A Pondering on the Interpretation of Judgments in the International Court of Justice, with Emphasis on the Preah Vihear Temple Case

Introduction
The system of peaceful settlement of international disputes is recognized as one of the most vital mechanisms for maintaining international peace and security. Within this framework, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) plays an indispensable role in ensuring the observance of this principle. According to Article 60 of its Statute, the Court’s judgments are final and without appeal; they can only be reconsidered through two limited mechanisms: “interpretation” and, in exceptional cases, “revision”. Among these, the interpretation of judgments has acquired particular significance, especially as exemplified by the well-known “Temple of Preah Vihear case” between Cambodia and Thailand. The 1962 judgment of this case, while recognizing Cambodia’s sovereignty over the temple structure, left unresolved ambiguities concerning the geographical boundaries and the practical consequences of the ruling. These ambiguities necessitated a subsequent interpretative judgment by the Court in 2013. This study, by examining Article 60 of the ICJ Statute and focusing on the Principle of “Non Ultra Petita”, seeks to answer the central question: To what extent does the Court’s strict adherence to this principle contribute to, or hinder, the realization of its main purpose—namely, the peaceful settlement of international disputes? Accordingly, the objective of this research is to analyze the role of this principle in generating, perpetuating, or eliminating ambiguities in the Court’s judgments, and to assess the evolution of the ICJ’s interpretative approach between its 1962 and 2013 decisions.
Methods
The present research employs an analytical–comparative method, based on documentary and library-based data collection. Initially, fundamental instruments of international law—including the United Nations Charter, the Statute of the ICJ, and the Rules of Court—were examined to extract the legal foundations governing the interpretation of judgments and the conditions for applying the Non Ultra Petita principle. Subsequently, the study analyzes the content and reasoning of the ICJ’s judgments, particularly the separate and dissenting opinions of judges in the 1962 and 2013 Preah Vihear cases, alongside other similar decisions, to trace the evolution of the Court’s understanding and application of this principle. Comparative analysis of these materials enables the identification of changes in the Court’s interpretative logic over time. This methodological approach allows for the examination of the ICJ’s jurisprudential development in context—showing how doctrinal principles and judicial practice interact in the interpretation of international judgments.
Results and Discussions
The findings indicate that, although the Non Ultra Petita principle was originally designed to ensure judicial impartiality and respect for the limits of the Court’s jurisdiction, an overly restrictive interpretation of this rule may itself become a source of ambiguity and renewed conflict. The ICJ’s 1962 judgment in the Preah Vihear case, based on a strict reading of this principle, merely declared Cambodia’s sovereignty over the temple and refrained from defining the precise boundary lines or the practical implications of the ruling. This narrow interpretation led to divergent readings by both States and prolonged their border tensions for nearly five decades. Conversely, in its 2013 interpretation judgment, the Court adopted a more functional and dynamic approach. While maintaining respect for the limits of its jurisdiction, the Court took into account the primary purpose of the 1962 ruling—resolving the dispute over the temple area—and determined that not only the temple but also its surrounding region, designated as a “Provisional Demilitarized Zone”, fell within Cambodian territory. This interpretative shift marks a significant departure from a purely formalistic and literal understanding toward a teleological and purpose-oriented interpretation of judicial decisions, based on the philosophy that a judgment’s true function lies in the effective resolution of disputes. The provisional demilitarized zone included areas that were not, in fact, subject to dispute and were clearly under the sovereignty of one of the parties. Nevertheless, the Court, in its effort to achieve a comprehensive and lasting settlement, extended its interpretation to these adjacent areas. The opposing opinions of several judges confirm that the Court, in this instance, deliberately moved beyond traditional interpretative constraints in pursuit of practical effectiveness. A comparative analysis of other ICJ cases supports this observation, demonstrating that in recent decades the Court has increasingly embraced evaluative and dynamic interpretation theories. Influenced by modern interpretative doctrines, the Court now tends toward interpretations that ensure the effective implementation and legal efficacy of its judgments, thereby preventing secondary disputes. In this context, the interpretation of the judgment is not simply a recitation of the words, but a means to ensure their legal and executive effect. From a doctrinal standpoint, recent judgments reveal an implicit acknowledgment that the Non Ultra Petita principle must be applied in conjunction with other fundamental doctrines such as “res judicata” and related principles of judicial economy. In this view, the limitations imposed by the Non Ultra Petita rule should not obstruct the ICJ’s higher objective of maintaining peace and stability. Otherwise, the principle may devolve into a mechanism for judicial silence, perpetuating rather than resolving disputes. The findings also highlight that the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility in the Court’s practice has become increasingly clear through interpretative jurisprudence. The 2013 judgment, while formally preserving the appearance of limited jurisdiction, effectively expanded the scope of its ruling. From the perspective of peace consolidation, however, this broader and more flexible interpretative approach has strengthened the ICJ’s legitimacy and authority in the international legal order.
Conclusion
The research concludes that while the Principle of Non Ultra Petita remains a cornerstone of international adjudication, it must be interpreted in light of the ICJ’s overarching mission—the peaceful settlement of disputes. The experience of the Preah Vihear case demonstrates that a narrowly textual or rigid interpretation may perpetuate ambiguity, whereas a teleological and functional interpretation contributes to consistency in the Court’s jurisprudence and fosters States’ trust in the international judicial system. In other words, the Court’s transition from a “text-bound interpretation” to a “purpose-oriented interpretation” signifies an institutional maturity that aligns legal reasoning with the practical realities of contemporary international relations. Thus, interpretation has evolved from a purely technical judicial function into an active instrument for advancing international peace and justice