Legal Research Quarterly

Legal Research Quarterly

The Ideal Model of Constitutional Adjudication in Iran

Document Type : Original Article

Author
PhD, Faculty of Law & Political Science, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran. Corresponding Author Email: r.alidadzadeh@atu.ac.ir
Abstract
Abstract
Introduction
Constitutional adjudication is a vital institution in contemporary legal systems, tasked with protecting the Constitution and ensuring compliance with the Constitution by the branches of government. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Guardian Council supervises the conformity of enactments with Sharia and the Constitution. However, its practice has prioritized the protection of Islamic rulings (“Sharia adjudication”) over the comprehensive protection of the Constitution (“constitutional adjudication”). The central problem is the separation of these competences within the Council: The Sharia adjudicator, consisting of the Council’s fuqaha, can annul enactments that legal experts consider constitutional on the grounds that they conflict with Sharia. This imbalance may weaken constitutional protection and legal certainty. The research asks: What model would enable the Guardian Council to fulfil its primary duty of safeguarding both the Constitution and Islamic Sharia? It hypothesizes that establishing a Constitutional Court without due regard to the religious nature of the Iranian system and Shiite jurisprudence would face serious challenges. Instead, a realistic model would retain the Council structure while reforming it by unifying its legal personality, integrating Sharia adjudication into constitutional adjudication, revising membership and selection, expanding review to regulations and enacted laws, and limiting electoral supervision. The study aims to explain the structural defect arising from the duality of legal personality, design a feasible model for the Council’s composition, independence, and competences, and propose constitutional amendments to advance constitutional justice and protect citizens’ rights and freedoms.
Methods
The study uses a descriptive-analytical method. Data were collected through library research and examined using legal documents, Guardian Council opinions and rulings, the detailed proceedings of the Council for the Revision of the Constitution (1989), public-law scholarship, and online resources. Normative and comparative analysis was applied by comparing established models of constitutional adjudication—particularly the centralized European Constitutional Court model and non-European models—with the requirements of Iran’s legal system. Iranian legal scholarship was also used to identify the theoretical foundations of independence in constitutional adjudication and the principles of judicial impartiality. Comparing the Constitution, especially Articles 91–99, with the Council’s practice helped identify structural deficiencies and assess which elements of other systems could be adapted to Iran’s particular legal and political circumstances.
Results and Discussions
The principal finding is a structural “gap of duality of legal personality” in Iran’s constitutional supervisory institution. Two parallel adjudicators operate within the Guardian Council: a constitutional adjudicator and a Sharia adjudicator. The latter can invalidate enactments already approved as constitutional because of an alleged conflict with Sharia, weakening the protection of fundamental rights and the legal certainty of legislation. The proposed model rests on five pillars. First, the Council’s independence should be guaranteed institutionally, administratively, and financially. Institutional independence requires separation from the three branches of government and a distinct constitutional chapter recognizing the Council’s judicial status. Administrative independence entails authority to adopt its own internal regulations and to enact of a special law governing the Council. Financial independence requires the Council to prepare its budget directly and submit it to the Cabinet, while restricting the government’s power to amend it. Second, membership should be restructured to prevent appointment from being concentrated in one institution and to balance participation. The proposed Council would have sixteen members: four jurists appointed by the Leader; four judges selected through nomination and voting involving the Supreme Court and the Administrative Justice Court; four law professors elected by university professors nationwide; two lawyers proposed by the President; and two lawyers proposed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Qualification requirements would include, for jurists, Level Four seminary education and eight years of teaching; for judges, at least a bachelor’s degree in law and eight years’ experience in senior authorities; and for law professors, associate-professor rank and eight years’ experience. General conditions would include a minimum age of forty-five, no party affiliation, no other employment or economic or political activity, and no effective criminal record, except political convictions. Membership would last eight non-renewable years. Removal would be permitted only on conclusive evidence through proceedings before a specialized six-member committee, followed by the specified two-thirds and ultimately three-fourths approval of the Council. Third, the Council’s adjudicatory competences should be redesigned. Constitutional and Sharia review of parliamentary enactments should be conducted by the Council as a single legal body, with all sixteen members participating. Its opinions should give reasons and propose amendment wording for Parliament’s consideration. Constitutional review of general regulations should be supported by special constitutional-claims chambers within the Supreme Court and the Administrative Justice Court, which could refer unconstitutional regulations to the Council. To address negative legislation by the jurists, the model proposes ex post review of laws through referrals by judicial authorities or lawyers representing the parties. Electoral supervision would be narrowed from unlimited approbative supervision to verifying the accuracy of election results. Constitutional interpretation would require a request from a high authority and an actual dispute concerning implementation. Fourth, referral and review procedures should distinguish fundamental laws from ordinary laws. Mandatory prior review would apply only to fundamental laws and territorial and peace treaties. Ordinary laws would be subject to ex post review, upon request by competent authorities, within one month before publication. Citizens would also be granted access to constitutional litigation through an “indirect constitutional action.” Fifth, decisions and their legal effects should be clarified. A finding that an enactment is unconstitutional would require a two-thirds majority of Council members. Substantive decisions would be final and non-appealable, while formal decisions would be relative and capable of amendment.
Conclusion
The study concludes that Iran’s current system of constitutional adjudication does not adequately protect the Constitution and fundamental rights because constitutional and Sharia competences are separated and Sharia adjudication predominates. The underlying defect is the duality of legal personality within the supervisory institution. The proposed remedy is to establish a single legal personality and integrate Sharia review into Constitutional review, consistent with the fact that Iran’s Constitution itself is grounded in Sharia. Given the country’s political realities and the influence of Shiite jurisprudence, reforming the existing Council is considered more compatible with Iran's context than establishing a separate Constitutional Court. A reformed Council, with a balanced and specialized membership, participation by judges and law professors, and institutional, administrative, and financial independence, is presented as the most suitable realistic model for constitutional justice and the protection of citizens’ rights and freedoms.

Highlights

Highlights

·         The Guardian Council’s emphasis on safeguarding Sharia and Islamic rulings has relegated the protection of the Constitution and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms to a secondary position, diminishing their importance.

·         Integrating Sharia oversight into constitutional review, limiting electoral supervision to the results, and expanding both a priori and a posteriori review of fundamental laws and regulations transforms the Guardian Council into an institution that supports the Constitution.

·         Achieving the ideal model of constitutional adjudication in Iran requires fundamental reforms, including a review of the composition of the Guardian Council, the eligibility criteria for membership, and the procedures for selecting its members.

Keywords
Subjects

 
References
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Thesis
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  • Receive Date 31 October 2023
  • Revise Date 02 February 2024
  • Accept Date 19 June 2024