Document Type : Original Article
Authors
1
Ph.D., Middle East Strategic Studies Center, Tehran, Iran Corresponding Author Email: hamidakbarpour172@gmail.com
2
Assistant Professor, Faculty of National Defense, Supreme National Defense University, Tehran, Iran
3
Ph.D., Research Institute of Irregular Warfare, Research Center for Holy Defense Sciences and Values, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
Abstract
The prohibition of the use of force constitutes one of the cardinal principles of international law, subject to only two exceptions: first, the inherent right of self-defense as enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and second, measures undertaken by the Security Council to maintain international peace and security pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter. Prior to the attacks of September 11, the invocation of the right of self-defense was predominantly confined to states against each other. However, following the emergence of non-state threats such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, the question arose as to whether self-defense can be invoked against terrorist groups. This article seeks to analyze the behavioral patterns of the United Nations Security Council in responding to this issue, and to assess the extent to which an expansive interpretation of the right to self-defense against terrorist groups. This study adopts a descriptive-analytical approach, grounded in extensive library-based research. Data were collected from academic literature, Security Council resolutions, judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and credible online resources, and were systematically analyzed. The research is selected from the pre-9/11 era to the emergence of ISIS and the corresponding Security Council resolutions. Special attention is devoted to detailed examination of Resolutions 1368, 1373, and 2249, and an analysis of the legal literature related to the right to self-defense. The findings reveal that the terrorist attacks of September 11 represented a watershed moment in the conceptualization of self-defense against non-state threats. In Resolutions 1368 and 1373, immediately after these attacks, the Security Council recognized the right of states to self-defense against terrorist threats, although this recognition was limited to the preamble of the resolution and was not explicit in the operative parts. In these resolutions, self-defense was presented in general terms without specific reference to the non-state nature of the attackers. A more nuanced analysis demonstrates that, after these two resolutions, in subsequent resolutions—even in facing broader threats such as ISIS—the Council refrained from reiterating or expanding this position. Resolution 2249 on ISIS, although it condemned the threats of this group and called for confronting it, without addressing the right to self-defense and was not issued under Chapter VII of the Charter; therefore, its legal value for justifying the use of force is limited. Moreover, in the analysis of existing legal theories, it was observed that the broad interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter, which accepts self-defense against non-state groups based on theories such as the "Unable or Unwilling" doctrine and the "Accumulation of Events" theory, although supported by some countries such as the United States, France and the United Kingdom, has not become a binding custom at the international level. Nevertheless, these interpretations have not crystallized into binding customary international law. The jurisprudence of the ICJ, notably in the Nicaragua case and more recently in Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda, has consistently maintained that an armed attack attributable to a state is a prerequisite for invoking the right of self-defense. On the other hand, the Security Council has emphasized the strengthening of collective mechanisms for counter-terrorism, such as Sanctions Committees and the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and has minimized reliance on unilateral uses of force. This approach indicates that the Security Council has considered self-defense against terrorism to be an exception and not an established norm. The Security Council’s practice indicates that the invocation of self-defense against terrorist groups post-9/11 has been recognized only as an exceptional response within a specific political context. In its subsequent resolutions, the Council has refrained from expanding this interpretation and has reaffirmed the traditional framework of the prohibition on the use of force. Even in facing the unprecedented threat posed by ISIS, the Council declined to institutionalize the right of self-defense against non-state actors as a legal procedure. Moreover, by prioritizing collective responses to terrorism and reinforcing the discourse surrounding threats to international peace and security, the Council has effectively precluded the establishment of a unilateral right to the use of force. As a result, the use of self-defense against non-state groups must continue to be analyzed with caution and within the traditional framework of international law.
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