Legal Research Quarterly

Legal Research Quarterly

Interaction between Private Law and International Law in Contract for the Transfer of Sensitive Technologies

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
1 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law & Political Sciences, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran
2 PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law & Political Sciences, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran. Corresponding Author Email: amir.khatami@hafez.shirazu.ac.ir
10.48308/jlr.2026.241203.2948
Abstract
Abstract
Introduction
Contracts for the transfer of sensitive technologies, although appearing as private law institutions founded on party autonomy, are in practice subject to peremptory norms and transnational requirements due to the strategic nature of the technologies involved – including military, dual‑use, biological and space technologies. These norms fundamentally challenge the classical structure of contractual freedom. This research aims to reconceptualise the interdisciplinary nature of such contracts and explain how private law rules interact with public international law imperatives. The central question is how the type of technology determines the degree of transnational normative intervention, and how these contracts can be analysed in light of non‑proliferation regimes, international sanctions, global public order and development‑oriented obligations. Beyond theoretical analysis, this study seeks to construct a framework for understanding the dual character of these contracts throughout their life cycle – from formation to performance and termination – and to propose practical solutions for reconciling the two legal systems.
Methods
This research adopts an analytical‑descriptive approach using documentary research. Library resources, international instruments, multilateral treaties, export control regimes, as well as domestic and international case law have been examined. The interdisciplinary analysis is structured in six logical steps: first, clarifying the concept and characteristics of technology; second, classifying sensitive technologies and examining how technological sensitivity restricts contractual freedom; third, exploring the positions of private law and public international law in this field; fourth, analysing transnational considerations relating to security, development and global peace; fifth, identifying normative conflicts between the two systems; and sixth, providing a phase‑by‑phase analysis of the contract's life cycle from the pre‑contractual stage to termination.
Results and Discussion
The findings show that the type of technology plays a decisive role in determining the extent of restriction on contractual freedom and the intensity of international law intervention. For military technologies, stringent export regulations and UN Security Council sanctions largely limit transfers to government‑to‑government transactions. For dual‑use technologies, informal but effectively powerful international regimes have made obtaining governmental licensing a precondition for any private agreement. Biological technologies are caught in a fundamental conflict: on the one hand, the Biological Weapons Convention in Article 10 emphasises the right to universal access to scientific and medical advances for peaceful purposes; on the other hand, concerns about the misuse of these technologies in producing biological weapons have led to severe restrictions on their transfer. Space technologies, governed by the principle of peaceful use of outer space and missile control regimes, are generally transferred in a managed and restricted manner. From a private law perspective, although fundamental principles such as freedom of contract uphold party autonomy, in the field of sensitive technologies peremptory transnational norms so structurally constrain the parties' will that clauses such as "suspension of performance pending export licensing" or "absolute prohibition on transfer to any third party" become standard and unavoidable elements of these contracts. Public international law, in contrast, adopts a dual approach: on the one hand, the development‑oriented approach – rooted in the New International Economic Order movement of the 1970s and the TRIPS Agreement and the UN Sustainable Development Goals – encourages industrialised countries to facilitate technology transfer to developing countries. On the other hand, the security‑oriented approach based on non‑proliferation regimes, Security Council Resolution 1540 and unilateral and multilateral sanctions severely restricts and, in some cases, completely prohibits the transfer of sensitive technologies. A phase‑by‑phase analysis of the contract's life cycle reveals that at the formation stage, party autonomy is valid only to the extent permitted by export control regimes and Security Council resolutions. In other words, before the parties can conclude an agreement, they must ensure the possibility of obtaining necessary licences and the compatibility of the contract with international obligations. At the drafting stage, confidentiality evolves from a secondary and routine obligation into the very backbone of the contract. Contemporary case law has clearly shown that breach of confidentiality in this field is not merely a contractual violation but a threat to technological security and the strategic supply chain, and can lead to severe penalties and even complete project collapse. During the performance stage, obligations arising from party autonomy and transnational requirements are so intertwined that both the judgment of the European Court of Justice in the Kadi case and the US court ruling in DuPont v. Kolon emphasise that requirements relating to international sanctions and the protection of trade and technical secrets override any private agreement; no contract can exempt the parties from complying with these requirements. Finally, at the termination stage, sovereign interventions often prove stronger and more decisive than the general rules of contractual dissolution, and can overnight annul a contract that had been properly performed for years.
Conclusion
The contract for the transfer of sensitive technologies is no longer merely a private institution; it has become a point of convergence between public and private interests at the global level, possessing a hybrid and systemic nature that can only be adequately analysed through a simultaneous reading of private law and peremptory international norms. Striking a balance between contractual freedom and transnational public order is not a theoretical choice but a vital practical necessity. This balance can be achieved through several mechanisms: first, incorporating explicit and clear clauses in contract texts regarding commitment to export licensing, non‑proliferation and confidentiality; second, drafting model rules and contractual guidelines by international bodies such as UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT to assist contracting parties in drafting clauses compatible with transnational requirements; third, strengthening multilateral supervisory bodies with transparent and accountable structures, similar to those employed in the Arms Trade Treaty. This research also opens new horizons for future studies, including comparative examinations of dispute resolution mechanisms in sensitive technology contracts, analysis of the role of international organisations in monitoring the performance of private contracts, and assessment of the effectiveness of contractual clauses in the face of unilateral sanctions and emerging peremptory norms.

Highlights

Highlights

·         The contract for the transfer of sensitive technologies is a hybrid and interdisciplinary institution situated at the intersection of private law and public international law, with the type and sensitivity of the technology determining the extent and intensity of the intervention of international rules and requirements.

·         Throughout the contract lifecycle from formation and drafting to performance and termination the parties’ freedom of contract is constrained by peremptory norms, non-proliferation regimes, export controls, sanctions, and considerations of security, development, and global peace, so that the contract’s validity and enforceability depend on its conformity with transnational public order.

·         A sustainable solution requires a balanced and practical framework between private autonomy and global public interests, achieved through explicit contractual clauses (such as peaceful end-use, prohibition of transfer to third parties, export-licensing requirements, and automatic suspension or termination clauses), multilateral institutional coordination, and the development of model rules and interpretive standards.

Keywords
Subjects

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  • Receive Date 13 September 2025
  • Revise Date 03 January 2026
  • Accept Date 10 June 2026