Banking Regulatory Rights and Its Difficulties in the Banking System of Iran

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Associate Professor of Law, Shahid Beheshti University

2 Ph.D. Candidate of Public Law, Shahid Beheshti University

10.22034/jlr.2019.166032.1308

Abstract

The subject of this article is to explain the modalities of the government's intervention in the banking system to regulate the banking market. Banks are subject to market failure due to problems such as information asymmetry, destructive and extreme competition, and behavioral risks. Therefore, government's intervention seems necessary to set up a banking system. The main question of this paper is that, in the light of public and private interest theories, how are the government regulatory interventions in the banking sector explained and explained and what are the challenges of this intervention in the legal system of Iran? From this point of view, after reviewing the theoretical foundations governing banking regulation rights, a variety of government tools for regulating the market structure and behavior of actors in the banking sector will be examined, and each of the positions of the Iranian legal system will be discussed. Given the fact that the existence of an independent and expert regulator in the banking sector is one of the most important components of the banking regulatory system, some of its institutional and structural requirements are also examined. Finally, some of the most important challenges of the banking regulatory system are mentioned in Iran.

Keywords

Main Subjects

References

Books:
 
Barth, James. R and Gerard Caprio and Ross Levin,Rethinking Bank Regulation,Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Broszner, Randall and Philip Strahan, obstacles to Optimal Policy: the Interplay of Politics and Economic spin Shaping Bank Supervision, and Regulation Reforms, in Frederics Mishkin, ed, Prudentied Supervision: What works and what Doesn’t (Chicago, university of Chicago Press), 2001.
Brown, Ashley C. and Jon Sterm, Bernard Tenenbaum, Defne Gencer,Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems, The World Bank, Washington, D. C. 2006.
Claudio, Borio and William C. Hunter, George G. Kaufman, Kostas Tsatsaronis, Market Discipline Across Countries And Industries, The MIT Press, 2004.
Cole, David and Betty Slade, Reform of Financial Systems, 1991.
Edwards, Frankilin R, Banks and Securities Activities: Legal and Economic Perspective on the Glass –Steagall Act, in L. Goldberg and L.J. White, eds, the Deregulation of Banking Securities Activities, 1979.
Freixas Xavier, and Jean Charles Rochet, Microeconomics of Banking, 2ndEd. The MIT Press, 2008.
Hellmann, Thomas, use - vin Murdoch and J. Seph Stiglitz, Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking and Prudential, Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough? American Economic Review, 90 (1), 2000.
Jordana, J., and David Levi - Faur. The Politics of Regulation: institutions and regulatory reforms for the age of governance, Cheltenham, UK. Northampton, MA, USA: Edwar Elgar, 2004.
Kaufman, George G. Helping, To Prevent Banking Crises: Taking the State out of State Banks, Review of pacic basin Financial Markets, and Policies, 1999.
Kornai, Janos, Resource constained us. Demand – constrained system, Econoetrica, 1979.
Menard Claude, and Mary Shirley, Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Springer, 2005.
Mishan, E. J., Welfare Economics: an Assessment. North – Holand Publishing Company, 1969.
OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, 2008.
Singh, D., Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets, Ashgate, 2007.
 
 
Articles:
Berger, Allen, Richard J. Herring and Gigio p. szeyo, The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions, Journal of Banking and Finance, 1995.
Bhattacharya, Sudipto and Anjan V. Thakor, “Contemporary Banking Theory”, Journal of Financial Intermediation 3, 1993.
Bhattacharya, Sudipo, Arnoud W.A. Boot and Anjan, v. Thakor, The Economic of Bank Regulation, Jurnal of Money Credit and Banking, 30 (4), 1998.
Diver, C. S,"The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules", The Yale Law Journal ,Vol. 93, No. 1, 1983.
Hellmann, Thomas F., and Kevin C. Murdock, Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?", The American Economic Review, Vol. 90 ,No. 1, 2000.
Kaufman, G. "Helping to Prevent Banking Crises: Taking the State Out of State Banks", Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, Vol. 2, No. 1.
Kohn, M.,"Early Deposit Banking", Working Paper 99-03, 1999, Department of Economics Darthmouth College.
Koehn, M., and A.M., Santomero, Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio Risk, Journal of Finance, 1980.
Leaven, Luc, The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance, Journal of Financial Services Research, 26, 2004.
North D. C., and John J. Wallis, "Integrating Institutional Change and Technical Change in Economic History", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 150, No. 4.
Peltzman, S., "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation ", The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1976.
Posner, R. A., "Theories of Economic Regulation", The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science Vol. 5, No. 2, 1974.
Sheny, Andrew, Bank supervision principles and practice. Economic Development Institute (EDI) of the World Bank, Washington D.C, 1990.
Shleifer, Andrei , and R.Vishny, Corruption, Quarterly Journal of Economic, 108, 1993.
Stigler. G. J., "The Theory of Economic Regulation", The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science Vol. 2, No. 1, 1971.
 
 
URL:
Koha, Meir, Early Deposit Banking, draft Chapter of Finance, Business and Government Before the Industrial Revolution, Darmouth college, @ http: //www.dartmouth, edu/mkohn/.
/http://www.aftabir.com.
/http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/.
 
 

Files

History

  • Receive Date: 06 January 2019
  • Revise Date: 05 March 2019
  • Accept Date: 07 April 2019

Share

How to cite

Statistics