The defeasible nature of criminal responsibility and its reflection in Iran's penal code

Document Type : Original Article


1 Criminal Law Department,Law faculty,Shahid Beheshti university,Tehran,Iran

2 Ph.D student at Shahid beheshti University


Defeasibility or attributability of criminal responsibility faces a challenge. What is to be seen in the criminal law discourse, is an affirmative concept of Responsibility that is based on guilt. In this impression, the responsibility came after Criminality, and is based on criminal capacity (consist of cognition/Discernment and free Will) and fault. But, in a defeasible sense, the mere material attribution of the breach, must be criminal and Regardless of fault and capacity, Identifies responsibility (in the prior sense) for committing. The abolition of priori responsibility effect is depend on the defenses that have been foreseen in particular cases.The analysis of the fault institution and its analytical evaluation along with the barriers to criminal liability - as envisaged in the Criminal Laws - can be found in the discovery of the knot subject. In this article tried descriptively to show defeasible nature of responsibility as a general rule in public criminal law and Its Manifestations in Iran's Criminal Code.


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