نظریه «حاکمیت مشترک نیروی کار و سرمایه» در حقوق شرکت‌های تجارتی ایران

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی ، دانشگاه تهران ،تهران ، ایران

2 دانشیار دانشگاه تهران

چکیده

این مقاله با یک شیوه توصیفی و تحلیلی سعی در پاسخ به این پرسش اساسی داشته است که آیا مدل حاکمیت شرکتی مبتنی بر مشارکت نیروی کار و سرمایه در ساختار شرکت‌های تجارتی ایران قابلیت اعمال را دارد یا خیر؟ نتایج مقاله نشان می‌دهد که علیرغم آنکه نظام حقوقی ایران تاکنون مقرره صریحی در خصوص مشارکت نیروی کار در هیئت‌مدیره شرکت‌های تجارتی نداشته است لیکن ایده اولیه توجه به نیروی کار در مقررات قانونی حاکم بر شرکتهای تجارتی ایران وجود داشته اما برخلاف برخی نظام های حقوقی نظیر آلمان هیچگاه منتهی به مشارکت مستقیم نیروی کار در ساختار مدیریت شرکتهای تجارتی نگردیده است. این در حالی است که مدل حاکمیت مشترک نیروی کار و سرمایه هم از منظر هنجاری و هم از حیث ابزاری می تواند سازوکاری مفید جهت تحقق اهداف حاکمیت شرکتی در نظام حقوقی ایران باشد و پیامدهای مثبتی از حیث کاهش عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی، تشویق سرمایه‌گذاری خاص نیروی کار در شرکت، تأمین منافع سایر ذینفعان شرکتی و توسعه پایدار شرکت تجارتی به ارمغان آورد. این مقاله با ارائه یک سازوکار تدریجی و منطبق با بافت مقررات حقوقی حاکم بر شرکتهای تجارتی ایران مدل حاکمیت مشترک نیروی کار و سرمایه را به‌عنوان یک شیوه جایگزین –دست‌کم در برخی شرکت‌های تجارتی با نیروی کار معتنابه- معرفی نموده است.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

The theory of "participation of labor and capital" in the law of Iranian commercial companies

نویسندگان [English]

  • mostafa kooshki 1
  • hasan badini 2
1 Ph. D. Student, Faculty of Law & Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
2 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law & Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
چکیده [English]

With a descriptive and analytical method, this article has tried to answer the basic question whether the governance model based on labor and capital participation in the structure of Iranian commercial companies can be applicable or not? The results of the article show that despite the fact that Iran's legal system has not had an explicit provision regarding labor participation in the board of directors of commercial companies, however, The basic idea of paying attention to employees has been in the legal regulations governing Iranian commercial companies but unlike some legal systems such as Germany, it has never led to the direct participation of employee in the management structure of commercial companies. Meanwhile, the theory of "participation of labor and capital" can be a useful mechanism for realizing the goals of corporate governance in Iran's legal system, both from a normative and instrumental perspective. This model of corporate governance has positive consequences from the perspective of reducing information asymmetry, encouraging firm-specific investments of the employees in the company, securing the interests of others corporate stakeholders and the sustainable development of a commercial company. By presenting a gradual mechanism and in accordance with the context of the legal regulations governing Iran's commercial companies, this article has introduced the governance model of participation labor and capital as an alternative method - at least in some commercial companies with a large number of workers.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Employees
  • codetermination
  • corporate governance
  • participation of labor and capital
  • law and economics
  1.  کتاب

    1. صقری، محمد، حقوق بازرگانی، شرکت‌ها، جلد 1 و 2، تهران: شرکت سهامی انتشار، چاپ اول، 1393.
    2. طوسی، عباس، تحلیل اقتصادی حقوق شرکت­ها، مؤسسه مطالعات و پژوهش‌های حقوقی، چاپ اول، 1393.

    مقاله

    1. بهشتی، شقایق، ربیعا اسکینی، محمدرضا پاسبان و علی زارع، «طرح تشویقی کارکنان شرکت: سهام تشویقی و سهام ترجیحی با مطالعه در نظام حقوقی انگلستان و ایران»، تحقیقات حقوقی بین‌المللی، دوره 11، شماره 40، 1397.
    2. رستمی، ولی، «مشارکت کارگران در اداره کارگاه»، نشریه کار و جامعه، شماره 20، 1376.
    3. طباطبایی­نژاد، سید محمد، محمود باقری و هدایت فرخانی، «عدم تقارن اطلاعات درحقوق بانکی (مطالعۀ موردی: قراردادهای تسهیلات سندیکایی»، مطالعات حقوق خصوصی، دوره 47، شماره 1، 1396.

     

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