Legal Language and the Instability of Concepts: A Deconstructive Analysis of the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights

Document Type : Original Article

Author

Ph.D, Faculty of Law & Political Sciences, Islamic Azad University: Science & Research Branch, Tehran, Iran. Mohsenmarhouni@gmail.com

Abstract

Introduction
This paper is both research-oriented and applied, aiming to systematically analyze the issue of semantic instability in legal language and its implications for the judicial practice of the European Court of Human Rights. The central research question is how the structural features of legal language and various methods of judicial interpretation, in conjunction with different socio-cultural contexts, lead to the deferral of meaning, polysemy, and interpretive contradictions, and how these phenomena affect legal certainty, predictability, and the realization of justice. The specific objectives of the research are: identifying the linguistic and institutional mechanisms that cause instability in fundamental concepts; analyzing the involvement of social and political mechanisms in the selection of judicial meanings; and proposing institutionalizable solutions to mitigate the negative effects of semantic instability on the coherence of judicial practice; therefore, it is expected that the results will both enrich theorization about the nature of semantic instability and provide practical suggestions for reforming judicial practice. However, this paper also acknowledges its methodological limitations—including its focus on a selected set of judgments that may overlook other aspects of judicial practice—and emphasizes the need for complementary empirical studies to test the impact of institutional proposals. Ultimately, the research seeks to offer a balanced framework that both preserves the necessary flexibility for adapting interpretations to new social demands and, through clarifying interpretive criteria and strengthening institutional oversight, enhances the predictability and coherence of judicial practice; an outcome that will contribute to improving the legitimacy and effectiveness of the protection of fundamental rights.
Methods
The present study employs a mixed analytical-critical approach. The sources examined include selected judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (cases such as S.A.S. v. France, Baka v. Hungary, Lautsi v. Italy, KlimaSeniorinnen v. Switzerland, Almeida v. Portugal), as well as relevant theoretical texts (works by Jacques Derrida, H. L. A. Hart, Peter Goodrich, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, and other scholars). Qualitative data were extracted through a full textual analysis of the judgments; this process involved careful rereading of the texts, coding of linguistic propositions influencing interpretation, tracing chains of reasoning, and conducting a comparative analysis of interpretive patterns. The analysis combined deconstruction to reveal internal contradictions within the texts and legal hermeneutics to understand their historical-cultural contexts, thereby enabling the simultaneous examination of hidden layers of meaning and contextual exigencies.
Results and Discussion
The findings of this study indicate that semantic instability is a multi-causal and multifaceted phenomenon arising from the interaction of linguistic, institutional, and social elements. First, legal texts, through the use of open-ended vocabulary and general concepts, create conditions for the production of multiple and sometimes inconsistent interpretations; this structural ambiguity compels judges to fill conceptual gaps and select meanings. Second, national cultural, historical, and political contexts have a decisive influence on interpretive orientations; the same concept may acquire different meanings and legal consequences across diverse contexts. Third, legal institutions and actors (states, civil institutions, think tanks) play a guiding role in shaping meaning by presenting evidence, policy arguments, and sociological materials. Fourth, doctrines and practices such as the “margin of appreciation” have a dual function: on one hand, they allow interpretations to adapt to national realities; on the other, they can justify extensive divergences and reduce the coherence of judicial practice. Comparative analysis of the cases revealed that instances such as Lautsi (religious symbols), S.A.S. (full-face covering), and Baka (judicial reforms and judicial independence) clearly illustrate the overlap between open legal language, socio-political pressures, and institutional choices. Furthermore, the study shows that in some judgments, the Court has relied on social evidence and national statistics to justify particular readings—an approach that extends the disciplinary boundaries of law into interdisciplinary domains and transforms concepts from abstract frameworks into functional ones. The practical implications of this condition include, on the one hand, a decrease in predictability, a risk of inequality in access to rights, and the erosion of public trust; and, on the other hand, the potential for the gradual development of law in response to emerging challenges such as environmental issues, technology, and cultural diversity. Overall, the findings indicate that semantic stability in law is not a fixed matter but rather the result of a balance between linguistic precision and social exigencies. The more consciously the relationship between legal language and its cultural context is managed, the greater the possibility of achieving fairer and more coherent interpretations, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of judicial institutions.
Conclusion
The overall conclusion is that semantic instability in legal language is an inevitable yet manageable phenomenon. It presents both challenges to predictability and coherence of judicial practice and opportunities for expanding human rights concepts in response to new issues. To reduce its negative effects and strengthen interpretive coherence, three practical measures are proposed: 1.Formulation of clear and transparent interpretive principles at the Court level, including criteria for defining the scope of key concepts and the obligation to explain interpretive choices. 2.Establishment of monitoring and analytical mechanisms—such as jurisprudential analysis units or comparative working groups—to track coherence and interpretive trends and to publish periodic reports. 3.Requirement to include contextual analytical sections in judgments that demonstrate how cultural, historical, and social factors have influenced interpretive choices. Implementing these measures can, while preserving the necessary flexibility for law to adapt to changing realities, prevent uncontrolled fragmentation in interpretation and enhance the predictability of judicial practice. Furthermore, the findings of the study indicate that managing semantic instability requires acknowledging it as a natural part of the dynamism of legal language, rather than merely a flaw within the interpretive system. In this regard, enhancing the linguistic and interpretive literacy of judges, promoting dialogue between national and international institutions, and expanding interdisciplinary studies in the field of legal linguistics can play a decisive role. Ultimately, the main goal is not to eliminate instability, but to guide it consciously toward the realization of justice, institutional coherence, and semantic dynamism within the framework of human rights

Highlights

  • The semantic instability of legal language is both a challenge to judicial predictability and an opportunity for innovation in the interpretation of human rights.
  • The continuous rethinking of legal concepts in light of socio-cultural contexts is the key to sustainable justice and adaptation to contemporary challenges.
  • This article, using a Derridean deconstructive approach, reveals the internal contradictions of fundamental concepts in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and proposes three practical solutions.

Keywords

Main Subjects


  1. References

    Books

    1. Barak, Aharon. Purposive Interpretation in Law, Princeton University Press, 2005.
    2. Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology, Translated by: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
    3. Derrida, Jacques. Writing and Difference, Translated by: Boyle Alan Bass, University of Chicago Press, 1978.
    4. Ghorbani, Ali, Fair Trial in The Jurisprudence of The European Court of Human Rights, Tehran: Today's Law, 2011. (In Persian)
    5. Goodrich, Peter. Languages of Law: From Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks, Northwestern University Press, Second Edition, 1990.
    6. Hart, H. L. A. Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, First Edition, 1983.
    7. Luhmann, Niklas. Law as a Social System, Oxford University Press, 2004.
    8. Menski, Werner. F. Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
    9. Seymour, Laura, An Analysis of Roland Barthes's The Death of the Author, Translated by: Sahand Elhami, Tehran: Mehrandish, 2024. (In Persian)
    10. Tiersma, P. M. Legal Language, University of Chicago Press, First Edition, 2000.
    11. Zariski, Archie. Legal Literacy: An Introduction to Legal Studies, AU Press, 2014.
    12. Zimaran, Mohammad, Michel Foucault: Knowledge and Power, Tehran: Hermes, 2008. (In Persian)

    Articles

    1. Ahmadi Nejad, Maryam and Yaser Amin Al-Ro’aya, “The Legal Nature of The Doctrine of The Permissible Margin of Interpretation”, Foreign Policy Quarterly, Volume 30, Issue 2, 2016, PP 115–139. (In Persian)
    2. Balkin, Jack, M. “Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory”, The Yale Law Journal, Volume 96, Issue 4, 1987, PP 743–786. Doi: 2307/796361
    3. Bix, Brian. “Law and Language: How Words Mislead Us”, Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09‑22, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1376366.
    4. Breskaya, Olga., Paolo De Stefani and Giuseppe Giordan.“The Lautsi Legacy: A New Judgment on the Crucifix in Classrooms and the Multiculturalist Turn on Freedom of/from Religion in Italy”, Religions, Volume 13, Issue 7, 2022. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13070666
    5. Derrida, Jacques, “Force of Law: Mystical Foundation of Authority”, In: Cornell, Drucilla, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds.). Deconstruction and The Possibility of Justice, New York: Routledge, 1992.
    6. Ebbesson, Jonas. “Law, Power and Language: Beware of Metaphors”, Scandinavian Studies in Law, Volume 53, 2008.
    7. Eskridge, William. N. , Brian G. Slocum and Stefan Th Gries. “The Meaning of Sex: Dynamic Words, Novel Applications, and Original Public Meaning”, Michigan Law Review, Volume 119, Issue 7, 2021, PP 1503-1580. https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.119.7.meaning
    8. Ghari Sayyed Fatemi, Sayyed Mohammad, “Human Rights Treaties: A Different Space”, International Law Journal, Volume 20, Issue 28, 2003, PP 5–44. (In Persian) https://doi.org/10.22066/cilamag.2003.18065/
    9. Goodrich, Peter. “Grammatology in America, A Sketch of the Return of Philology in Legal Studies”, OPUS 4, Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 2010, PP 140-153.
    10. Khanzad, Mohammad Reza and Mohammad Shokri, “Deconstruction and Hermeneutics; An Analysis of "Understanding" and "Other" with a Look at the Debate between Derrida and Gadamer in Paris (1981)”, Bi-Quarterly Journal of Epistemological Research, Volume 9, Issue 20, 2010, PP 165-180. (In Persian)
    11. Mohebi, Mohsen and Esmaeil Samavi, “The Role of The European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence in The Dynamic Interpretation of Human Rights”, International Law Journal, Volum 35, Issue 58, 2018, PP 7–30. (In Persian) https://doi.org/10.22066/cilamag.2018.31672/
    12. Mosleh, Ali Asghar and Parsa Khaneghah, “Deconstruction as A Strategy”, Metaphysics Journal, Volume 3, Issue 11, 2011, PP 59–72. (In Persian) https://doi.org/20.1001.1.20088086.1390.3.11.5.9/
    13. Mousavi Asl, Sayyed Sa’eed and Zahra Moradi, “Herbert Hart’s Philosophy of Language Approach in The Concept of Law as A Form of Legal Hermeneutics”, Public Law Studies Quarterly, Volume 52, Issue 1, 2022, PP 379–394. (In Persian) https://doi.org/10.22059/jplsq.2020.278875.1962/
    14. Moyn, Samuel. “Knowledge and Politics in International Law”, Harvard Law Review, Volume 129, Issue 8, 2016, PP 2164-2189.
    15. Naghib Zadeh, Ahmad and Majid Estowar, “Bourdieu And Symbolic Power. Politics Quarterly”, Politics Quarterly, Volume 42, Issue 2, 2012, PP 279–294. (In Persian) https://doi.org/10.22059/jpq.2012.29980/
    16. Pierik, R. “State Neutrality and the Limits of Religious Symbolism”, In: J. Temperman (ed.). The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom, Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012, PP 201-218.
    17. Pound, Roscoe. “The Political and Social Factor in Legal Interpretation”, Michigan Law Review, Volume 45, Issue 5, 1947, PP 599-604.
    18. Poursa’eed, Ramin and Hossein Yassaeri, “Critical Methodology and Legal Hermeneutics”, Journal of Islamic Jurisprudence and Law, Volume 4, Issue 7, 2011, PP 67-84. (In Persian)
    19. Sadat Akhavvi, Sayyed Ali and Nafiseh Parsania, “The Rules of Interpretation of The European Convention on Human Rights in Light of The Jurisprudence of The European Court of Human Rights”, International Law Journal, Volume 30, Issue 49, 2013, PP 127–144. (In Persian) https://doi.org/10.22066/cilamag.2013.15999/
    20. Samar, Vincent. J. “Rethinking Constitutional Interpretation to Affirm Human Rights and dignity”, UC Law Constitutional Quarterly, Volume 47, Issue 1, 2019, PP 83-144.
    21. Schauer, Frederick. “On the Open Texture of Law”, Law and Philosophy, Volume 31, 2012.
    22. Schuck, Peter H. “Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures”, Duke Law Journal, Volume 42, Issue 1, 1992, PP 1-52.
    23. Sharifi Tarazkouhi, Hossein and Javad Mobini, “The Doctrine of The Permissible Margin of Interpretation in The Jurisprudence of The European Court of Human Rights”, Public Law Research Quarterly, Volume 16, Issue 44, 2014, PP 73–103. (In Persian)
    24. Solan, L. M. “The Interpretation of Legal Language”, Annual Review of Linguistics, Volume 4, 2018, PP 337-355. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-linguistics-011817-045649
    25. Taherkhani, Mostafa and Sayyed Mohammad Ghari Sayyed Fatemi, “Jacques Derrida And the Deconstruction of Law”, Legal Research Quarterly, Volume 25, Issue 100, 2023, PP 59–85. (In Persian) https://doi.org/10.29252/jlr.2021.222358.1934/
    26. Teimouri, Sharareh, Shamsolmolouk Mostafavi and Maryam Bakhtiaryan, “The Expansion of Derrida’s Theory of Deconstruction: A Philosophical Critique of The Deconstruction Style in Contemporary Architecture”, Wisdom and Philosophy Quarterly, Volume 17, Issue 66, 2021, PP 127–150. (In Persian) https://doi.org/10.22054/wph.2021.53878.1878/
    27. Tiersma, P. M. “The Ambiguity of Interpretation”, Washington University Law Review, Volume 73, Issue 3, 1995, PP 1095-1101.
    28. Waldron, Jeremy. “Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues”, California Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 3, 1994, PP 509-540. http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38WB2M.

    Cases

    1. Baka v. Hungary. App.No.20261/12. 23/06/2016.
    2. Broniowski v. Poland, App.No.31443/96, 22/06/2004.
    3. KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland. App.No.53600/20. 09/04/2024.
    4. Lautsi v. Italy. App.No.30814/06, 2011/03/18.
    5. Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland. App.No.14234/88. 29/10/1992.
    6. A.S. v. France. App.No.43835/11. 01/07/2014