A critical approach to the criteria justifying the right to be wrong with an emphasis on the analytical foundations of the philosophy of right

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 PhD student of Public Law, University of Tehran

2 Faculty member of Shahid Beheshti University

10.48308/jlr.2024.234136.2635

Abstract

Today, "right to be wrong" is considered one of the achievements of modern human rights. In order to justify it as a "right", it has been tried to refer to the analytical foundations of "right" in the philosophy of right And in order to establish it, the foundations of two schools of utilitarianism and voluntarism have been used. With a critical-analytical approach, this research seeks to answer the question of whether, in contemporary human rights, legal justification processes have the capacity to justify "right to wrong"? In this research and with a critical view, it becomes clear at the beginning that the above two schools not only do not have comprehensiveness in defining their examples, but also face serious challenges in analyzing the concept of right. Therefore, based on the contemporary legal justification processes, this right cannot be justified in terms of content. After that, by examining the works of Western thinkers on issues related to right to be wrong , such as "separation of morals from law", "the role of the state in culture building" and "civil disobedience", a deep difference of opinion was observe, which shows the lack of sufficient justifications for the theoretical establishment of this right in the system of human rights literature. Therefore, the lack of general consensus in legal doctrine can be considered as another reason for the above-mentioned right facing a serious theoretical challenge.

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Legal Research Quarterly

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 12 May 2024

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History

  • Receive Date: 13 December 2023
  • Revise Date: 11 May 2024
  • Accept Date: 12 May 2024

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