Document Type : Original Article
Authors
1
Ph.D., Faculty of Law & Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran Corresponding Author Email: mahdi.zare@ut.ac.ir
2
Assistant Professor, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
Introduction
This study adopts a critical–analytical approach to examine one of the most controversial issues in the philosophy of right and contemporary human-rights theory—namely, the possibility and justification of the so-called “right to do/be wrong.” This notion refers to an individual’s entitlement to engage in actions that may be regarded as morally or socially wrong, while the legal or political system nonetheless refrains from prohibiting or punishing them. The main research question is whether legal justification processes in modern human rights are capable of justifying this right?
Methods
The article begins by tracing the historical and philosophical roots of the concept of right. Prior to the Renaissance, rights were defined through an inseparable connection with moral norms, and the legitimacy of law was contingent on its conformity with ethical criteria. After the Renaissance, however, the conceptual distinction between being right and having a right emerged, Accordingly, the possibility of enacting laws arose that, although not morally justified, were considered rights based on the will of the legislator or the public interest. From this development, the idea of “right to do wrong”emerged. To analyze this idea, reference has been made to the two fundamental schools of philosophy of law - utilitarianism and voluntarism - in order to establish a criterion for justifying the right to be imposed.
Results and Discussions
In the school of utilitarianism, the foundation of law is based on the principle of profit or the greatest public happiness. From the perspective of Bentham and his followers, law and right are justified when they create the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people. However, the article shows that this approach fails to explain right over wrong, because "profit" is a relative and individual concept and cannot be a comprehensive basis for human rights. On the other hand, utilitarianism, by focusing excessively on material pleasure, ignores spiritual and moral values such as altruism or sacrifice, and therefore does not have the comprehensiveness necessary to justify this right. Voluntarism, rooted in Kantian moral philosophy, conceives of rights as expressions of individual will and autonomy. Under this view, a person holds a right only when able to exercise or waive it by choice. However, this theory also exhibits critical deficiencies when used to justify the right to do wrong. It applies only to those capable of free will, whereas children and the mentally incapacitated are also recognized as rights-bearers Furthermore, in cases such as the right to life, which is obligatory, the concept of will cannot play an explanatory role. Therefore, both schools of thought are weak in their theoretical and moral explanation of right over wrong. To further evaluate these shortcomings, the paper turns to Western thinkers’ discussions of related themes—the separation of law and morality, the state’s role in cultural formation, and civil disobedience. In the first debate, the separation of law from morality is analyzed as the primary foundation for recognizing a right to do wrong. Legal positivists such as Bentham, Austin, and Waldron argue that moral obligations cannot serve as criteria for legislation. Law is formed solely on the basis of social contract and practical interests. From this perspective, it is legally permissible for an individual to act in ways that morality deems wrong. In contrast, philosophers such as Cicero, Augustine, Ripert, and Simmonds uphold an intrinsic link between law and morality, insisting that “an unjust law is not law.” They warn that severing moral principles from legal validity leads to the collapse of justice and human dignity. On this reading, lawmakers have no right to enact rules contrary to moral fundamentals, and the acceptance of a right to do wrong effectively dissolves the ethical boundaries essential to a just legal order. The second axis of discussion concerns the role of the state in cultural formation. The first view, which emphasizes the neutrality of the state, believes that the state should not interfere in cultural and moral affairs, because this leads to cultural tyranny and the restriction of individual freedoms. This approach considers the right to be wrong as a natural consequence of respect for human autonomy. In contrast, the second approach emphasizes the responsibility of the state in the cultural guidance of society. Thinkers such as Plato, Hobbes, and, in certain respects, Adam Smith, maintain that in order to preserve order, social cohesion, and public virtue, the state must exercise some degree of cultural oversight. From this angle, absolute neutrality toward moral error fails to secure liberty and instead erodes the ethical foundations of community life. The author concludes that the government, as an institution arising from the public will, must play a guiding and cultural engineering role within the framework of fixed moral principles and not allow the right to be wrong to lead to public obscenity.The third issue examined is the relationship between the right to do wrong and civil disobedience. Civil disobedience is defined as a conscious, non-violent breach of unjust laws. If a right to do wrong were accepted, acts of civil disobedience might be interpreted as legitimate exercises of that right. Theorists such as Ronald Dworkin view civil disobedience as a moral form of protest permissible when normal political channels for reform have been exhausted. Critics, however, stress the ethical duty to obey the law, arguing that political legitimacy requires universal compliance with enacted norms, even when they conflict with individual conviction. Synthesizing these views, the paper concludes that civil disobedience can be morally defensible only within a specific ethical framework that challenges injustice; it cannot be justified as an unconditional manifestation of a right to do wrong.
Conclusion
In its final analysis, the article asserts that the existing philosophical foundations for legitimizing the “right to do wrong” are conceptually and normatively fragile. Both the will-based and utility-based theories of right suffer from analytical and moral deficiencies and thus fail to offer a persuasive basis for recognizing such a right. Moreover, the persistent lack of consensus among western theorists on the interrelation of law and morality, the cultural obligations of the state, and the limits of individual liberty underscores that the right to do wrong has yet to secure a stable theoretical position within the corpus of human-rights thought. In fact, accepting such a right without relying on a moral and rational basis causes a disconnect between rights and justice and may lead to a decline in moral standards and social laxity. Finally, it is emphasized that if the right to be wrong is to be accepted within the framework of human rights, new reasons and foundations must be presented to justify it; foundations that can simultaneously balance individual freedom and moral responsibility. Until such a foundation is formed, the "right to be wrong" cannot be recognized as a legitimate and sustainable right in the contemporary human rights system
Highlights
- Most scholars have relied on two theories of choice and utility to analyze the concept of right, each of which faces serious challenges in the conceptual analysis of "right."
- The foundations of the schools of utility and will are not solid in the analysis of right over wrong.
- The idea of the right to be wrong cannot find a justified place as a "right" in the contemporary human rights system due to the lack of a justifying theory.
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