Document Type : Original Article
Authors
1
PhD Student in International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Qom, Qom, Islamic Republic of Iran.
2
Associate Professor, International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Qom, Qom, Islamic Republic of Iran.
10.48308/jlr.2025.241592.2957
Abstract
Abstract
Introduction
In the contemporary world, complex cooperation and interactions among States and international organizations, from joint military operations and migration control regimes to economic and security pressures, increasingly give rise to indivisible human rights harms. Traditional frameworks of State responsibility, which are primarily designed on the basis of bilateral relations and direct attribution, have proven inadequate in accounting for multiple or shared responsibility of States in such scenarios. The Guiding Principles on Shared Responsibility in International Law (2020) were developed to fill this gap and introduce the concept of “coercion” as one of the distinct and independent grounds for establishing shared responsibility (particularly Principle 8(2)). Nevertheless, the judicial application of this concept, especially within the specialized field of human rights, has not yet been comprehensively examined. The principal objective of the present study is to analyze the conceptual relationship between “coercion” and “shared responsibility” in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In this regard, the precise scope and judicial application of the concept of “coercion”, which emerges as a distinct and potentially significant factor for shared responsibility (Principle 8(2)), has received insufficient attention, particularly in the specialized adjudication of human rights cases. The central research question is the extent to which the Court recognizes coercion as an independent basis for establishing shared responsibility and how it distinguishes it from related concepts such as complicity, effective control, and positive obligations. The hypothesis of the study posits that, despite frequently encountering coercion-based scenarios, the Court lacks a coherent and explicit doctrine in this area and relies predominantly on alternative or functionally equivalent concepts, thereby generating ambiguity in the allocation of shared responsibility and creating accountability gaps. The significance of this issue lies in the fact that explicit recognition of coercion could prevent major powers from evading responsibility through the indirect exertion of pressure on weaker States or international organizations, while enhancing coherence between general rules of international responsibility and the specialized European human rights regime.
Methods
The research methodology is qualitative and doctrinal, based on legal content analysis. A theoretical framework was first constructed drawing on the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility (ARSIWA), the 2020 Guiding Principles on Shared Responsibility, and relevant scholarly literature. Subsequently, an analytical-comparative approach was employed to conduct an in-depth examination of landmark judgments of the European Court of Human Rights containing elements of coercion or its functional equivalents. The pivotal cases selected include Ilascu v. Moldova and Russia, Catan v. Moldova and Russia, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, El-Masri v. Macedonia, Cyprus v. Turkey, Georgia v. Russia (II), M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, and Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan. These cases were chosen owing to their incorporation of hierarchical power dynamics, extraterritorial control, security cooperation, and migration-related elements. The analysis proceeded comparatively between the Court’s standards (decisive influence, effective control, positive obligations) and the stricter criteria of the Guiding Principles (intentional coercion, absence of reasonable alternatives, nullification of agency).
Results and Discussions
The findings of the study may be categorized into three principal axes: First, the Court rarely employs the term “coercion” explicitly but consistently applies functionally equivalent concepts. In Ilascu and Catan, the Court invoked phrases such as “decisive influence” and “overwhelming pressure” to hold Russia primarily responsible for completely nullifying the agency of Moldova and the Transnistrian authorities. This approach aligns precisely with Principle 8(2) of the Guiding Principles, which treats coercion as effecting a transfer of responsibility to the coercing actor while simultaneously preserving shared responsibility. The Court emphasized that Russia’s military and economic support rendered local authorities “devoid of any reasonable alternative” and reduced Moldova’s sovereignty to a “legal fiction.” Second, the Court regards coercion not as a factor extinguishing responsibility but as one that redistributes it. In Al-Skeini and Sargsyan, the Court drew on the doctrine of positive obligations to declare that, even in the presence of external pressure or wartime conditions, a State exercising de facto control remains obliged to take preventive and remedial measures. This perspective is fully consonant with Principle 5 of the Guiding Principles (non-elimination of wrongfulness due to coercion) and demonstrates that coercion cannot serve as an excuse for inaction on the part of the host or occupying State. Third, the absence of a clear distinction between coercion and adjacent concepts constitutes the most significant weakness in the Court’s jurisprudence. In El-Masri, the Court held Macedonia responsible solely on the ground of “knowing assistance” and refrained from examining the possibility of United States coercion; yet, had the Guiding Principles’ criteria been applied, the United States could have been deemed jointly or even primarily responsible. Similarly, in Al-Skeini, the Court established the United Kingdom’s “effective control” without addressing potential coercion arising from Security Council resolutions or coalition pressure. This insufficient differentiation results in weaker States bearing exclusive or disproportionate responsibility in hierarchical situations, while the coercing power escapes accountability.
Conclusion
In sum, the present study demonstrates that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights exhibits considerable practical convergence with the 2020 Guiding Principles yet remains conceptually deficient in a coherent doctrine of coercion. It is recommended that the Court, in future judgments, recognize coercion as an independent ground for shared responsibility, explicitly articulate its threshold of proof (intent, absence of reasonable alternatives, specific wrongful act), and apply the concept in cases involving migration, joint military operations, or European Union pressures. Such an evolution would not only enhance the Court’s judicial consistency but also prevent accountability gaps in the international human rights system and encourage States to adhere to the principle of coercion-free cooperation in international relations
Highlights
Highlights
· The European Court of Human Rights seldom explicitly employs the term “coercion”; nevertheless, through concepts such as “decisive influence,” “effective control,” “unbearable pressure,” and “positive obligations,” it fulfils the same function in multilateral scenarios.
· The Court lacks a coherent doctrine for distinguishing “coercion” from “participation in a crime” and “effective control”; this ambiguity has rendered the apportionment of shared responsibility difficult.
· The explicit recognition of coercion as an autonomous basis for shared responsibility strengthens the coherence of judicial practice.
Keywords
Subjects