Introduction
In recent decades, the decline of citizens' trust in political institutions and elected representatives has highlighted the need to redesign participatory mechanisms in public affairs management. Participatory Budgeting (PB), as a process in which non-elected citizens participate in the allocation or prioritization of public resources, has evolved since its inception in Porto Alegre, Brazil (1989) into one of the most effective tools for realizing direct democracy, reducing corruption, improving distributive justice, and enhancing public accountability. By 2019, over 12,000 PB cases had been identified across 71 countries. Despite the emphasis of several articles of the Iranian Constitution (Articles 3, 6, 43, 100, and provisions on councils) on public participation in all political, social, and economic dimensions, PB remains theoretically unexplored and practically neglected in Iran. Therefore, the main objective of this research is to assess the feasibility of establishing PB in Iran through a comparative study of three countries: Spain, France, and Germany. The research questions are: (1) What are the optimal models of PB and their key components? (2) Which models align with the PB systems of the aforementioned countries? (3) Is it possible to establish such a system in Iran given its existing legal and institutional contexts?
Methods
This research adopted a descriptive-comparative approach. First, by reviewing theoretical literature, six ideal models of PB—"Participatory Democracy", "Proximity Democracy", "Participatory Modernisation", "Multi-stakeholder Participation", "Neo-corporatism", and "Community Development"—were elaborated based on criteria such as citizens' decision-making power, socio-political objectives, degree of decentralization, the role of civil society, and resource allocation methods. Second, the experiences of Spain, France, and Germany were separately examined using reliable international reports, domestic laws, and previous studies, and then matched with the six models. Third, using documentary analysis, Iran's upstream laws (the Constitution, the Islamic Councils Act, and provisions regarding Neighborhood Councils or Shorayari), as well as the rulings of the Administrative Justice Court, were evaluated in terms of legal-institutional capacities and obstacles to establishing PB. Finally, by comparing the strengths of all three foreign models and localizing them with Iran's urban management structure, a hybrid model was proposed.
Results and Discussions
The comparative study reveals that Spain, inspired by the Porto Alegre experience, follows the "Participatory Democracy" model. In this model, non-elected citizens hold actual decision-making power, and projects are ranked based on distributive justice criteria to redistribute resources in favor of disadvantaged classes. Local councils and citizens' associations manage over 10% of the municipal budget, and civil society enjoys significant independence and influence in setting priorities. In France, PB is shaped within the framework of "Proximity Democracy". Through the establishment of neighborhood councils (mandatory for cities with over 80,000 inhabitants) and the strengthening of local budgets, its primary goals are decentralizing public decisions, bringing citizens and policymakers closer, and enhancing political legitimacy through local dialogues. Paris, allocating €100 million annually (5% of its investment budget), runs the largest PB program globally and employs digital tools ("civic technology") to facilitate participation. In Germany, however, a different approach prevails. PB is primarily advisory and emerged within the context of "Participatory Modernisation" in response to the fiscal crisis of the 1980s. Here, citizens are invited as "customers" of public services to submit cost-saving proposals, while final decision-making authority remains with elected officials. Around 280 German municipalities use this method. In the Iranian feasibility section, findings indicate that the Constitution provides robust legal foundations for citizen participation through principles such as "administration of the country based on public votes" (Art. 6), "general public participation" (Art. 3, para. 8), and "Islamic Councils" (Art. 100). Furthermore, council laws (especially Articles 80, paragraphs 5 and 7) and the experience of establishing Neighborhood Councils (Shorayari) in metropolises like Tehran demonstrate institutional capacity. However, the annulment of the Shorayari election resolution by the Administrative Justice Court (2016) and the lack of general decision-making competence for local units in Iran's legal system constitute serious obstacles. By combining the advantages of the three foreign models (Spain's justice-orientation, France's decentralization, and Germany's managerial efficiency) and adapting them to Iran's structure of Islamic Councils and Shorayari, a "hybrid model" can be designed. In this model, local councils act as intermediaries, the budgeting process is defined at three levels (neighborhood, district, and city), and citizens participate in the formulation of priorities and monitoring of implementation.
Conclusion
Establishing PB in Iran is not only legally consistent with constitutional principles but also yields significant benefits politically (enhancing legitimacy and accountability), socially (creating solidarity, sense of belonging, and awareness), and economically (optimizing resources, distributive justice, and cost reduction). Achieving this requires strong political will, the enactment of a comprehensive PB law, redesigning the fiscal decentralization system, empowering councils and Shorayari, establishing e-government and information transparency throughout the entire budget cycle (formulation, approval, implementation, and oversight), and continuous citizen education. Given the success of international experiences and the untapped domestic capacities, PB can serve as a fundamental step in strengthening the republican dimension of Iran's system and realizing social justice.