Introduction
Transformations in water management over recent decades demonstrate that the water cycle is not merely a technical or operational matter; rather, its quality depends on the organization of institutions, the relationship between state and society, and the modes through which power is exercised. The transition of countries from private ownership and state-centered water management to governance-oriented models further indicates that contemporary water management operates within a more complex framework grounded in broader institutional and social arrangements—an approach commonly referred to as good water governance. As a component of public governance, water governance rests on the design of socially accepted policies, the establishment of effective institutional frameworks, and the mobilization of social resources for managing water resources and services. Adopting the good water governance approach, this article examines three structural components—institutions, actors, and management styles—in the legal systems of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan to clarify the position of each country along the path toward desirable water governance.
Methods
The research methodology is based on documentary and structural analysis; however, unlike the conventional separation of literature and method, the theoretical concepts and analytical tools are developed within the examination of institutional and legal structures in both countries. By reviewing laws, regulations, policy documents, strategic plans, governmental resolutions, and organizational structures related to water in Iran and Afghanistan, the study first traces the evolution of formal and informal institutions and then reconstructs the water management model in each country through an analysis of actors and management styles. This approach—anchored in the direct linkage between institutional discussions and legal-administrative frameworks—allows the comparative analysis of the two countries to unfold not as a separate section but continuously throughout the examination of each component.
Results and Discussion
The findings indicate that in Iran, formal water institutions hold a dominant and nearly exclusive role in managing water resources and services. From the Constitutional Revolution to the present, the evolution of water institutions—from the Civil Code and the Qanats Law to the Law on Water and Its Nationalization, the Law on Fair Distribution of Water, the establishment of the Ministry of Water and Electricity and later the Ministry of Energy, the creation of regional water companies, and the Supreme Water Council—has consistently reinforced centralized management and strengthened the role of the state. Although post-revolution strategic documents emphasize principles such as integrated water-cycle management, recognition of the economic and security value of water, improved efficiency, and public participation, the institutional structure in practice has remained hierarchical and state-centered. Traditional informal institutions such as Mirabs, which once played a significant role in regulating relations among water users, have lost their position, and water user associations are largely products of state policies rather than local traditions. Consequently, water-sector actors in Iran are predominantly governmental, and civil society and local communities have limited direct involvement in decision-making and policy processes. This institutional configuration has steered water management toward a hierarchical model in which decisions are made centrally and implemented at lower levels, while water networks and markets emerge only marginally and under the close supervision of formal institutions. In Afghanistan, however, the findings present a different yet complex picture. During the period of the Islamic Republic, inspired by the EU Water Framework Directive, efforts were made to shift water management from a fragmented system rooted in traditional Mirab-based practices to a basin-oriented, participatory, and multi-actor model. The establishment of the Ministry of Water and Energy, the Water Affairs Regulation Authority, the delineation of major and minor river basins, the formation of basin advisory councils, and the formal recognition of water user associations all reflect the combination of formal and informal institutions and the attempt to involve local communities and water users in resource management. Within this institutional framework, governmental and non-governmental actors operate alongside one another: the Ministry of Water and Energy, the Ministry of Agriculture, local administrations, advisory councils, and water user associations each assume part of the responsibilities related to regulation, allocation, monitoring, and dispute resolution. The interaction of these institutional arrangements and actor configurations has produced a management style that blends network-based and market-oriented elements. Nevertheless, political instability, prolonged conflict, legal changes—particularly the weakening of explicit provisions on user participation in the new water law—and limited administrative and financial capacity have prevented this hybrid model from being fully and sustainably realized.
Conclusion
The overall outlook of the study shows that Iran and Afghanistan both face significant challenges in water management and follow different trajectories in their transition toward good water governance. In Iran, the persistence of a centralized and state-dominated structure has restricted stakeholder participation and slowed the shift toward participatory and multi-actor models. Moreover, the historical dependence of water management on state institutions and the weakness of intersectoral coordination mechanisms have further complicated reform efforts. In Afghanistan, although basin-based and participatory mechanisms have begun to take shape and a combination of formal and informal institutions has emerged, political instability and limited institutional capacity have hindered the consolidation of these developments. Additionally, financial constraints and administrative fragility have intensified the difficulties of transition. These findings demonstrate that the three structural components—institutions, actors, and management styles—have shaped distinct pathways for the two countries in their movement toward good water governance; however, neither has yet achieved a fully realized model.