نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
This article examines the impact of executive–legislative relations on legislative effectiveness and explores how the institutional design of these relations may enhance or undermine the quality, coherence, and enforceability of legislation. The main objective is to identify a model of interaction between the two branches which, in light of the requirements of modern governance and with particular emphasis on the executive’s role in legislative initiative, ensures greater legislative efficiency.
The study adopts a descriptive–analytical and problem-oriented approach, relying on library-based research and drawing upon constitutional law sources, parliamentary studies, classical and contemporary theories, and legislative statistical data. The findings show that in parliamentary systems, due to the structural linkage between government and parliament, the executive plays a dominant role in legislative initiative, leading to more coordinated and effective law-making. In contrast, in presidential systems characterized by a rigid separation of powers, limited executive involvement often results in legislative deadlock and inefficiency.
Mixed systems, particularly the French model, strike a relative balance between efficiency and oversight by granting legislative initiative to both branches while affording practical priority to government bills. In Iran, although the Constitution envisages a participatory model, the lack of priority for government bills and the extensive amendment powers of legislators have weakened the executive’s legislative role. Strengthening the status of government bills and reforming related procedures may therefore enhance legislative effectiveness in Iran.
کلیدواژهها English