Independence versus Accountability: A Reflection on Justiciability in the Judicial System of the United States

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 دانشگاه قم

2 Qom University

3 Dep. of Public Law, Faculty of Law, Qom University, Qom, Iran

10.48308/jlr.2024.234859.2685

Abstract

Independence and accountability are two sides of the same coin in the judicial system; in a sense, they are not contradictory but rather complementary. The independence of judges from other policy makers in the government, on one hand, increases the possibility of undue procrastination in decision-making, disregard for certain existing evidence, and the issuance of unfair decisions or decisions based on irrelevant laws. Independent judges, albeit a sine quo non for the rule of law, can also pose a threat to it; in a sense, if the authority of judges extends, the rule of law will not be realized. Findings of this research, conducted through a descriptive-analytical method and relying on research literature and conventional practices in the legal system of the United States, indicate that judicial accountability is an inevitable but insufficient condition for the realization of the rule of law. Moreover, many scholars believe that judicial independence and democratic accountability are also in irreconcilable tension with each other. However, this study emphasizes that these competing ideals are not the end goal themselves, but rather means for a more important objective, which is the realization of an efficient judicial system with acceptable performance. Accordingly, the Constitution of the United States has granted extensive independence to judges while placing them in an institution that is subject to intense political scrutiny.

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Legal Research Quarterly

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 08 July 2024

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History

  • Receive Date: 03 March 2024
  • Revise Date: 23 June 2024
  • Accept Date: 08 July 2024

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