The theory of "participation of labor and capital" in the law of Iranian commercial companies

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Ph. D. Student, Faculty of Law & Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

2 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law & Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

With a descriptive and analytical method, this article has tried to answer the basic question whether the governance model based on labor and capital participation in the structure of Iranian commercial companies can be applicable or not? The results of the article show that despite the fact that Iran's legal system has not had an explicit provision regarding labor participation in the board of directors of commercial companies, however, The basic idea of paying attention to employees has been in the legal regulations governing Iranian commercial companies but unlike some legal systems such as Germany, it has never led to the direct participation of employee in the management structure of commercial companies. Meanwhile, the theory of "participation of labor and capital" can be a useful mechanism for realizing the goals of corporate governance in Iran's legal system, both from a normative and instrumental perspective. This model of corporate governance has positive consequences from the perspective of reducing information asymmetry, encouraging firm-specific investments of the employees in the company, securing the interests of others corporate stakeholders and the sustainable development of a commercial company. By presenting a gradual mechanism and in accordance with the context of the legal regulations governing Iran's commercial companies, this article has introduced the governance model of participation labor and capital as an alternative method - at least in some commercial companies with a large number of workers.

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