The Role of Ignorance of Law in Criminal Responsibility According to Virtue Ethics Theory

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran Corresponding Author Email: r-nobahar@sbu.ac.ir

2 Ph.D., Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Introduction
The revival of virtue ethics as one of the important moral theories in recent decades caused the formation of virtue jurisprudence that focuses on human flourishing among the concerns of Law. The teachings of this theory have attracted the attention of scholars of criminal Law in different realms. Focusing on character traits, the role of habituation, and the significance of learning the quiddity of values in the habituation of virtues to become a state of character, has effects on criminal responsibility. This moral theory takes a different approach to ignorance of the law as a cause that can remove blame from ignorant agents compared to legal perspective and provides a different reading of ignorance of the law. Consequently, a new perspective on the bases and qualifications of blaming the behaviors that stem from ignorance. In this theory, education is critical in character formation and the acquisition of moral virtues and vices. Also, in evaluating the contribution of the moral agent in the formation of his character and how to confront him for his actions, the manner of his moral education in childhood and his intrinsic traits are considered. So, analyzing the stages of people’s moral development is very important. The aim of this research is to provide a basis for legislator in dealing with agents who are ignorant of criminal laws.  In this regard it seeks to answer to following questions: What role dose ignorance of moral universals play in determining the blameworthiness of behavior? What challenges arise in this context? If there is not any excuse and the agent is involved in ignorance under specific momentary circumstances, what will be the appropriate response to his wrongful conduct?
Methods
Given that the subject of the research is interdisciplinary, basic and analytical, this research has been conducted using descriptive-analytic manner and along with a philosophical approach. Since this research, due to its philosophical nature, pertains to fundamental theoretical issues and Also, because philosophical discussions describe and ultimately analyze existing viewpoints, the data collection method is library-based. It is important to elucidate how to deal with agents acting in ignorance and to provide a normative criterion for legislators to deal with such agents. To consider agent’s character and the conditions of their moral development, this study first provides an explanation of ignorance of moral universals. Then the study examines the role of ignorance of moral universals in the blameworthiness of behavior in the form of a general rule and its exceptions, with attention to the stages of moral development and explore the legal implications of this analysis. Finally, the study presents the conclusions drawn from of applying the teachings of virtue ethics to ignorance.
Results and Discussions
According to virtue ethics theory, actions stemming from ignorance of moral universals and the law are assumed to be voluntary. This is supported by Aristotle, a progenitor of virtue ethics, that the wrongful actions of vicious agents are blameworthy, although are performed in ignorance of universals. Consequently, wrongdoing resulting from such ignorance is deemed blameworthy, provided that the agent’s upbringing and education offered adequate opportunity to learn how to act rightly. Nevertheless, there are instances in which a moral agent commits a wrongful act under circumstances that temporarily hinder his access to knowledge of moral and legal norms—for example, when acting out of anger or under the influence of intoxication. The wrongdoing of such an agent merits less moral blame than that of an agent whose ignorance stems from an enduring state; because the former agent does not suffer from complete ignorance; whereas the later agent is ignorant in a sobriety state. By contrast, if people’s moral education interferes with their emotional development and damages their moral perception, or if they are not provided with the opportunity to experience virtuous action, it will be a reason to remove blaming for their immoral and criminal actions. Also, the difficulty of deliberation in ambiguous circumstances and the persistent ignorance that happens even for virtuous agents who are eager to learn moral and legal principles will remove blame from ignorant agents. It is because such people don’t have any defect or evil in their character due to a lack of access to their understanding of goodness or due to the incompleteness of their knowledge. In fact, when moral perception is impaired due to deficient education, it can incapacitate the agent of true perception of societal values. This factor, in its turn, makes the agent to be unable to understand that his action is wrong. Furthermore, exposure to morally ambiguous circumstances can hinder the agent's ability to correctly apply moral principles or legal rules to concrete instances. It is important to recognize that moral knowledge is perfected through experiential learning, and no individual possesses a prior knowledge of the full spectrum of moral values. In fact, Exceptions to removing blame from ignorant agents are based on the difficulty in knowing, not the impossibility; For this reason, applying the teachings of this theory make more ignorant offenders out of the realm of blameworthy.
Conclusion
Based on the research findings, it seems that individuals who commit immoral or criminal acts due to drunkenness or any momentary state are less blameworthy than individuals who commit such acts whereas they are attentive. Therefore, it is appropriate for the legislator to consider a milder reaction in cases where drunkenness causes ignorance of the law. It is also suggested that the legislator consider harmed moral perception, deficient moral development, the difficulty of deliberating, and perpetual ignorance as grounds for removing criminal blame. Consequently, applying the teaching of virtue ethics, can offer valuable normative insights for legislators about ignorance of law.

Highlights

*Virtue ethics offers a distinct and just interpretation of ignorance by emphasizing the significance of character traits, the stages of moral development and the difficulty of deliberation under specific circumstances.
*The lack of opportunity to learn moral rules through experiences can lead to the negation of moral and criminal blame.
*To negate criminal blame, it is not necessary that knowledge of criminal laws be impossible; the fact that access to knowledge is difficult, seems sufficient.

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Main Subjects



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