human control, guaranteeing the right to life based on the principles of necessity and proportionality becomes impossible or severely constrained, as algorithms lack the capacity for human-like assessment of threats, necessity of force, and proportionality. c) Legal accountability—whether civil, criminal, or international—faces a vacuum in the absence of human control, since existing legal systems attribute responsibility to human agents, not to machines or algorithms. d) Fundamental human rights such as the prohibition of discrimination, the right to a fair trial, and the right to access justice are also significantly threatened by autonomous decision-making, as such systems often lack transparency, accountability, and mechanisms for review. Conclusion Lethal artificial intelligence represents one of the most complex challenges of the 21st century in the fields of technology and law, necessitating a rethinking of classical human rights concepts. The findings of this study demonstrate that meaningful human control is not only a tool for ensuring the moral legitimacy of lethal decisions but also a legal imperative to safeguard fundamental rights such as the right to life, human dignity, and accountability. The absence of such control disrupts the chain of accountability, increases the risk of human rights violations, and undermines the rule of law. Therefore, the international community must take steps toward adopting binding international norms that mandate effective human control over lethal systems. Only through such action can the coexistence of emerging technologies and human rights in a just and humane world be secured. The findings of this research have significant implications for international policymaking, technological regulation, and the enhancement of human rights protection mechanisms. From a policymaking perspective, the study emphasizes the need for binding international regulations to ensure the preservation of human control in the design, development, and deployment of lethal systems. These findings can serve as a foundation for treaty negotiations at the United Nations or for reinforcing the Human Rights Council's agenda on AI. Legally, the findings may be invoked in international litigation or in defense of victims of human rights violations caused by autonomous actions. Furthermore, the analysis can assist states currently formulating national AI policies in aligning their frameworks with human rights obligations

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_106480_3c1364050c1ee56ac0f2e856f93b4293.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 The basis of civil liability of factors related to the performance of artificial intelligence systems in European Union documents and Iranian law The basis of civil liability of factors related to the performance of artificial intelligence systems in European Union documents and Iranian law 267 288 105721 10.48308/jlr.2025.235893.2736 FA Same’il Keshavarz Safi’e Assistant Professor, Faculty of Humanities, Islamic Azad University: Qazvin Branch, Qazvin, Iran. keshavarzsmaeil@gmail.com Journal Article 2024 06 03 Introduction The development of computer science since the mid-twentieth century has led to the formation of the phenomenon of artificial intelligence. Today, artificial intelligence, by using precise calculations, access to very large volumes of information, and a lower error rate, has demonstrated its superiority over human performance in thinking and decision-making in many fields. However, this development has also brought risks with it. One of these risks is the issue of compensation for damages resulting from the behavior of artificial intelligence systems, as well as the basis for civil liability resulting from their harmful actions. The emergence of damages caused by artificial intelligence systems has led to the tendency of lawyers and legislators in various countries to establish special regulations regarding human factors related to artificial intelligence activities, from the production and manufacturing process to its use in relationships between humans. The European Union is one of the leading regions in regulating civil liability arising from the operation of AI. This article seeks to comprehensively examine various EU documents separately in the field of civil liability, factors related to the performance of artificial intelligence systems, and compare the current Iranian legal system with EU documents. In the final step, a proposed solution to address the shortcomings and criticisms of EU documents as well as the Iranian legal system will be examined. Methods The main research method in this study is a descriptive-analytical method. The sources required in this study have been collected through library methods and by referring to reliable databases and websites. The main goal of this study is to determine the basis for civil liability of various factors related to the performance of artificial intelligence systems. In this context, two legal systems of the European Union and Iran were selected. Regarding the European Union, various documents were studied, such as the 2020 European Parliament Resolution, the 2022 PLD Proposed Directive on Defective Products, as well as the 2022 AILD Proposed Directive. Also, despite the lack of a specific law in Iranian law regarding civil liability arising from the performance of artificial intelligence, the capacities of related laws such as the Consumer Protection Law and the E-Commerce Law to respond to the harmful performance of artificial intelligence were examined. Results and Discussions European Union documents are one of the leading legal documents in the field of regulation regarding the obligations, requirements and responsibilities of various factors related to the performance of artificial intelligence systems. In short, Resolution 2020, PLD's proposal and instructions for artificial intelligence producers, contains a no-fault liability system. But regarding providers and users of artificial intelligence AILD Directive And the artificial intelligence Act 2024 is proportional to the degree of risk of artificial intelligence systems, including liability based on fault (presumed fault for high-risk systems). However, due to the differences between documents regarding the basis of civil liability of various factors, as well as the interference and mixing in the definition of some titles such as producer, operator and provider, the preparation of a single recipe for the precise definition of each of the titles and determining the basis of civil liability of each one of factors are suggested separately to resolve the ambiguity and complexity of these documents. Regarding the laws of Iran, the current laws do not have the ability to respond to the challenges and harms of the emerging phenomenon of artificial intelligence and the progress of this technology and the degrees of danger and harm they cause, and the need to enact a comprehensive law to determine the legal framework and civil responsibility of each of the factors related to the performance of artificial intelligence appears to be an urgent matter. Until then, the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act And the Law of Electronic Commerce and Note 2 of Article 526 of the Islamic Punishment Act of Iran will rule regarding the harmful behavior of artificial intelligence systems, that due to some conflicts and deficiencies, the amendment of the conflicting articles and the addition of amendments to the mentioned laws in order to properly cover the types and Various degrees of high-risk and low-risk artificial intelligence systems will be essential. In summary, in the field of Iranian law, the author suggests two suggestions: 1- The most appropriate solution is to regulate the rules governing the civil liability of artificial intelligence systems in a specific manner. The 2024 Artificial Intelligence Law and its instructions can be a useful and appropriate guide for establishing regulations in this field. 2- The second suggestion (in case the first proposal cannot be implemented), regarding the civil liability of manufacturers (including suppliers) of artificial intelligence systems, is to eliminate the conflict between the note to Article 2 and Articles 18 and 19 of the Consumer Protection Law by amending the note to Article 2 and removing the condition that the supplier be aware of the defect in production, in order to establish a system of liability without fault for manufacturers and suppliers of artificial intelligence systems. Conclusion The 2020 Resolution, the PLD Proposal 2022 for AI Producers contain a system of no-fault (strict) liability. However, for AI Providers and Deployers, the AILD Directive and the AI Act 2024 contain, in proportion to the degree of risk of AI systems, presumed fault-based liability for high-risk systems and fault-based liability for low-risk systems. In the current Iranian legal system, the Consumer Protection Law can be considered to include no-fault liability of the manufacturer (including the supplier) of defective artificial intelligence systems by removing the note in Article 2 of this law. With respect to users of artificial intelligence systems, Article 78 of the Electronic Commerce Law and Note 2 of Article 526 of the Islamic Penal Code cannot, in the current situation, respond to the risk levels of artificial intelligence systems Introduction The development of computer science since the mid-twentieth century has led to the formation of the phenomenon of artificial intelligence. Today, artificial intelligence, by using precise calculations, access to very large volumes of information, and a lower error rate, has demonstrated its superiority over human performance in thinking and decision-making in many fields. However, this development has also brought risks with it. One of these risks is the issue of compensation for damages resulting from the behavior of artificial intelligence systems, as well as the basis for civil liability resulting from their harmful actions. The emergence of damages caused by artificial intelligence systems has led to the tendency of lawyers and legislators in various countries to establish special regulations regarding human factors related to artificial intelligence activities, from the production and manufacturing process to its use in relationships between humans. The European Union is one of the leading regions in regulating civil liability arising from the operation of AI. This article seeks to comprehensively examine various EU documents separately in the field of civil liability, factors related to the performance of artificial intelligence systems, and compare the current Iranian legal system with EU documents. In the final step, a proposed solution to address the shortcomings and criticisms of EU documents as well as the Iranian legal system will be examined. Methods The main research method in this study is a descriptive-analytical method. The sources required in this study have been collected through library methods and by referring to reliable databases and websites. The main goal of this study is to determine the basis for civil liability of various factors related to the performance of artificial intelligence systems. In this context, two legal systems of the European Union and Iran were selected. Regarding the European Union, various documents were studied, such as the 2020 European Parliament Resolution, the 2022 PLD Proposed Directive on Defective Products, as well as the 2022 AILD Proposed Directive. Also, despite the lack of a specific law in Iranian law regarding civil liability arising from the performance of artificial intelligence, the capacities of related laws such as the Consumer Protection Law and the E-Commerce Law to respond to the harmful performance of artificial intelligence were examined. Results and Discussions European Union documents are one of the leading legal documents in the field of regulation regarding the obligations, requirements and responsibilities of various factors related to the performance of artificial intelligence systems. In short, Resolution 2020, PLD's proposal and instructions for artificial intelligence producers, contains a no-fault liability system. But regarding providers and users of artificial intelligence AILD Directive And the artificial intelligence Act 2024 is proportional to the degree of risk of artificial intelligence systems, including liability based on fault (presumed fault for high-risk systems). However, due to the differences between documents regarding the basis of civil liability of various factors, as well as the interference and mixing in the definition of some titles such as producer, operator and provider, the preparation of a single recipe for the precise definition of each of the titles and determining the basis of civil liability of each one of factors are suggested separately to resolve the ambiguity and complexity of these documents. Regarding the laws of Iran, the current laws do not have the ability to respond to the challenges and harms of the emerging phenomenon of artificial intelligence and the progress of this technology and the degrees of danger and harm they cause, and the need to enact a comprehensive law to determine the legal framework and civil responsibility of each of the factors related to the performance of artificial intelligence appears to be an urgent matter. Until then, the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act And the Law of Electronic Commerce and Note 2 of Article 526 of the Islamic Punishment Act of Iran will rule regarding the harmful behavior of artificial intelligence systems, that due to some conflicts and deficiencies, the amendment of the conflicting articles and the addition of amendments to the mentioned laws in order to properly cover the types and Various degrees of high-risk and low-risk artificial intelligence systems will be essential. In summary, in the field of Iranian law, the author suggests two suggestions: 1- The most appropriate solution is to regulate the rules governing the civil liability of artificial intelligence systems in a specific manner. The 2024 Artificial Intelligence Law and its instructions can be a useful and appropriate guide for establishing regulations in this field. 2- The second suggestion (in case the first proposal cannot be implemented), regarding the civil liability of manufacturers (including suppliers) of artificial intelligence systems, is to eliminate the conflict between the note to Article 2 and Articles 18 and 19 of the Consumer Protection Law by amending the note to Article 2 and removing the condition that the supplier be aware of the defect in production, in order to establish a system of liability without fault for manufacturers and suppliers of artificial intelligence systems. Conclusion The 2020 Resolution, the PLD Proposal 2022 for AI Producers contain a system of no-fault (strict) liability. However, for AI Providers and Deployers, the AILD Directive and the AI Act 2024 contain, in proportion to the degree of risk of AI systems, presumed fault-based liability for high-risk systems and fault-based liability for low-risk systems. In the current Iranian legal system, the Consumer Protection Law can be considered to include no-fault liability of the manufacturer (including the supplier) of defective artificial intelligence systems by removing the note in Article 2 of this law. With respect to users of artificial intelligence systems, Article 78 of the Electronic Commerce Law and Note 2 of Article 526 of the Islamic Penal Code cannot, in the current situation, respond to the risk levels of artificial intelligence systems

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105721_82b5ffb94e8bc2ea73b85a90dbf147f9.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 Protecting Individual Privacy in the Metaverse: Solutions to Combat Assault and Abuse Protecting Individual Privacy in the Metaverse: Solutions to Combat Assault and Abuse 289 305 105332 10.48308/jlr.2025.238261.2834 FA مهدی Karimi Assistance Professor, Faculty of law & Social Science, Payame Noor University, Tehran, Iran. m.karimi342@pnu.ac.ir Journal Article 2025 01 08 Abstract Introduction The emergence of the metaverse represents a fundamental transformation in human-computer interaction. This space, which blends augmented physical reality with persistent virtual life, provides unprecedented opportunities for social relationships, commerce, education, and entertainment. However, this expansive digital realm is not without significant challenges. Among these challenges, the occurrence of sexual violence in the metaverse presents itself as an urgent and serious issue requiring immediate attention. This disturbing phenomenon exploits the very technological innovations that shape the metaverse's unique characteristics. This article undertakes two critical tasks: (1) it precisely demonstrates how the metaverse is evolving and provides an in-depth analysis of its development, and (2) it examines how certain individuals misuse these emerging technologies to commit sexual crimes. This research begins with a comprehensive evaluation of extensive studies surrounding the complex aspects of metaverse development. This evaluation encompasses the metaverse's foundational technologies, ethical challenges and issues, concerns related to user privacy and security, and legal frameworks for ensuring a safe environment and preventing criminal activities. This research seeks to identify effective legal mechanisms for mitigating sexual violence in the metaverse, recognize deficiencies in existing legislation, and offer recommendations for improving current laws. Methods This article employs legal methodology, library research, and descriptive analysis to comprehensively examine challenges and develop holistic solutions regarding sexual violence in the metaverse. This research primarily utilized academic sources through searches in reputable scientific databases including Google Scholar, ScienceDirect, and other authoritative databases containing legal, technological, and social science publications. Key search terms included "metaverse," "virtual world," "sexual harassment," "online harassment," and "technology law”. Results and Discussion The metaverse represents a revolutionary domain for social interactions that faces serious legal challenges. Current legal frameworks are inadequate for addressing the complexities of this environment, particularly concerning sexual violence and victimization. This article seeks to provide solutions for understanding the legal challenges of the metaverse, establishing a comprehensive legal framework, and maintaining user security and dignity regarding sexual crimes. The metaverse blurs the boundaries between virtual and physical reality, necessitating that legal concepts be redefined in a manner that considers the psychological and emotional impacts of virtual interactions. The role of consent mechanisms in the metaverse has emerged as a fundamental concern in sexual crimes. Developing clear protocols for obtaining explicit consent in virtual interactions is essential to protect users from unwanted experiences. This issue requires educating users about behavioral norms and etiquette in the metaverse and equipping them with interaction control tools. For example, Meta has introduced personal boundary features that allow users to manage their personal space, thereby reducing the likelihood of sexual harassment and victimization. The global nature of the metaverse creates significant jurisdictional challenges that require international cooperation and the establishment of a common legal framework. This framework must cover key issues such as consent, anonymity, and financial transactions while ensuring unified cross-border regulation. Addressing the issue of anonymity in the metaverse in relation to sexual crimes is another critical aspect that requires attention. Implementing user authentication mechanisms through real-world identifiers can reduce accountability issues but raises concerns about data protection and user privacy. Therefore, platforms must strike a balance between user identity verification and ethical management of sensitive information. In the virtual world of the metaverse, it must be clearly established what duties and responsibilities companies operating these virtual spaces bear. The first matter concerns content moderation. Platforms have a duty to monitor and control the content circulating within their virtual environments. This duty encompasses not only identifying and removing harmful content but must also be balanced with users' right to freedom of expression. The primary challenge lies in designing monitoring systems that are both effective and attentive to the nuances of user interaction in these virtual spaces. The second matter concerns the critical issue of user identity verification, which plays a vital role. Verifying users' real identities is a powerful strategy for preventing inappropriate behavior, as it links virtual actions to real-world accountability. However, implementing user authentication processes raises concerns about privacy and data protection, requiring an approach that enhances overall security while respecting user privacy. The legal liabilities of metaverse platforms primarily emerge when these duties are violated or neglected. Suppose a platform fails to properly moderate its content or verify user identities, and this negligence leads to instances of sexual harassment or abuse. In such cases, the platform may face legal and regulatory consequences. This underscores the importance of proactive and robust management by platform providers to protect users and ensure a respectful and secure virtual environment. As the metaverse continues to expand and becomes integrated into various aspects of daily life, the imperative for these platforms to embrace their responsibility in creating and maintaining safe virtual spaces becomes increasingly paramount. Conclusion This article emphasizes the evolving role of metaverse platforms. These platforms can no longer be regarded merely as communication intermediaries but must actively participate in content moderation and ensuring user safety against sexual victimization. This shift in responsibility necessitates that platforms develop robust monitoring systems and contribute to creating a safe virtual environment. The central argument is that regulating the metaverse is a multidimensional process requiring coordinated collaboration among legislators, technology experts, and users. The legal framework of the metaverse must be dynamic while maintaining the fundamental principles of safety, respect, and accountability. This article provides a comprehensive analysis for these efforts and presents insights and recommendations that can guide future legal and regulatory approaches in addressing sexual crimes in this emerging digital frontier Abstract Introduction The emergence of the metaverse represents a fundamental transformation in human-computer interaction. This space, which blends augmented physical reality with persistent virtual life, provides unprecedented opportunities for social relationships, commerce, education, and entertainment. However, this expansive digital realm is not without significant challenges. Among these challenges, the occurrence of sexual violence in the metaverse presents itself as an urgent and serious issue requiring immediate attention. This disturbing phenomenon exploits the very technological innovations that shape the metaverse's unique characteristics. This article undertakes two critical tasks: (1) it precisely demonstrates how the metaverse is evolving and provides an in-depth analysis of its development, and (2) it examines how certain individuals misuse these emerging technologies to commit sexual crimes. This research begins with a comprehensive evaluation of extensive studies surrounding the complex aspects of metaverse development. This evaluation encompasses the metaverse's foundational technologies, ethical challenges and issues, concerns related to user privacy and security, and legal frameworks for ensuring a safe environment and preventing criminal activities. This research seeks to identify effective legal mechanisms for mitigating sexual violence in the metaverse, recognize deficiencies in existing legislation, and offer recommendations for improving current laws. Methods This article employs legal methodology, library research, and descriptive analysis to comprehensively examine challenges and develop holistic solutions regarding sexual violence in the metaverse. This research primarily utilized academic sources through searches in reputable scientific databases including Google Scholar, ScienceDirect, and other authoritative databases containing legal, technological, and social science publications. Key search terms included "metaverse," "virtual world," "sexual harassment," "online harassment," and "technology law”. Results and Discussion The metaverse represents a revolutionary domain for social interactions that faces serious legal challenges. Current legal frameworks are inadequate for addressing the complexities of this environment, particularly concerning sexual violence and victimization. This article seeks to provide solutions for understanding the legal challenges of the metaverse, establishing a comprehensive legal framework, and maintaining user security and dignity regarding sexual crimes. The metaverse blurs the boundaries between virtual and physical reality, necessitating that legal concepts be redefined in a manner that considers the psychological and emotional impacts of virtual interactions. The role of consent mechanisms in the metaverse has emerged as a fundamental concern in sexual crimes. Developing clear protocols for obtaining explicit consent in virtual interactions is essential to protect users from unwanted experiences. This issue requires educating users about behavioral norms and etiquette in the metaverse and equipping them with interaction control tools. For example, Meta has introduced personal boundary features that allow users to manage their personal space, thereby reducing the likelihood of sexual harassment and victimization. The global nature of the metaverse creates significant jurisdictional challenges that require international cooperation and the establishment of a common legal framework. This framework must cover key issues such as consent, anonymity, and financial transactions while ensuring unified cross-border regulation. Addressing the issue of anonymity in the metaverse in relation to sexual crimes is another critical aspect that requires attention. Implementing user authentication mechanisms through real-world identifiers can reduce accountability issues but raises concerns about data protection and user privacy. Therefore, platforms must strike a balance between user identity verification and ethical management of sensitive information. In the virtual world of the metaverse, it must be clearly established what duties and responsibilities companies operating these virtual spaces bear. The first matter concerns content moderation. Platforms have a duty to monitor and control the content circulating within their virtual environments. This duty encompasses not only identifying and removing harmful content but must also be balanced with users' right to freedom of expression. The primary challenge lies in designing monitoring systems that are both effective and attentive to the nuances of user interaction in these virtual spaces. The second matter concerns the critical issue of user identity verification, which plays a vital role. Verifying users' real identities is a powerful strategy for preventing inappropriate behavior, as it links virtual actions to real-world accountability. However, implementing user authentication processes raises concerns about privacy and data protection, requiring an approach that enhances overall security while respecting user privacy. The legal liabilities of metaverse platforms primarily emerge when these duties are violated or neglected. Suppose a platform fails to properly moderate its content or verify user identities, and this negligence leads to instances of sexual harassment or abuse. In such cases, the platform may face legal and regulatory consequences. This underscores the importance of proactive and robust management by platform providers to protect users and ensure a respectful and secure virtual environment. As the metaverse continues to expand and becomes integrated into various aspects of daily life, the imperative for these platforms to embrace their responsibility in creating and maintaining safe virtual spaces becomes increasingly paramount. Conclusion This article emphasizes the evolving role of metaverse platforms. These platforms can no longer be regarded merely as communication intermediaries but must actively participate in content moderation and ensuring user safety against sexual victimization. This shift in responsibility necessitates that platforms develop robust monitoring systems and contribute to creating a safe virtual environment. The central argument is that regulating the metaverse is a multidimensional process requiring coordinated collaboration among legislators, technology experts, and users. The legal framework of the metaverse must be dynamic while maintaining the fundamental principles of safety, respect, and accountability. This article provides a comprehensive analysis for these efforts and presents insights and recommendations that can guide future legal and regulatory approaches in addressing sexual crimes in this emerging digital frontier

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105332_3a6909fd8af53e082df24439cf8f0461.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 A Pondering on the Interpretation of Judgments in the International Court of Justice, with Emphasis on the Preah Vihear Temple Case A Pondering on the Interpretation of Judgments in the International Court of Justice, with Emphasis on the Preah Vihear Temple Case 307 327 105530 10.48308/jlr.2025.235487.2815 FA Seyed Mohammad Hoseini Ph.D., Faculty of Law, Mofid University, Qom, Iran mh_smh@yahoo.com Journal Article 2024 12 02 Introduction The system of peaceful settlement of international disputes is recognized as one of the most vital mechanisms for maintaining international peace and security. Within this framework, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) plays an indispensable role in ensuring the observance of this principle. According to Article 60 of its Statute, the Court’s judgments are final and without appeal; they can only be reconsidered through two limited mechanisms: “interpretation” and, in exceptional cases, “revision”. Among these, the interpretation of judgments has acquired particular significance, especially as exemplified by the well-known “Temple of Preah Vihear case” between Cambodia and Thailand. The 1962 judgment of this case, while recognizing Cambodia’s sovereignty over the temple structure, left unresolved ambiguities concerning the geographical boundaries and the practical consequences of the ruling. These ambiguities necessitated a subsequent interpretative judgment by the Court in 2013. This study, by examining Article 60 of the ICJ Statute and focusing on the Principle of “Non Ultra Petita”, seeks to answer the central question: To what extent does the Court’s strict adherence to this principle contribute to, or hinder, the realization of its main purpose—namely, the peaceful settlement of international disputes? Accordingly, the objective of this research is to analyze the role of this principle in generating, perpetuating, or eliminating ambiguities in the Court’s judgments, and to assess the evolution of the ICJ’s interpretative approach between its 1962 and 2013 decisions. Methods The present research employs an analytical–comparative method, based on documentary and library-based data collection. Initially, fundamental instruments of international law—including the United Nations Charter, the Statute of the ICJ, and the Rules of Court—were examined to extract the legal foundations governing the interpretation of judgments and the conditions for applying the Non Ultra Petita principle. Subsequently, the study analyzes the content and reasoning of the ICJ’s judgments, particularly the separate and dissenting opinions of judges in the 1962 and 2013 Preah Vihear cases, alongside other similar decisions, to trace the evolution of the Court’s understanding and application of this principle. Comparative analysis of these materials enables the identification of changes in the Court’s interpretative logic over time. This methodological approach allows for the examination of the ICJ’s jurisprudential development in context—showing how doctrinal principles and judicial practice interact in the interpretation of international judgments. Results and Discussions The findings indicate that, although the Non Ultra Petita principle was originally designed to ensure judicial impartiality and respect for the limits of the Court’s jurisdiction, an overly restrictive interpretation of this rule may itself become a source of ambiguity and renewed conflict. The ICJ’s 1962 judgment in the Preah Vihear case, based on a strict reading of this principle, merely declared Cambodia’s sovereignty over the temple and refrained from defining the precise boundary lines or the practical implications of the ruling. This narrow interpretation led to divergent readings by both States and prolonged their border tensions for nearly five decades. Conversely, in its 2013 interpretation judgment, the Court adopted a more functional and dynamic approach. While maintaining respect for the limits of its jurisdiction, the Court took into account the primary purpose of the 1962 ruling—resolving the dispute over the temple area—and determined that not only the temple but also its surrounding region, designated as a “Provisional Demilitarized Zone”, fell within Cambodian territory. This interpretative shift marks a significant departure from a purely formalistic and literal understanding toward a teleological and purpose-oriented interpretation of judicial decisions, based on the philosophy that a judgment’s true function lies in the effective resolution of disputes. The provisional demilitarized zone included areas that were not, in fact, subject to dispute and were clearly under the sovereignty of one of the parties. Nevertheless, the Court, in its effort to achieve a comprehensive and lasting settlement, extended its interpretation to these adjacent areas. The opposing opinions of several judges confirm that the Court, in this instance, deliberately moved beyond traditional interpretative constraints in pursuit of practical effectiveness. A comparative analysis of other ICJ cases supports this observation, demonstrating that in recent decades the Court has increasingly embraced evaluative and dynamic interpretation theories. Influenced by modern interpretative doctrines, the Court now tends toward interpretations that ensure the effective implementation and legal efficacy of its judgments, thereby preventing secondary disputes. In this context, the interpretation of the judgment is not simply a recitation of the words, but a means to ensure their legal and executive effect. From a doctrinal standpoint, recent judgments reveal an implicit acknowledgment that the Non Ultra Petita principle must be applied in conjunction with other fundamental doctrines such as “res judicata” and related principles of judicial economy. In this view, the limitations imposed by the Non Ultra Petita rule should not obstruct the ICJ’s higher objective of maintaining peace and stability. Otherwise, the principle may devolve into a mechanism for judicial silence, perpetuating rather than resolving disputes. The findings also highlight that the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility in the Court’s practice has become increasingly clear through interpretative jurisprudence. The 2013 judgment, while formally preserving the appearance of limited jurisdiction, effectively expanded the scope of its ruling. From the perspective of peace consolidation, however, this broader and more flexible interpretative approach has strengthened the ICJ’s legitimacy and authority in the international legal order. Conclusion The research concludes that while the Principle of Non Ultra Petita remains a cornerstone of international adjudication, it must be interpreted in light of the ICJ’s overarching mission—the peaceful settlement of disputes. The experience of the Preah Vihear case demonstrates that a narrowly textual or rigid interpretation may perpetuate ambiguity, whereas a teleological and functional interpretation contributes to consistency in the Court’s jurisprudence and fosters States’ trust in the international judicial system. In other words, the Court’s transition from a “text-bound interpretation” to a “purpose-oriented interpretation” signifies an institutional maturity that aligns legal reasoning with the practical realities of contemporary international relations. Thus, interpretation has evolved from a purely technical judicial function into an active instrument for advancing international peace and justice Introduction The system of peaceful settlement of international disputes is recognized as one of the most vital mechanisms for maintaining international peace and security. Within this framework, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) plays an indispensable role in ensuring the observance of this principle. According to Article 60 of its Statute, the Court’s judgments are final and without appeal; they can only be reconsidered through two limited mechanisms: “interpretation” and, in exceptional cases, “revision”. Among these, the interpretation of judgments has acquired particular significance, especially as exemplified by the well-known “Temple of Preah Vihear case” between Cambodia and Thailand. The 1962 judgment of this case, while recognizing Cambodia’s sovereignty over the temple structure, left unresolved ambiguities concerning the geographical boundaries and the practical consequences of the ruling. These ambiguities necessitated a subsequent interpretative judgment by the Court in 2013. This study, by examining Article 60 of the ICJ Statute and focusing on the Principle of “Non Ultra Petita”, seeks to answer the central question: To what extent does the Court’s strict adherence to this principle contribute to, or hinder, the realization of its main purpose—namely, the peaceful settlement of international disputes? Accordingly, the objective of this research is to analyze the role of this principle in generating, perpetuating, or eliminating ambiguities in the Court’s judgments, and to assess the evolution of the ICJ’s interpretative approach between its 1962 and 2013 decisions. Methods The present research employs an analytical–comparative method, based on documentary and library-based data collection. Initially, fundamental instruments of international law—including the United Nations Charter, the Statute of the ICJ, and the Rules of Court—were examined to extract the legal foundations governing the interpretation of judgments and the conditions for applying the Non Ultra Petita principle. Subsequently, the study analyzes the content and reasoning of the ICJ’s judgments, particularly the separate and dissenting opinions of judges in the 1962 and 2013 Preah Vihear cases, alongside other similar decisions, to trace the evolution of the Court’s understanding and application of this principle. Comparative analysis of these materials enables the identification of changes in the Court’s interpretative logic over time. This methodological approach allows for the examination of the ICJ’s jurisprudential development in context—showing how doctrinal principles and judicial practice interact in the interpretation of international judgments. Results and Discussions The findings indicate that, although the Non Ultra Petita principle was originally designed to ensure judicial impartiality and respect for the limits of the Court’s jurisdiction, an overly restrictive interpretation of this rule may itself become a source of ambiguity and renewed conflict. The ICJ’s 1962 judgment in the Preah Vihear case, based on a strict reading of this principle, merely declared Cambodia’s sovereignty over the temple and refrained from defining the precise boundary lines or the practical implications of the ruling. This narrow interpretation led to divergent readings by both States and prolonged their border tensions for nearly five decades. Conversely, in its 2013 interpretation judgment, the Court adopted a more functional and dynamic approach. While maintaining respect for the limits of its jurisdiction, the Court took into account the primary purpose of the 1962 ruling—resolving the dispute over the temple area—and determined that not only the temple but also its surrounding region, designated as a “Provisional Demilitarized Zone”, fell within Cambodian territory. This interpretative shift marks a significant departure from a purely formalistic and literal understanding toward a teleological and purpose-oriented interpretation of judicial decisions, based on the philosophy that a judgment’s true function lies in the effective resolution of disputes. The provisional demilitarized zone included areas that were not, in fact, subject to dispute and were clearly under the sovereignty of one of the parties. Nevertheless, the Court, in its effort to achieve a comprehensive and lasting settlement, extended its interpretation to these adjacent areas. The opposing opinions of several judges confirm that the Court, in this instance, deliberately moved beyond traditional interpretative constraints in pursuit of practical effectiveness. A comparative analysis of other ICJ cases supports this observation, demonstrating that in recent decades the Court has increasingly embraced evaluative and dynamic interpretation theories. Influenced by modern interpretative doctrines, the Court now tends toward interpretations that ensure the effective implementation and legal efficacy of its judgments, thereby preventing secondary disputes. In this context, the interpretation of the judgment is not simply a recitation of the words, but a means to ensure their legal and executive effect. From a doctrinal standpoint, recent judgments reveal an implicit acknowledgment that the Non Ultra Petita principle must be applied in conjunction with other fundamental doctrines such as “res judicata” and related principles of judicial economy. In this view, the limitations imposed by the Non Ultra Petita rule should not obstruct the ICJ’s higher objective of maintaining peace and stability. Otherwise, the principle may devolve into a mechanism for judicial silence, perpetuating rather than resolving disputes. The findings also highlight that the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility in the Court’s practice has become increasingly clear through interpretative jurisprudence. The 2013 judgment, while formally preserving the appearance of limited jurisdiction, effectively expanded the scope of its ruling. From the perspective of peace consolidation, however, this broader and more flexible interpretative approach has strengthened the ICJ’s legitimacy and authority in the international legal order. Conclusion The research concludes that while the Principle of Non Ultra Petita remains a cornerstone of international adjudication, it must be interpreted in light of the ICJ’s overarching mission—the peaceful settlement of disputes. The experience of the Preah Vihear case demonstrates that a narrowly textual or rigid interpretation may perpetuate ambiguity, whereas a teleological and functional interpretation contributes to consistency in the Court’s jurisprudence and fosters States’ trust in the international judicial system. In other words, the Court’s transition from a “text-bound interpretation” to a “purpose-oriented interpretation” signifies an institutional maturity that aligns legal reasoning with the practical realities of contemporary international relations. Thus, interpretation has evolved from a purely technical judicial function into an active instrument for advancing international peace and justice

https://lawresearchmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/article_105530_ed12558e1e5ab98eba680e17e4b862a9.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University Legal Research Quarterly 1024-0772 28 4 2025 11 22 Legal Language and the Instability of Concepts: A Deconstructive Analysis of the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights Legal Language and the Instability of Concepts: A Deconstructive Analysis of the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights 327 346 105297 10.48308/jlr.2025.237947.2821 FA Mohsen Marhouni Ph.D, Faculty of Law & Political Sciences, Islamic Azad University: Science & Research Branch, Tehran, Iran. Mohsenmarhouni@gmail.com 0009-0001-8138-6202 Journal Article 2024 12 14 Introduction This paper is both research-oriented and applied, aiming to systematically analyze the issue of semantic instability in legal language and its implications for the judicial practice of the European Court of Human Rights. The central research question is how the structural features of legal language and various methods of judicial interpretation, in conjunction with different socio-cultural contexts, lead to the deferral of meaning, polysemy, and interpretive contradictions, and how these phenomena affect legal certainty, predictability, and the realization of justice. The specific objectives of the research are: identifying the linguistic and institutional mechanisms that cause instability in fundamental concepts; analyzing the involvement of social and political mechanisms in the selection of judicial meanings; and proposing institutionalizable solutions to mitigate the negative effects of semantic instability on the coherence of judicial practice; therefore, it is expected that the results will both enrich theorization about the nature of semantic instability and provide practical suggestions for reforming judicial practice. However, this paper also acknowledges its methodological limitations—including its focus on a selected set of judgments that may overlook other aspects of judicial practice—and emphasizes the need for complementary empirical studies to test the impact of institutional proposals. Ultimately, the research seeks to offer a balanced framework that both preserves the necessary flexibility for adapting interpretations to new social demands and, through clarifying interpretive criteria and strengthening institutional oversight, enhances the predictability and coherence of judicial practice; an outcome that will contribute to improving the legitimacy and effectiveness of the protection of fundamental rights. Methods The present study employs a mixed analytical-critical approach. The sources examined include selected judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (cases such as S.A.S. v. France, Baka v. Hungary, Lautsi v. Italy, KlimaSeniorinnen v. Switzerland, Almeida v. Portugal), as well as relevant theoretical texts (works by Jacques Derrida, H. L. A. Hart, Peter Goodrich, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, and other scholars). Qualitative data were extracted through a full textual analysis of the judgments; this process involved careful rereading of the texts, coding of linguistic propositions influencing interpretation, tracing chains of reasoning, and conducting a comparative analysis of interpretive patterns. The analysis combined deconstruction to reveal internal contradictions within the texts and legal hermeneutics to understand their historical-cultural contexts, thereby enabling the simultaneous examination of hidden layers of meaning and contextual exigencies. Results and Discussion The findings of this study indicate that semantic instability is a multi-causal and multifaceted phenomenon arising from the interaction of linguistic, institutional, and social elements. First, legal texts, through the use of open-ended vocabulary and general concepts, create conditions for the production of multiple and sometimes inconsistent interpretations; this structural ambiguity compels judges to fill conceptual gaps and select meanings. Second, national cultural, historical, and political contexts have a decisive influence on interpretive orientations; the same concept may acquire different meanings and legal consequences across diverse contexts. Third, legal institutions and actors (states, civil institutions, think tanks) play a guiding role in shaping meaning by presenting evidence, policy arguments, and sociological materials. Fourth, doctrines and practices such as the “margin of appreciation” have a dual function: on one hand, they allow interpretations to adapt to national realities; on the other, they can justify extensive divergences and reduce the coherence of judicial practice. Comparative analysis of the cases revealed that instances such as Lautsi (religious symbols), S.A.S. (full-face covering), and Baka (judicial reforms and judicial independence) clearly illustrate the overlap between open legal language, socio-political pressures, and institutional choices. Furthermore, the study shows that in some judgments, the Court has relied on social evidence and national statistics to justify particular readings—an approach that extends the disciplinary boundaries of law into interdisciplinary domains and transforms concepts from abstract frameworks into functional ones. The practical implications of this condition include, on the one hand, a decrease in predictability, a risk of inequality in access to rights, and the erosion of public trust; and, on the other hand, the potential for the gradual development of law in response to emerging challenges such as environmental issues, technology, and cultural diversity. Overall, the findings indicate that semantic stability in law is not a fixed matter but rather the result of a balance between linguistic precision and social exigencies. The more consciously the relationship between legal language and its cultural context is managed, the greater the possibility of achieving fairer and more coherent interpretations, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of judicial institutions. Conclusion The overall conclusion is that semantic instability in legal language is an inevitable yet manageable phenomenon. It presents both challenges to predictability and coherence of judicial practice and opportunities for expanding human rights concepts in response to new issues. To reduce its negative effects and strengthen interpretive coherence, three practical measures are proposed: 1.Formulation of clear and transparent interpretive principles at the Court level, including criteria for defining the scope of key concepts and the obligation to explain interpretive choices. 2.Establishment of monitoring and analytical mechanisms—such as jurisprudential analysis units or comparative working groups—to track coherence and interpretive trends and to publish periodic reports. 3.Requirement to include contextual analytical sections in judgments that demonstrate how cultural, historical, and social factors have influenced interpretive choices. Implementing these measures can, while preserving the necessary flexibility for law to adapt to changing realities, prevent uncontrolled fragmentation in interpretation and enhance the predictability of judicial practice. Furthermore, the findings of the study indicate that managing semantic instability requires acknowledging it as a natural part of the dynamism of legal language, rather than merely a flaw within the interpretive system. In this regard, enhancing the linguistic and interpretive literacy of judges, promoting dialogue between national and international institutions, and expanding interdisciplinary studies in the field of legal linguistics can play a decisive role. Ultimately, the main goal is not to eliminate instability, but to guide it consciously toward the realization of justice, institutional coherence, and semantic dynamism within the framework of human rights Introduction This paper is both research-oriented and applied, aiming to systematically analyze the issue of semantic instability in legal language and its implications for the judicial practice of the European Court of Human Rights. The central research question is how the structural features of legal language and various methods of judicial interpretation, in conjunction with different socio-cultural contexts, lead to the deferral of meaning, polysemy, and interpretive contradictions, and how these phenomena affect legal certainty, predictability, and the realization of justice. The specific objectives of the research are: identifying the linguistic and institutional mechanisms that cause instability in fundamental concepts; analyzing the involvement of social and political mechanisms in the selection of judicial meanings; and proposing institutionalizable solutions to mitigate the negative effects of semantic instability on the coherence of judicial practice; therefore, it is expected that the results will both enrich theorization about the nature of semantic instability and provide practical suggestions for reforming judicial practice. However, this paper also acknowledges its methodological limitations—including its focus on a selected set of judgments that may overlook other aspects of judicial practice—and emphasizes the need for complementary empirical studies to test the impact of institutional proposals. Ultimately, the research seeks to offer a balanced framework that both preserves the necessary flexibility for adapting interpretations to new social demands and, through clarifying interpretive criteria and strengthening institutional oversight, enhances the predictability and coherence of judicial practice; an outcome that will contribute to improving the legitimacy and effectiveness of the protection of fundamental rights. Methods The present study employs a mixed analytical-critical approach. The sources examined include selected judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (cases such as S.A.S. v. France, Baka v. Hungary, Lautsi v. Italy, KlimaSeniorinnen v. Switzerland, Almeida v. Portugal), as well as relevant theoretical texts (works by Jacques Derrida, H. L. A. Hart, Peter Goodrich, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, and other scholars). Qualitative data were extracted through a full textual analysis of the judgments; this process involved careful rereading of the texts, coding of linguistic propositions influencing interpretation, tracing chains of reasoning, and conducting a comparative analysis of interpretive patterns. The analysis combined deconstruction to reveal internal contradictions within the texts and legal hermeneutics to understand their historical-cultural contexts, thereby enabling the simultaneous examination of hidden layers of meaning and contextual exigencies. Results and Discussion The findings of this study indicate that semantic instability is a multi-causal and multifaceted phenomenon arising from the interaction of linguistic, institutional, and social elements. First, legal texts, through the use of open-ended vocabulary and general concepts, create conditions for the production of multiple and sometimes inconsistent interpretations; this structural ambiguity compels judges to fill conceptual gaps and select meanings. Second, national cultural, historical, and political contexts have a decisive influence on interpretive orientations; the same concept may acquire different meanings and legal consequences across diverse contexts. Third, legal institutions and actors (states, civil institutions, think tanks) play a guiding role in shaping meaning by presenting evidence, policy arguments, and sociological materials. Fourth, doctrines and practices such as the “margin of appreciation” have a dual function: on one hand, they allow interpretations to adapt to national realities; on the other, they can justify extensive divergences and reduce the coherence of judicial practice. Comparative analysis of the cases revealed that instances such as Lautsi (religious symbols), S.A.S. (full-face covering), and Baka (judicial reforms and judicial independence) clearly illustrate the overlap between open legal language, socio-political pressures, and institutional choices. Furthermore, the study shows that in some judgments, the Court has relied on social evidence and national statistics to justify particular readings—an approach that extends the disciplinary boundaries of law into interdisciplinary domains and transforms concepts from abstract frameworks into functional ones. The practical implications of this condition include, on the one hand, a decrease in predictability, a risk of inequality in access to rights, and the erosion of public trust; and, on the other hand, the potential for the gradual development of law in response to emerging challenges such as environmental issues, technology, and cultural diversity. Overall, the findings indicate that semantic stability in law is not a fixed matter but rather the result of a balance between linguistic precision and social exigencies. The more consciously the relationship between legal language and its cultural context is managed, the greater the possibility of achieving fairer and more coherent interpretations, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of judicial institutions. Conclusion The overall conclusion is that semantic instability in legal language is an inevitable yet manageable phenomenon. It presents both challenges to predictability and coherence of judicial practice and opportunities for expanding human rights concepts in response to new issues. To reduce its negative effects and strengthen interpretive coherence, three practical measures are proposed: 1.Formulation of clear and transparent interpretive principles at the Court level, including criteria for defining the scope of key concepts and the obligation to explain interpretive choices. 2.Establishment of monitoring and analytical mechanisms—such as jurisprudential analysis units or comparative working groups—to track coherence and interpretive trends and to publish periodic reports. 3.Requirement to include contextual analytical sections in judgments that demonstrate how cultural, historical, and social factors have influenced interpretive choices. Implementing these measures can, while preserving the necessary flexibility for law to adapt to changing realities, prevent uncontrolled fragmentation in interpretation and enhance the predictability of judicial practice. Furthermore, the findings of the study indicate that managing semantic instability requires acknowledging it as a natural part of the dynamism of legal language, rather than merely a flaw within the interpretive system. In this regard, enhancing the linguistic and interpretive literacy of judges, promoting dialogue between national and international institutions, and expanding interdisciplinary studies in the field of legal linguistics can play a decisive role. Ultimately, the main goal is not to eliminate instability, but to guide it consciously toward the realization of justice, institutional coherence, and semantic dynamism within the framework of human rights

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