حق بر تنظیم‌گری: نقطه تلاقی حاکمیت دولت با حقوق سرمایه‌گذار خارجی در داوری سرمایه‌گذاری

Abstract
Introduction: 
The relationship between state sovereignty and the protection of foreign investors’ rights represents one of the most contested issues in international investment arbitration. Regulatory measures adopted by states in areas such as human rights, environmental protection, public health, water governance, and national security are frequently perceived as threats to the stability and predictability of the international investment regime. This tension has led to numerous investment claims against states. Sovereignty, as the foundational attribute of states, includes permanent control over natural resources, non-intervention principles, territorial integrity, and domaine réservé. On the other hand, foreign investor rights—rooted in BITs, multilateral agreements, customary international law, and domestic laws—guarantee access to dispute resolution, FET, protection from expropriation, non-discrimination, legitimate expectations, profit repatriation, and compensation for losses. Conflicts arise when state regulations, intended to protect public welfare, inadvertently impair these rights, prompting investor-state disputes. However, evolving jurisprudence and newer treaties recognize the right to regulate as a sovereign tool to balance these interests. The research question explores how treaties and tribunals differentiate legitimate regulation from indirect expropriation using criteria like public purpose, proportionality, and non-discrimination, demonstrating that sovereignty and investor protection can coexist harmoniously.
Methods: 
This study adopts an analytical and doctrinal approach, examining arbitral awards, international investment treaties, and relevant principles of international law. Through qualitative analysis of tribunal reasoning, the research evaluates how investment tribunals assess state regulatory measures, with particular focus on concepts such as public purpose, proportionality, and non-discrimination. The study also reviews contemporary treaty practice to identify evolving normative frameworks governing the balance between sovereignty and investor rights. Key sources include historical documents like the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which first articulated regulatory authority over foreign investments; the Energy Charter Treaty, affirming sovereignty over energy resources; and failed drafts like the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, which introduced explicit right-to-regulate clauses. Many treaties with explicit right-to-regulate provisions are surveyed, categorized into four evolutionary phases: formation, duality with North-South divides, expansion, and reform emphasizing balance. Tribunal decisions are dissected using the tripartite test: public purpose, non-discrimination, and proportionality. The methodology ensures comprehensive coverage by integrating theoretical dimensions, historical origins, and practical arbitral applications.
Results and Discussion:
The analysis reveals a gradual shift in arbitral jurisprudence away from a rigid conception of regulatory measures as presumptive violations of investor protections. Increasingly, tribunals employ holistic evaluative criteria that recognize the legitimacy of regulatory action when it pursues public interests, applies proportionate means, and avoids discriminatory treatment. This emerging approach challenges the traditional narrative of an unavoidable conflict between state sovereignty and foreign investor rights and indicates greater judicial sensitivity to the regulatory responsibilities of states. Initially, tribunals favored the "sole effects" doctrine, prioritizing investment impacts over regulatory intent, as seen in early cases like Biloune v. Ghana or Metalclad v. Mexico. However, a paradigm shift toward the police powers doctrine—rooted in customary law—has emerged. In Feldman v. Mexico, the tribunal upheld tax and invoicing regulations for tobacco exports as legitimate public purpose actions to curb illicit sales, affirming states' freedom in environmental, fiscal, and trade policies without compensation if non-discriminatory. ADC v. Hungary acknowledged regulatory rights but required genuine public interest proof, rejecting unsubstantiated claims. Methanex v. USA validated California's MTBE fuel additive ban as a proportionate, non-discriminatory environmental measure, not expropriation. Philip Morris v. Uruguay endorsed single-presentation tobacco rules and 80% health warnings as valid health regulations, prioritizing public welfare. Conversely, Eiser v. Spain emphasized FET's stability requirement, finding renewable energy subsidy cuts disproportionate despite regulatory intent. Addiko Bank v. Montenegro balanced FET with sovereignty, rejecting absolute stability interpretations that undermine regulation. Fourth-generation treaties incorporate right-to-regulate via exceptions (general, security), preambles, explicit texts, or implicit references, covering health, environment, ethics, and sustainability. This fosters tribunal deference, reducing "regulatory chill" and aligning with sustainable development. Analysis of several landmark arbitral awards confirms that arbitrators grounded in the public international law tradition have achieved notable success in precisely delineating the state’s public interest and awarding fair compensation to the foreign investor. By systematically utilizing the capacities of this legal regime, this group has established a concurrent balance between the state’s right to regulate and the rights of the foreign investor. They have remained faithful not only to the treaty text but have also, through the exercise of judicial discretion, made a tangible contribution to the development of international law and the establishment of a new economic order. In comparison, arbitrators adhering predominantly to a private law tradition have often relied on the sole effects doctrine, emphasizing only the restrictive consequences of state measures—with little regard for their intent or purpose. Nonetheless, contemporary investment arbitration practice indicates a decline in the exclusive standing of the sole effects doctrine and its gradual replacement by doctrines recognizing regulatory authority or the right to regulate.